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Foreword
With the avoidance of abject failure earlier this month of the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Bali, the WTO has lived to fight another day but we can hardly count 
the outcome as a clear ‘win’. There is still much to be done to rehabilitate the WTO’s 
importance as international economic institution and restore ‘WTO centrality’ in global 
trade governance. 
The megaregional trading agreements under negotiation – especially the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – would 
shift governance of global trade massively away from the WTO. Never before has the 
WTO faced such intense institutional competition. Competition, however, can bring out 
the best in those involved. 
This VoxEU.org eBook has been put together to collect ideas on how to give the WTO 
a fighting chance in this pending institutional competition. The contributions show how 
this organisation's work programme in the next two to four years can be structured so 
as to build on Bali's success. 
It is hard to disagree with the editors when they conclude:
“… a liberalisation-heavy, negotiation-dominated WTO work programme is a 
non-starter in the near term. For too long this approach has generated more heat 
than light. The polar opposite – drift – risks the WTO being left out in the cold 
as companies and governments move on. The recommendations contained in this 
volume persuade us that a work programme can be cooked up that satisfies enough 
palates, bearing in mind that some tastes are changing as the 21st century progresses 
and others have more settled preferences ... the resulting fare won’t be the promised 
banquets of yesteryear – but it will provide a nutritious, more balanced diet from 
which the WTO can gain in strength over time.”
Building on Bali: A Work Programme for the WTO
viii
The editors compare the recipes contained in this eBook to the porridge favoured by 
Goldilocks – neither too hot nor too cold. Whether they represent porridge or something 
grander, the recipes deserve the close scrutiny of the trade policy community.
Simon Evenett, the co-director of the CEPR's International Trade and Regional 
Economics programme, teamed up with Alejandro Jara, a distinguished trade diplomat 
and former Deputy Director-General of the WTO, to lead this effort. 
Twenty-seven contributions were commissioned for this VoxEU eBook, titled Building 
on Bali. They cover not only the key strategic considerations that should inform the 
WTO membership's deliberations over its near-term work programme but also specific 
recommendations as what the WTO can do in seventeen policy areas.  Simon, Alejandro, 
and I are very grateful to the contributors – all leading trade experts – for their succinct 
and incisive analyses.
We are also grateful for the dedication and commitment of Anil Shamdasani, who 
helped produce this ebook in record time. Many thanks also to Antoine Cerisier, who 
proof-read sections of this volume. Team Vox also edited the column that was published 
along with this eBook.
Stephen Yeo
Chief Executive Officer, CEPR
16 December 2013
1Executive Summary
Simon J Evenett and Alejandro Jara
The successful conclusion of the Bali Ministerial Conference and its terrific reception 
in the international press and from government leaders means that the WTO now has 
the opportunity to restore its fortunes. Talk of the WTO’s demise as a negotiating forum 
has been set aside, at least for now. If, in the coming months, the WTO membership 
takes the right decisions concerning its near-term work programme and assiduously 
follows up, then such talk might be banished for good. 
For sure, the Bali deal addressed only part of the Doha Development Agenda and 
was sealed after its fair share of drama. Still, the run-up to Bali and the Ministerial 
Conference itself showed that creative solutions could be found, that the membership 
is prepared to rally around them, and ultimately, that the prospect of another damaging 
deadlock was unacceptable. How can the WTO build on Bali?
The purpose of this VoxEU eBook is to identify a number of pragmatic, near-term 
options for the WTO’s post-Bali work programme. Twenty-seven contributions were 
commissioned covering both the strategic considerations that will likely shape near-
term deliberations on the WTO’s priorities and the steps that should be taken by the 
WTO membership in the coming years on a wide range of important topics, ranging 
from long-standing staples like agriculture to new big-ticket items, such as electronic 
commerce. What follows here are some reflections of our own, based on these 
contributions and recent developments.
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The fate of the WTO should not hinge on the success of its 
negotiating function
The ultimate purpose of the WTO is not confined to the progressive reduction of state 
favouritism towards domestic commercial interests – it is to discourage the resort to 
favouritism in the first place. That discrimination can take many, many forms. Plus the 
forms of discrimination employed by governments evolve as corporate organisation 
changes (the development of international supply chains being a leading example) and 
new products and services are introduced (a modern example being services provided 
over the internet, to say nothing of 3D printing). 
Successive trade diplomats were far-sighted enough to recognise these facts and they 
constructed a multilateral trading system that involved not only negotiating accords 
to lock-in reforms but also mechanisms to monitor government decision-making, to 
resolve disputes, and to deliberate on the merits of potential future initiatives. For sure, 
this architecture doesn’t deliver results instantly but look at the stalled reform processes 
in many countries – it is not as if national processes operate at light speed either, 
witness labour and agricultural market reform efforts in many industrialised economies. 
Moreover, as the endless negotiations on climate change and voting weights on the IMF 
Executive Board have shown, it has been difficult to reach global deals. 
A very good example of how the system works relates to the explosion in use of 
voluntary export restraints in the 1980s. Rather than raise tariffs by means of safeguard 
measures and thus having to provide compensation, governments induced trading 
partners to limit certain exports. This practice was picked up by the WTO’s predecessor, 
the GATT, in its monitoring of protectionism in the early 1980s, raised alarm bells 
among diplomats in Geneva, was put on the negotiating agenda of the Uruguay Round, 
and a ban on the use of these restraints came into force in 1995.1  This combination of 
the WTO’s 5Ls (Look-Learn-Liaise-Legislate-Litigate) is how the system is supposed 
1 Having said that, the resolution of the recent dispute between China and the EU over solar panels looks involves terms 
that look suspiciously like a voluntary export restraint. 
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to work. The 'legislate' component – the result of negotiation – is an important part but 
it is not the only part. Companies and their employees benefit from every step in what 
these days might be called the WTO’s institutional supply chain.
With this in mind, it is unfortunate to say the least that, in recent years, the WTO’s 
reputation in the eyes of many senior policymakers and commentators is seen solely in 
terms of its capacity to deliver negotiated agreements. To the extent that such agreements 
are associated with slashing trade barriers and the like, it has encouraged some business 
lobbies and negotiators to demand greater and greater levels of ‘ambition’ at a time 
when it is evident that there is not enough appetite for liberalisation among the WTO 
membership. 
Still, as many of the contributions to this volume make clear, even with tempered 
ambition there is plenty that could be negotiated in the next two to four years. To the 
suggestions made by the contributors, we would add one more. Given the sustained 
tendency towards unilateral tariff reform in many developing countries and shrinking 
agricultural support in leading OECD jurisdictions, in the near term there is no harm 
dwelling on how to encourage WTO members to bind more of their autonomous 
initiatives. For example, a push to bind more zero applied tariffs on manufactured 
goods at that level could be part of a package negotiated over the next two to four years.
There is also plenty of valuable work to get done at the WTO that isn’t about closing 
deals. A post-Bali work programme should give prominence to the deliberative as well 
as the dispute settlement functions of the WTO. With respect to dispute settlement this 
amounts to making a virtue out of necessity given this function is already entrenched in 
the WTO rulebook. This is not to imply that the current dispute settlement understanding 
works perfectly. Indeed, in this regard two of the contributions in this eBook contain 
recommendations for improving both compliance with and the utility to developing 
countries of dispute settlement. 
With respect to deliberation, it is not immediately apparent which new multilateral trade 
rules are needed to address the challenges of ‘21st century commerce’, so organised 
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processes of information collection, analysis, and discussion will be needed if sizeable 
constituencies for reform are to develop. Let us be clear, deliberation is meant to be 
an open-minded exploratory process—not a pre-negotiating phase with heavy-handed 
attempts to promote narrow proposals. Recent years have seen a scaling up of the 
transparency-promoting, monitoring, and surveillance functions of the WTO, so there 
is a good base of experience upon which to build. 
We were struck by the number of contributors to this volume that have made 
recommendations that emphasise deliberation or the combination of deliberation and 
negotiation as parts of the work programme that the WTO membership could adopt in 
a number of important areas – ranging from Special and Differential Treatment and Aid 
for Trade to migration and assessing the crisis-era resurgence in industrial policy. Some 
of the steps proposed by our contributors would also have the benefit of strengthening 
the hands of trade ministries in national governments and in publishing information that 
story-hungry media outlets can use, which in turn puts on the defensive the proponents 
of beggar-thy-neighbour steps. 
The mix of deliberation and negotiation will see growing payoffs over time, helping to 
restore the reputation of the WTO. At the moment a WTO work programme that delivers 
step-by-step progress in a number of significant policy areas may pale compared to 
ambitions associated with the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership. But that will change as the exalted ambitions of those mega-
regional deals are confronted with domestic realities. Our money is on the tortoise 
beating the hare. If your money is on the hare, what’s the harm in taking out some 
insurance? 
21st century trade matters – but so does 19th and 20th century 
commerce
One often-heard gripe is that, after 12 years of negotiating the Doha Development 
Agenda, work at the WTO has drifted further and further from the realities of international 
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commerce in the 21st century. It is certainly true that corporate reorganisation and the 
growth of international supply chains, the rise of electronic commerce, and the resort 
to beggar-thy-neighbour measures since the onset of the global economic crisis have 
changed the landscape of world commerce. But many export-oriented farmers still 
face foreign trade barriers and subsidised rivals. And plenty of manufacturers’ export 
plans are frustrated by tariff peaks and many more by a bewildering array of foreign 
regulations and procedures. Alas, cutting-edge commercial developments haven’t 
obviated protectionism inherited from the past.
Indeed, the distinction between 21st century and earlier forms of commerce can be 
somewhat misleading. While it is true, for example, that the existence of international 
supply chains alters the interpretation of trade data and potentially national commercial 
policy priorities, it is worth recalling that what is ‘supplied’ in supply chains are goods 
and services, for which longstanding multilateral trade disciplines exist. Moreover, 
since optimising supply chains implicates many different types of government policy 
any future WTO initiative on such matters may need to cut across existing ‘silos’ of 
the multilateral architecture as well as addressing some matters that have hitherto lay 
outside the WTO’s remit. 
For these reasons, the reality is that what might be referred to as 21st century commerce 
matters, but so does the commerce of yesteryear. The next work programme of the 
WTO should reflect the diversity of contemporary global commerce and, to that end, 
this volume contains recommendations for the WTO’s near-term work programme in 
17 specific areas of public policy. The recommendations for each policy area can be 
found in Section Two of this eBook and the headline recommendations are reproduced 
in the table at the end of this Executive Summary.
For the newer issues, one theme of the recommendations made in this volume is 
that deliberation processes be established before the launch of any negotiation is 
contemplated, not least to help build confidence among the WTO membership. Here 
the less-than-successful experience of the working groups convened to consider the 
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Singapore Issues should inform the design of future deliberative initiatives. The reality 
is that if this matter is poorly handled then some won’t move away from a default 
position of rejecting new areas for negotiation. Beefing up the capacity of the WTO 
Secretariat to provide informative analyses would benefit those WTO Members 
that have less analytical capacity to assess emergent commercial trends, options for 
multilateral cooperation, and supporting national measures. 
Irrespective of the vintage of a trade matter (19th, 20th, or 21st century), many have raised 
the question of whether negotiations on new topics in the WTO must be conducted 
on a multilateral basis. Under what circumstances would the WTO membership agree 
to launch of a negotiation that does not involve every Member? The question further 
arises as to whether any new negotiations should be part of the Single Undertaking of 
the DDA. 
In our view, despite their evident advantages, it is best not to put either multilateral 
accords or the Single Undertaking on pedestals. The principles underlying both 
approaches to negotiations have been honoured more in the breach during the past 
twelve years. How many categories of WTO membership were introduced during the 
Doha Round negotiations to accommodate different circumstances? If multilateral 
approaches were the only formula for success, how can one explain the progress made in 
government procurement in recent years? What about all those Special and Differential 
Treatment provisions included in the supposedly pure Single Undertaking employed 
during the Uruguay Round? Let’s not make the perfect the enemy of the good.
A fresh look at ends and means is needed here. Many, including some of our contributors, 
advocate plurilateral and critical mass approaches. We would point out there is a third 
option, a good example of which being the Bali deal on trade facilitation. The latter 
accord included in it a pragmatic way of tailoring special and differential treatment 
for developing countries to national circumstances. Such ‘bespoke multilateralism’ is 
another option worth considering. The desirability of these three alternative approaches 
will almost certainly vary on a topic-by-topic basis, depending on the types of 
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obligations that might be negotiated and the potential adverse consequences of those 
obligations for any WTO Member that decides not to join a negotiation.  
The Goldilocks solution – not too hot, not too cold
So, in general terms, how can the WTO build on Bali? The starting point is surely 
to recognise that, while the Bali Ministerial Declaration was a relief, a huge dose of 
realism is in order. The liberalising zeal of many is evidently not shared by enough of 
the WTO membership. Frustration has led some to undertake further trade liberalisation 
outside of the WTO – indeed, the mega-RTAs under negotiation may overshadow 
developments at the WTO in the near term. The move towards a multipolar world 
continues. In many WTO Members faltering economic recoveries haven’t helped. For 
sure, this isn’t going to be plain sailing. 
Yet Bali has provided an opening and this opportunity must be seized. Clearly a 
liberalisation-heavy negotiation-dominated WTO work programme is a non-starter 
in the near term. For too long this approach has generated more heat than light. The 
polar opposite – drift – risks the WTO being left out in the cold as companies and 
governments move on. Like Goldilocks, our taste is for porridge that is neither too hot 
nor too cold. 
The recommendations contained in this volume persuade us that a work programme 
can be cooked up that satisfies enough palates, bearing in mind that some tastes are 
changing as the 21st century progresses and others have more settled preferences. Plus 
the chefs involved need to deploy all of the utensils at their disposal, reflecting the 
full range of the WTO’s functions. For now the resulting fare won’t be the promised 
banquets of yesteryear – but it will provide a nutritious, more balanced diet from which 
the WTO can gain in strength over time.
Building on Bali: A Work Programme for the WTO
8
Contents and organisation of the remainder of this eBook
The overall goal here is to provide in a single volume a comprehensive set of strategic 
considerations and topic-specific suggestions that can inform the deliberations among 
the WTO membership on the post-Bali work programme. We deliberately chose to 
release this VoxEU eBook once matters settled down after Bali – providing an input that 
governments and those interested in the WTO could digest over the calm of the holiday 
period and during the lull at the beginning of the new calendar year. Rome was not built 
in a day and the next work programme of the WTO need not be chosen overnight or in 
response to some artificial very near-term deadline.
Twenty-seven distinct analyses were prepared for this eBook by leading experts on 
international trade policy. Some contributors are current or former senior officials. Other 
contributors are legal practitioners and experts based in academia. A wide range of 
expertise was deliberately tapped. These analyses have direct implications for all three 
of the WTO’s main functions – namely, negotiation, dispute settlement, and monitoring 
and deliberation. Furthermore, together the contributions speak to the interests of every 
group of WTO Members. 
In almost every case, these analyses were prepared in the aftermath of the Bali 
Ministerial Conference. The few that weren’t haven’t become dated either because of 
the subject matter in question or because of the focus on longer-standing matters. No 
attempt was made to reconcile different positions, nor was there an attempt to come to 
a common view. 
The only request made to all contributors was that they spelt out not only good ideas but 
also suggestions for a work programme for the WTO during the next two years and the 
two years that follow, that is, from Bali through to the next two Ministerial Conferences 
(MC10 and MC11, respectively). 
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It made sense to organise the contributions into two sections. The first section comprises 
seven contributions that make observations about the broader strategic choices available 
to the WTO membership as they decide the post-Bali work programme.
The second section comprises 20 topic-specific contributions, ranging from significant 
items that have long been on the WTO agenda to those that are relatively new. Some 
may object to the decision not to include non-agricultural market access as a separate 
item; however, as readers will discover, a number of contributors make reference to this 
important matter, as we did here.
In most cases there is one contribution per topic in Section Two. However, some 
topics are sufficiently broad in scope (specifically, agriculture, dispute settlement, and 
electronic commerce) that two contributions were included.
Each of the contributions in Section Two includes specific recommendations for 
the post-Bali work programme. To make it easier for readers to take away the most 
important recommendations, as well as to gauge the totality of those recommendations, 
these recommendations are summarised in the table that follows. Next to each entry are 
the page numbers where the recommendations are spelt out in more detail. 
About the authors
Simon J. Evenett is Professor of International Trade and Economic Development at 
the University of St Gallen, Switzerland; Co-Director of the CEPR’s programme on 
International Trade and Regional Economics, and Coordinator of the Global Trade 
Alert, the independent trade policy monitoring initiative.
Alejandro Jara is the former Ambassador of Chile to the WTO and Chair of the 
Services Negotiations (2000-2005), former Deputy Director-General of WTO (2005 – 
2013), and presently Senior Counsel, King & Spalding LLP (Geneva).
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Table 1   Topic-by-topic elements of a potential post-Bali work programme for the 
WTO
Topic Elements of a potential work programme Pages
Investment Launch a preparatory process that would:
•	 Raise awareness among WTO members of the profound 
changes in global investment flows
•	 Undertake a systemic analysis of the terms and coverage 
of existing BITs and RTAs, including existing investment 
liberalisation commitments
•	 Explore alternative definitions of investment and standards 
of protection
•	 Examine investment-related aspects of sustainability and 
corporate social responsibility
•	 Explore the relative merits of investor-state dispute 
settlement mechanisms
•	 Examine potential plurilateral and other options for new 
WTO disciplines on investment
67-74
Plurilateral 
and Critical 
Mass Accords
By the next Ministerial:
•	 Establish a framework and set of procedures for a critical 
mass and/or a club-of-clubs approach
•	 Agree procedural modifications to the consensus rule.  
By MC11 at least two new agreements negotiated under the 
agreed procedures should be in place.
75-80
Aid for Trade •	 Over the next two years WTO members should streamline 
the Aid for Trade Initiative by focusing solely on trade-
related projects. In line with this approach, the Aid for 
Trade Work Programme for 2014-2015 should focus on 
aid for trade on projects associated with the Bali trade 
facilitation accord, with the implementation of unilateral 
reforms and regional trade agreements, with supporting 
the implementation of WTO rules by new members, and 
with building the trade policy infrastructure that many 
countries negotiating their accession are missing.
•	 Before MC11, the WTO should establish independent 
body to undertake searching evaluation of Aid for Trade, 
highlighting where such aid has the biggest impact on 
trade and development.
81-86
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Topic Elements of a potential work programme Pages
Special and 
Differential 
Treatment
To complement to the Review on S&D announced at Bali, 
WTO members should launch a preparatory process that would 
•	 Explore more objective, potentially quantifiable, 
approaches to differentiation among WTO members, 
bearing in mind the forms of SDT vary across policy 
domain
•	 Examine alternative potential graduation mechanisms 
partly drawing upon the experience of such mechanisms 
in existing WTO accords (such as Articles 27.5 and 
27.6 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures)
WTO members would commit to conclude negotiations on a 
graduation mechanism by the next Ministerial Conference.
87-92
Dispute 
Settlement
Steps could be taken to improve compliance by:
•	 Giving more resources to the WTO secretariat so that 
panel and compliance proceedings are concluded in a 
more timely fashion
•	 Consider alternative procedures that in effect 
“multilateralise” disputes so that all WTO members are 
parties to each dispute
•	 Explore steps to simplify arbitration panel proceedings
•	 Explore reviving the use of suggestions pursuant to Article 
19.1 of the DSU
•	 Consider means to strengthen penalties for late 
compliance
With respect to the role of developing countries in dispute 
settlement, WTO members could:
•	 Review associated S&D provisions, including considering 
the pros and cons of deleting Art. 22.3bis DSU and Art. 
22.4 DSU in favour of Art. 28 DSU
•	 Explore the pros and cons of building a bridge between 
27.2 DSU to Art. 28 DSU, a move that would ensure that 
developing countries get an opinion about the legal merits 
of pursuing a dispute and the funding to launch productive 
consultations. The required text for this recommendation 
should be drafted for the next WTO ministerial. 
•	 Explore the pros and cons of building a bridge between 
Art. 27.2 and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL).
93-104
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Topic Elements of a potential work programme Pages
Agriculture By the next WTO Ministerial:
•	 Agree a market access package that includes tariff cuts 
(along the lines spelt out in the draft modalities in Rev4), 
a Special Safeguards Mechanism with appropriate 
provisions against long term abuse, and certain disciplines 
on export bans and taxes for basic grains and oilseeds
•	 Secure agreement to finally eliminate export subsidies 
and other forms of export competition in agricultural trade 
according to a negotiated timetable, potentially as part of a 
plurilateral accord as such elimination does not implicate 
every WTO member
•	 Agree terms on domestic support regimes (along the 
lines spelt out in the draft modalities in Rev4) and clarify 
the criteria for so-called blue and green box subsidies, 
including those relating to food security policies that were 
the subject of controversy at Bali
Establish a separate work programme on the trade-related 
aspects of food security, identifying better practices for 
government initiatives in this area and implications for 
multilateral trade rules. This work programme would report on 
its deliberations at MC11.
105-120
Services •	 Establish a Working Group to examine the operation 
of provisions in RTAs relating to “mutual equivalence” 
of regulations and their potential application at the 
multilateral level. Report to MC10 on the findings of this 
Working Group.
•	 Before the 10th Ministerial Conference, Member States 
could agree on a broad decision, pursuant to Article 
VI(4) of GATS, to apply disciplines to national services 
regulation to ensure that they are not more burdensome 
than is necessary to achieve the relevant regulatory goal. 
121-126
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Topic Elements of a potential work programme Pages
Mutual 
Recognition
Over a four-year horizon, that is in the run up to 11th  
Ministerial Conference, Member States could agree on: 
•	 specific sectors in which they would engage in majority 
voting with respect to harmonisation of regulation for 
goods and services  
•	 provisions for opt-outs where important national concerns 
are implicated, as well as technical assistance to ensure 
full participation of developing countries  
In a complementary arrangement, Member States could also 
agree to interpret Article I:1 of GATT and the MFN provisions 
of the TBT Agreement and SPS Agreement to clarify 
authorisation for “open” recognition agreements relating to 
goods, similar to the permission contained in Article VII of 
GATS, in sectors not covered by their agreement for majority 
voting on harmonisation. 
127-132
Local Content 
Requirements
Launch discussions in 2014 among interested parties on the 
elements and merits of a potential plurilateral accord on local 
content requirements that contain could include new disciplines 
on the use of such policies, reporting requirements, enhanced 
monitoring, expedited consultations for dispute settlement, as 
well as procedures to accede to any such accord.
133-142
Exchange 
Rates
Before the next Ministerial Conference:
•	 WTO members should reassess the extent and instruments 
for cooperation with the IMF, including the joint 
preparation of an external sector report (covering trade, 
financial, monetary and exchange rate policies)
•	 WTO members should invite the G20 to integrate trade 
and associated policies into its Mutual Assessment 
Process
143-148
Climate 
Change
By the next Ministerial Conference WTO member should 
commence negotiations on “green” trade liberalisation 
including
•	 Agreeing a target date for the adoption of duty-free 
treatment of covered products
•	 Negotiation of a plurilateral or critical mass accord that 
also included modification of the Agreement of Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures for certain classes of “green 
subsidies”
•	 Conclusion of an “informal” accord on the exercise of 
self-restraint in imposing new trade defence measures on 
“green” products
•	 Preparation for negotiations on fossil fuel subsidies
149-154
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Topic Elements of a potential work programme Pages
Electronic 
Commerce
Revive the WTO Work Programme on Electronic Commerce 
over the next four years by:
Negotiating higher de minimis levels for customs procedures
•	 Work closely with the United Postal Union to create 
binding rules for international postal communication and 
cooperation
•	 Create an electronic platform containing information on 
each Member’s consumer rights legislation
•	 Discourage actions that seek to disconnect portions of the 
Internet or that give preference to certain services over 
others
With respect to data flows and related digital trade barriers, 
should a review of existing multilateral disciplines identify 
deficiencies given the rapid development of electronic 
commerce, WTO members would negotiate a horizontal 
discipline to deal with all trade-related aspects of data for 
goods and services alike which would, where appropriate, 
include a necessity test for any state imposed restrictions on 
data flows motivated by non-commercial considerations.
155-168
State-Linked 
Enterprises
In the run up to the 10th Ministerial Conference the WTO 
membership could consider 
•	 Adopting more extensive rules on transparency and 
disclosure of internationally active state-linked companies
•	 Reconsider the current interpretation of the relationship 
between Article XVII(a) and Article XVII:1(b) which 
implies that there is no separate obligation applied 
to state trading enterprises to operate in accordance 
with commercial considerations.  Re-establishing 
such a commercial considerations obligation would be 
tantamount to having a competition-law-type obligation 
on state enterprises.
•	 Explore the pros and cons of allowing, for the purposes of 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
state-linked enterprises to be considered as “state bodies” 
as a result implying that any subsidies granted by these 
enterprises fall within existing WTO disciplines.
169-176
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Topic Elements of a potential work programme Pages
Crisis-era 
Industrial 
Policy
A Working Group would be established that, having established 
the relevant facts concerning crisis-era industrial policy 
interventions and experience from earlier eras, reports to the 
10th Ministerial Conference on the results of the following 
work programme:
•	 Identification, for each broad motive for industrial policy, 
the types of government intervention that do not raise 
concerns from the perspective of non-discrimination. 
“Safe harbours” for industrial policy interventions would 
thereby be established.
•	 Identification of the circumstances where effective 
industrial policy intervention does not involve violating 
the Most Favoured Nation principle.
•	 Identification and statement of better practices for the 
processes that WTO members should follow when 
considering industrial policy interventions, in particular 
those interventions that might harm foreign commercial 
interests.
•	 Statement of principles for the periodic review of 
industrial policy interventions, including the potential 
for the removal or amendment of the intervention being 
reviewed.
•	 Consideration of ways to encourage the phasing out of 
discriminatory industrial policy interventions taken in 
recent years or, where possible, the substitution of more 
discriminatory policy instruments with less discriminatory 
alternatives. 
177-182
Export 
Taxes and 
Restrictions
The work programme would include:
•	 Further consideration of existing proposals concerning 
export restraints (for example, that submitted by Japan) 
and any proposals subsequently submitted by WTO 
members
•	 Consideration of the pros and cons of linking any 
multilateral disciplines on export restraints to new rules on 
import tariff escalation (as suggested by the Cairns Group)
•	 Identification and examination of alternative potential 
exemptions from multilateral rules on export restraints on 
account of food shortages
•	 Consideration of the treatment of acceded WTO members 
that already have legal obligations on the exercise of 
export restraints
183-188
Topic Elements of a potential work programme Pages
Technology 
Transfer
Before the next Ministerial Conference WTO members could 
commit to:
•	 Complete the expanded International Technology 
Agreement
•	 Conclude negotiations to open R&D services, ranging 
from equipment purchases and testing protocols to grant 
management and accounting and beyond, to competition, 
whether through GATS or, should it come into the WTO 
fold, the Trade in Services Agreement
Before MC11 WTO members would negotiate a plurilateral 
agreement to significantly liberalise skilled-labour flows under 
the framework of an innovation zone work visa.  
189-196
Migration The WTO Secretariat should collect data on the migration 
agreements have been signed in the last decade to identify their 
scope and definitions and the extent of their discrimination 
between source countries. With this data WTO members could 
over the next four years:
•	 Negotiate an agreement in which Mode 4 concessions are 
requested and offered but which all parties accept can be 
over-ruled by any party by reference to its visa policy
•	 Consider the pros and cons of negotiating a framework 
agreement which governed bilateral arrangements 
in Mode 4, recognising their lack of MFN (i.e. their 
discriminatory nature) but nonetheless offering to make 
them enforceable through WTO processes
197-202
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How to Reassert the WTO’s 
Negotiating Authority
Stuart Harbinson
The WTO today: unique, inclusive, yet partly outdated
The WTO still provides the most inclusive forum for global trade rule-making. 
Nowhere else is it possible to have a policy dialogue between such a large number 
of governments responsible for such diverse economies. This diversity and (almost) 
universality is an enormous strength. It also makes it difficult to achieve results in trade
negotiations. We should not be surprised about that, or become too despondent when 
the negotiating train sometimes hits the buffers. It’s important to keep talking and keep 
trying. The WTO adds unique and irreplaceable value to discussions and negotiations 
about trade policy.
But some current WTO rules, inherited from the GATT, are still predicated on the 
outdated assumption that a product is made solely in one country and then traded 
across a border to another country. WTO rules are also compartmentalised; there are 
separate rules for trade in goods, trade in services, and for the trade-related aspects 
of intellectual property rights. These features are increasingly at odds with modern, 
integrated business practices, which have been revolutionised by technological progress 
over the past 25 years.
These practices are increasingly characterised by the fragmentation of production into 
global networks and value chains, by growing trade in intermediate products, by greatly 
increased use of digital interconnectedness for trade, by the integration of goods and 
services, and by the growth of services trade in itself. To be sure, not all economies and 
businesses share these characteristics. But nor can it be argued that they are the preserve 
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of advanced economies and big business. China and East Asia have used them as a 
powerful development tool to lift millions out of poverty. Technology-enabled small 
businesses, entrepreneurs and individuals around the world are also at the forefront of 
the transformation. Technology is empowering global consumers and driving the rise of 
the so-called ‘micro-multinational’.
Act now or face a patchwork of regulations
At the WTO, the Doha Round has been in a state of paralysis. Success at the Bali 
Ministerial Conference, while extremely welcome, will not transform perceptions of 
the WTO’s effectiveness as a negotiating forum overnight. In the short to medium term, 
governments will continue to put most of their energy into the slew of major preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs) already under negotiation. Too much political capital has been 
invested in these to permit a sudden change in course now. The WTO will still be on 
the backburner, but Bali has provided some breathing space in which governments can 
reflect on the WTO’s future work programme and explore options for renovating the 
multilateral trading system over the longer term.
In terms of providing a rational policy framework within which businesses can 
operate to maximum potential, the landscape of current and potential PTAs is at 
best ambiguous.  On the one hand there is an ever-increasing overlap of PTAs. For 
example, a world in which the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and other bilateral agreements such as EU-Japan co-
exist would seem to be interconnected and open to possible consolidation in due course. 
Countries with common membership in such structures could assume the responsibility 
to minimise divergence.
On the other hand, the new generation of ‘mega-preferential’ PTAs – such as TPP, TTIP, 
the mooted Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) and the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) – also appear to be driven, to varying degrees, by 
geopolitical/strategic considerations, which may in some cases cut across economically 
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rational production networks. The RCEP (comprising the ten ASEAN countries and 
their existing FTA partners) would include some countries which are also tied into the 
TPP – and possibly tied to the EU through separate bilateral arrangements as well.  But 
it would also include countries such as China and India, which do not have those links. 
These potential new ‘mega-preferential’ agreements also aspire to go much deeper than 
traditional PTAs in terms of addressing ‘behind-the-border’ issues. They cover regulatory 
coherence or convergence, and also deal with polocies towards competition, investment 
and the environment, which are currently largely outside the WTO framework. These 
negotiations are more about how to regulate than how to lower tariffs.
Unless the WTO can restore its primacy in rule-making we may be headed for a 
patchwork system of bewildering complexity in which different regulatory systems co-
exist within the same country and/or in which different regulatory systems in groups of 
countries compete with each other. While this tendency may be mitigated somewhat by 
individual governments striving for internal and external coherence, such a framework 
is suboptimal for large businesses and unworkable for small businesses with limited 
capacity to grapple with the associated complexities. 
It is also important to note that it is generally the biggest and most powerful economies 
which are driving these ‘mega-preferential’ agreements. The broad mass of small 
developing countries is being sidelined and disenfranchised and will simply have to live 
with the consequences. This is not a desirable model for a 21st century trading system.
What next? Work with what we have
The question is: Can the WTO reinvent itself with modern rules and an efficient 
negotiating system? It is tempting to suggest root and branch reform given the 
obsolescence of some aspects of the WTO model, but this is unlikely to happen in the 
real world. We have to work with what we have. Opportunities do exist to update the 
system and breathe new life into the WTO’s negotiating machinery.
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WTO Members should return from Bali in a much more flexible state of mind. Even 
if they have had some success, they should now explicitly acknowledge that the Doha 
Round, as originally conceived in terms of both scope and organisation, is no longer 
viable. They should review, amend, and trim down the Doha negotiating agenda and 
adopt a more flexible approach than the all-embracing ‘single undertaking’. They 
should also be prepared to add new issues to the WTO’s work programme, whether in 
terms of negotiations or exploratory discussions, with a view to updating the system. 
They should focus on making practical progress as, when, and how, they can.
By way of illustration, Members could:
•	 review the Doha mandate on rules negotiations: which elements of the mandate 
remain priorities, which might be discarded, and which might be strengthened?
•	 reactivate the working groups on investment and competition (which remain 
technically in existence), with a view to identifying elements for future negotiations;
•	 consider which elements of the work programme on electronic commerce might 
be prioritised for negotiations (for example, the interface between e-commerce and 
trade facilitation, which is a key issue for many small businesses); and
•	 consider whether and how to develop work to date on trade and exchange rates.
Members should also raise their sights in terms of considering the future direction 
of international trade policy and how the WTO can more effectively promote the 
multilateral trading system. We need serious debates about trade policy rather than 
political point scoring. A working group might be established with a mandate to make 
recommendations on improving the functioning of the WTO.
Some may regard this is as a betrayal of the Doha ‘Development Agenda’, but the 
truth is that this was always just a label. Doha was conceived as a balanced agenda 
rather than a one-way street, as the negotiating history amply demonstrates. The WTO’s 
development mandate will endure through the composition of its membership. 
How to Reassert the WTO’s Negotiating Authority
23
The possibility of reaching plurilateral agreements within the WTO framework is one 
avenue that should be kept in mind, while being aware of the dangers of discrimination. 
Since plurilateralism is in vogue, it is better to contain this within the WTO where 
possible, rather than to run the risk of arbitrary fragmentation of the trading system 
through arrangements outside the WTO. The plurilateral approach may be useful as a 
testing ground for developing new rules in areas not presently covered by WTO. Proper 
safeguards would be needed for non-participants. It is not necessary at this stage to be 
prescriptive on the precise areas to which this technique might apply – better that this 
should emerge organically from deliberations under a revised work programme. 
Having said this, it should be recognised that we do not really know what the long-term 
consequences of adding new plurilateral agreements to the WTO might be. Possibly 
they would be ‘multilateralised’ in due course, in the same way the Tokyo Round codes 
were multilateralised in the Uruguay Round, but we cannot be certain that history would 
repeat itself in the same way. Furthermore, the difficulties of achieving the consensus 
necessary to include such agreements in Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement should not 
be underestimated. 
The ‘critical mass’ technique may be a more promising avenue for building multilateral 
agreement. A major opportunity to test this approach has recently presented itself in the 
form of China’s interest in joining the TiSA negotiations. China has hitherto been firm 
in its support for the fully multilateral approach of the Doha single undertaking. Here 
the domestic reform agenda appears to have triggered a change.
Some may point to recent experience with the ITA “critical mass” talks – which have 
again been suspended owing to the alleged dissatisfaction of other participants with 
China’s offer – as an indication that China is unwilling to be sufficiently forthcoming 
in this type of negotiation. However, the final outcome of the ITA negotiations remains 
to be seen. 
China’s offer to take part in the TiSA negotiations presents an historic opportunity. 
Its inclusion in the TiSA talks would break the current WTO mould and potentially 
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reconfigure and re-energise services negotiations. It would make it much more likely 
that TiSA could be brought back into the WTO, since more countries would be likely 
to follow China’s lead. Services negotiations would at last assume the importance they 
have long warranted in the WTO. Bearing in mind the potential of China’s services 
economy, the inclusion of China in the TiSA talks could well be a game changer for the 
WTO, for China and for the world at large. 
A crucial question is how China and other potential new participants might be brought 
into the TiSA negotiations. A deal concluded among existing participants and then 
offered to others on ‘accession’ terms may well be unpalatable. But if new participants 
can be included into the ongoing negotiations at an appropriate point, we may have 
the makings of a critical mass, leading ultimately to a fully multilateral agreement. 
A multilateral agreement in trade in services would be a huge accomplishment – and 
could be the catalyst for similar initiatives in other areas.
A five-pronged approach
In summary, the WTO could begin to reassert its negotiating authority and effectiveness 
through:
•	 reviewing the current work programme to prioritise practical, modernising 
initiatives;
•	 engaging in serious policy discussions on the future of the global trading system and 
how to improve the effectiveness of the WTO;
•	 concluding stand alone multilateral agreements (such as trade facilitation) wherever 
feasible;
•	 exploring possible avenues to update the rule book through new Annex 4 plurilateral 
agreements; and
•	 using ‘critical mass’ techniques to build multilateral agreement, especially in trade 
in services.
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The Post-Bali Agenda
Gary Horlick
Numerous post-Bali agendas are already being discussed in wake of the 9th WTO 
Ministerial Conference. The most important outcomes of MC9, especially the successful 
role of DG Azevedo, lead to new opportunities for the WTO and its Members to move 
forward – if they can.
While the WTO cannot take on all of these agendas, or even solve any one of them 
completely, the Members have to be more ambitious than in the past 20 years.
It is literally inexplicable (meaning that I have tried without success to explain to 
very intelligent heads of businesses around the world) why the WTO in 12 years and 
counting since Doha was launched has not been able to get beyond its preoccupation 
with cutting a 7.4% tariff to 3.2% in six uneven tranches, rather than simply cut all 
tariffs to zero, as occurs in many RTAs (which, not at all coincidentally, eliminates a 
raft of paperwork concerning valuation and classification, although, not unfortunately, 
rules of origin).  This includes taking seriously challenges in areas such as reforms of 
the DSU, where Members have been blocking even minor reforms while discussing 
whether there should be one hearing or two.
At least some of the 21th century agenda has been taken on by the WTO. The work 
on trade facilitation at Bali is a good start on the most traditional of trade issues. 
Why does it cost US$5.60 to send a small parcel from Washington to Los Angeles 
(approximately 4,000 km) but $19.95 to send the same parcel 1,500 km to Canada – a 
country with which the US has had zero tariffs for 15 years and a comprehensive free 
trade agreement?
The WTO has to take on the challenges of the trading system that will increasingly 
be driven by the internet, including but not limited to global supply chains, and 
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indeed dealing with the disaggregation of at least some global supply chains as they 
are replaced by direct contacts through the internet.  The decision to adopt what is in 
essence a ‘positive’ list approach in TiSA is not encouraging in that regard.
Finally, the WTO does not need to take on all of the climate change/public health/other 
looming agendas, but there are major trade components in each of those areas and the 
WTO cannot afford to botch them, whether by action or inaction.
What are those agendas?
•	 Most obviously, there is an agriculture agenda, left over from prior GATT and WTO 
rounds.  Excellent work was done in the Doha negotiations on domestic support, 
export subsidies and other areas, but it is still a challenge for the WTO to make 
sure that the topic is finally closed out.  An effort needs to be made early to explore 
what other parts of the Doha negotiations can be salvaged.  The effort in December 
2013 is a very small sample of some of the excellent work done in areas ranging 
from agriculture, as discussed above, through rules on regional trade agreements 
[e.g defining ‘substantially all trade’] to even some common sense (though under-
ambitious) reforms to the economic illiteracy of the Antidumping Agreement 
(which defines profit by excluding unprofitable sales, just as Enron, Parmalat, and, 
it appears, numerous large financial institutions did).  But the Doha negotiations 
left out really important topics, notably on subsidies disciplines (especially for the 
environment and energy/minerals), safeguards (in the wake of several WTO dispute 
rulings), state influence on enterprises and so on. 
•	 A serious examination of development and trade, based on the serious thinking 
about development going on around the world (except, perhaps, in some trade 
ministries that assume that development always requires high tariffs).
•	 There is a complex ‘global value chain’ agenda.  For example, agriculture includes 
transportation, marketing, research, and much else.
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•	 Where does the internet economy fit?  Is it Mode 5 of GATS or is it ‘Mode 10 plus’ 
(adding up Modes 1+2+3+4 which equals 10, plus the GATT, the GATS and still 
more)?
•	 Ignoring climate change will not make it go away, and resolving the climate change 
challenge will involve important considerations of the trading regime.
•	 Related to the climate change agenda, but separate, is the energy/minerals agenda. 
The WTO and its Members now struggle with issues long thought (mistakenly) to 
be outside the purview of the GATT/WTO system, in the form of dispute settlement 
cases on export restraints, local content, import substitution, forced localisation, 
and so on.
•	 A public health agenda, with trade issues including pharmaceutical prices and 
tobacco controls, starts to present itself in the context of rising healthcare costs.
It is probably too early to decide what the post-Bali agendas are for the WTO and the 
multilateral system, but it is certainly not too early to start developing that agenda. 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Bali was the cooperation of the EU, China, and 
the US, which bodes well for the future.
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Multilateral Trade Cooperation post-
Bali: Three Suggestions
Bernard Hoekman
Efforts to negotiate liberalisation and new rules of the game have increasingly shifted 
away from the WTO. Major preferential trade agreements are being negotiated among 
small groups of countries, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and a Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). 
These follow on a large number of bilateral trade agreements that have already been 
negotiated by countries that are pursuing aggressive trade liberalisation and integration 
strategies in Europe, Latin America and East Asia. Whatever the reasons for the lack of 
movement in the WTO to further liberalise trade and define new rules of the game (see 
Wolfe 2013), the action today has moved to other fora.
A key question is what the consequences will be for the many countries that are not 
players in the mega-regionals. The WTO as a multilateral institution is particularly 
important to small countries that do not have any market power. A breakdown in the 
ability of the WTO to extend the reach of disciplines to new policy areas may impact 
most detrimentally on the 100+ countries that are not included in the mega-regionals. 
These countries have options that they can pursue in the WTO. These include: (1) using 
the WTO as a forum to engage on policies that are currently not covered by the WTO; 
(2) learning about (from) the PTAs; and (3) using plurilateral agreements under the 
umbrella of the WTO to cooperate in new areas that are of interest to a subset of the 
membership. 
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1. The WTO as a focal point for policy dialogue and learning 
There are many policies not covered by the WTO that generate negative pecuniary 
spillovers. A precondition for cooperation on such policy areas is a shared recognition 
of the extent of negative spillovers and the benefits of cooperation. No mechanism exists 
in the WTO that provides a platform to identify and discuss how policies impact on 
trade costs and investment location decisions. Creating mechanisms that help identify 
how policies impact on economic outcomes/incentives and whether there are important 
‘gaps’ in the coverage of WTO rules would, at a minimum, be informative. But greater 
understanding may also support unilateral action by governments seeking to improve 
the competitiveness of firms located in their jurisdictions and, over time, prepare the 
ground for new agreements or the deepening of existing disciplines.  
In Hoekman (2013a) I suggested one option to move in this direction while at the 
same time engaging more with business: establishing ‘supply chain councils’ that 
would focus on identifying the most binding regulatory policy constraints that affect 
negatively supply chain trade (SCT). Doing this for a number of ‘representative’ supply 
chain networks could help to both improve the understanding of policymakers of how 
a broad variety of regulatory policies affect SCT and identify priority policy areas 
that should be the focus of WTO members—including policies that currently are not 
covered by WTO accords. This type of exercise could become the basis of an eventual 
SCT agreement that addresses policy matters that are relevant to the operation of global 
value chains. Such an agreement could be plurilateral in nature and most likely would 
be, given differences in interests and preferences across WTO members.
2. Engaging with the PTAs: Transparency and learning 
PTAs offer opportunities as well as potential downsides for non-members. Innovations 
in PTAs that are successful may be transferable. Over time, WTO Members may come 
to the view that approaches that have proved successful in a PTA context should be 
incorporated into the WTO. A precondition for this is learning about what is done and 
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what works. This can be facilitated by the WTO Secretariat. Ideally, PTA signatories 
would provide information and share their experiences of implementation with the 
broader WTO membership. But independent of whatever PTA members are willing to 
provide in this regard, the WTO Secretariat could be mandated to analyse and report 
on the specific processes or approaches that have been implemented in PTAs and to 
assess their economic impacts. Current monitoring of PTAs by the Secretariat focuses 
primarily on documenting the provisions of PTAs. This is not particularly informative 
for countries seeking to understand what is entailed in implementing those provisions 
and the outcomes that are generated. 
3. Plurilateral agreements under the WTO umbrella
Article II.3 WTO offers a little used mechanism for members to form a club to advance 
an agenda of common interest without necessarily extending the benefits to other WTO 
Members: a Plurilateral Agreement (PA). The main PA extant is the Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA), which deals with a subject that is not covered by 
WTO disciplines. There has been limited use of PAs to date because WTO Members 
have taken the view that agreements should be multilateral and cover all Members. As 
the world increasingly fragments into different regional blocs, this rationale has become 
much less compelling – variable geometry is unavoidable. Given that the counterfactual 
increasingly is a PTA, greater effort to pursue PA among subsets of WTO Members – 
on subjects such as global value chains, green goods and services, investment policies, 
competition policy, and so on – offers a viable mechanism for new rule-making in the 
WTO.
PAs offer a number of benefits relative to PTAs. They can be – and most likely will be 
– issue-specific; there is no need for complex issue linkage. They are open; any country 
can join if, and when, it perceives membership and implementation of the relevant 
disciplines to be in its interest. This is not the case with mega-regionals such as the TPP, 
TTIP or most PTAs.  PAs can make use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms. 
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They are also more transparent to outsiders. Any PA will involve the establishment of 
the types of WTO bodies that assist Members in the implementation of agreements, 
such as a committee, with regular (annual) reporting on activities to the Council, and 
documentation that is open to all WTO Members. A constraint in pursuing PAs is 
that their adoption into the WTO is subject to consensus. While presumably intended 
to ensure that any PA is consistent with the objectives of the WTO (for example, a 
proposed PA does not address an issue that has very little to do with trade), consensus is 
arguably too strong a constraint. Relaxing the consensus requirement – for example, by 
accepting that ‘substantial coverage’ of world trade or production is sufficient (Hufbauer 
and Schott 2012) – would still ensure that truly controversial issues can be rejected.
Moving forward
A necessary condition for operationalising the forgoing suggestions is leadership by 
some WTO Members. Given that the US and EU are fully engaged in mega-regional 
initiatives, this leadership must come from other countries. In the GATT years, one 
approach that was used to identify potential gains from multilateral cooperation on 
new issues was to agree on a work programme. Services provide an example. After the 
failed 1982 Ministerial where a US suggestion to negotiate on services was rejected, 
a work programme was agreed involving a series of national studies and dialogue 
on services policies.  A similar approach can be followed now. In the next two years 
(that is, in the period leading up to the next Ministerial), countries that are out of the 
mega-regionals and/or want to move forward in new areas can create working groups 
where technical issues are worked out and specific proposals developed. This would 
include matters such as establishing what information members of mega-regionals are 
willing to provide, what the Secretariat should be asked to do, and how to organise a 
mechanism to promote policy dialogue and learning. The objective would be to put 
forward a proposed agreement on enhancing the transparency of – and learning from – 
PTAs and a mechanism to promote greater analysis-based dialogue and interaction on 
economic policies affecting trade and investment at the next Ministerial in 2015. 
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Working groups can also be formed in the post-Bali period to focus on specific policy 
areas that are of interest to a subset of the WTO Members. This would be similar to 
the groups formed to assess the Singapore issues after 1997, with the difference that 
the presumption would be that the focus of cooperation would be to conclude new 
plurilateral agreements. A two-year period of deliberation should suffice to identify 
an agenda for negotiation-cum-cooperation. Specific agreements and modalities of 
cooperation could then be negotiated with a view to putting them forward at the 11th 
Ministerial Conference in 2017, i.e. four years from now.
The lack of progress in the DDA should not be taken to imply a lack of relevance of 
the WTO. Multilateral negotiations have become more complex because developing 
countries have interests they are pursuing and objectives they want to achieve. At the 
end of the day, it is likely that the majors – China, India, the EU and the US – will 
come back to the multilateral negotiating table, whether or not the mega-regionals are 
successful. Much can be done in the interim to use the WTO to better understand what 
is done in the new vintage PTAs and whether this is worth emulating, and to pursue 
the opportunities that exist for subsets of countries to agree on plurilateral cooperation 
under the umbrella of the WTO.  The proposals sketched out above would support such 
processes.1 
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Simplify and Complete the DDA 
Clemens  Boonekamp
Negotiators at the WTO’s 9th Ministerial Conference (MC9) in Bali deserve enormous 
credit for arriving at a deal. It greatly improves the credibility of the WTO. However, 
it is a small deal, low hanging fruit, and it does not clearly strengthen the system: the 
trade facilitation accord is largely ‘best efforts’ and food security leaves a potential hole 
in the disciplines on agricultural support. Nevertheless, the result in Bali could present 
an opportunity to complete the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and to leave no 
doubt that the WTO is the sine qua non of international trade. Failing this, enthusiasm 
could continue to grow for regional trade agreements (RTAs), such as the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In 
fact, they carry the seeds of an alternate trading system, which would not be global and 
is potentially very divisive.
Matters such as these, and others including the now wilful breaches of agricultural 
support commitments, should be handled fully in accord with WTO principles and 
jurisprudence; the aim should be to strengthen a welfare-enhancing single system, 
rather than drift away from it. For Members to do so, however, belief in the system 
needs to be firmly re-established and, for that, getting the DDA done quickly would be 
a very valuable plus. With Bali now as a first, confidence-building step, the rest may 
be possible.
A problem with the DDA as it stands is that it is too complicated, with each of a large 
number of technically awkward decision points a stumbling block. The Uruguay Round 
was even more intricate, but then there was political will. That will is now only barely 
present, as shown by the difficulty in arriving at the Bali deal.  A possible way to 
proceed in the months ahead is a drastic simplification of the DDA, while retaining a 
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single undertaking.  Start with agriculture, where simplification requires more detail 
than in other areas because of its three pillars.
Simplify agriculture
The draft modalities in agriculture are no longer acceptable as a basis to negotiate for 
a number of delegations; the environment has changed too much since the start of the 
DDA. For example, China’s Producer Support Estimate (PSE) rose from 3.96% in 2001 
to 16.81% in 2012 while over the same period those of the EU and the USA fell by 68% 
and 37%, respectively. In absolute terms, China’s PSE in 2012 exceeded the combined 
PSE of the EU and the USA by a significant margin.1 Indeed, including China, the value 
of agricultural production has increased very significantly in some major developing 
members, entitling them under the modalities to high levels of (trade-distorting) 
support, while that of many other Members, particularly industrialised countries, 
declined markedly. Also, there are what many consider potential ‘loop holes’, like the 
developing country exemption for public stock-building for food security. This leaves 
some wondering whether the playing field would be made more level under the current 
modalities – as is the aim of the negotiations – or be tilted once again.
Moreover, significant differences remain including over the Special Safeguard 
Mechanism (SSM) for developing countries. The SSM was agreed at MC6 (Hong 
Kong), but not how it would function.  Also, under the modalities, notification 
requirements would increase considerably, both in number and complication. Under 
the present Agreement on Agriculture, few Members are up to date in their notifications 
and presentations differ – difficulties that would compound and monitoring and 
transparency could suffer.
1 Source: OECD countries: Producer Support Estimates by country, Agricultural Policy Indicators, OECD Statistics, 
www.oecd.org.
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The goal should be a more market-oriented, transparent agricultural trading system 
that allows Members the maximum amount of policy (and instrument) choice while 
minimising the damage to others. This suggests a simple framework, perhaps as follows: 
1. On overall trade distorting support (OTDS), define base OTDS, as per the modalities 
but with a more recent reference period (eg 2005-2010), and bind it (except perhaps 
for LDCs), possibly with modest reduction commitments.  Members would be 
allowed to use their OTDS in any way they wish, subject to a percentage per product, 
say 10%, to avoid concentration (and which would be halved for cotton, to meet 
the MC6 commitment). The Development and Green Boxes would remain, but the 
need for the Amber and Blue Boxes and for de minimis would be obviated. Reports 
should be annually (every two years for LDCs and perhaps net food importing 
developing countries).
2. On market access, restrict the decision points to average tariff cuts and the SSM, 
dropping sensitive and special products and the like.  Base the SSM on GATT 
Article XIX (Safeguards), replacing ‘serious injury’ with ‘injury’.  Average tariff 
reductions should be easily doable, to compensate for the absence of flexibilities 
– say, 18% for developed and 12% for developing countries, with an exemption 
for LDCs. This would bring some improvement in market access, especially to 
developed markets, where applied are close to bound rates. Bear in mind here that 
there has been little improvement among major traders since 2001, except for China 
in its WTO accession.  Furthermore, Members could encourage the EU’s tariff 
simplification and seek to multilateralise the EU’s deal on tropical products with 
a group of countries. If the latter proves elusive, put them into a ‘built-in agenda’ 
(BIN). 
3. On export competition, the modalities here are clean. If they are hard to retain, repeat 
the MC6 agreement on export subsidies and seek consensus on export credits, with 
the rest in the BIN, along with export restrictions and geographical indications.
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Market access for manufacturing goods
The rest of the package is ‘easier’, at least to describe. In Non-Agricultural Market 
Access (NAMA), Members should focus only on the coefficients, ignoring ‘sectorals’, 
environmental products and so on, which could be for the BIN. The coefficients should 
be relatively easy to implement – say, 12 for developed and 25 for developing countries 
(with LDCs exempted) – a step that would nevertheless reduce tariff peaks. If needed, 
allow flexibility to double the coefficients on 5% and 10% of lines for developed and 
developing countries, respectively. Encourage more bindings, but that could be taken 
up in the BIN. 
Rules and Services
On trade rules, note there is a provisional Transparency Mechanism for RTAs.  It has 
a review clause in the context of closing the DDA with difficult legal implications; 
replace it with a review of the operation of the Mechanism.  For trade remedies, agree 
on a transparency mechanism, as for RTAs, and abide by the status quo and the work 
programme for fisheries subsidies.  In the area of Services, seek binding of actual 
conditions and for those Members who find this too hard, engage in an ‘offer-request’ 
procedure. Members could continue the regulatory and gradual liberalisation processes 
in the BIN. 
Trade facilitation, as agreed in Bali, and implementation issues could fit into the above 
package.  To the extent that they hold up matters, they could go into the BIN.  The latter 
would be activated after a Council review, within a year, of the implementation of the 
DDA and would be conducted in the respective negotiating groups.
A slimmed down yet ambitious package all the same
The package described here is surprisingly ambitious. In agriculture, OTDS and export 
competition would see significant improvements; there would be an overall gain in 
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market access for farm products, an area where the WTO did not excel, and monitoring 
and transparency would certainly get better.  The deal is also balanced: China, in OTDS, 
and the USA, in tariff peaks and in not getting zeroing, would be major contributors. 
Furthermore, with base OTDS on a more recent reference period, India and others 
would retain the room for stock-building, but within disciplines, and other parties would 
make minor, doable contributions. The WTO would be immeasurably strengthened to 
plan for the future of the trading system.  It is a deal worth having.  
How to get there? It would be best if, with the Director-General (DG) fully involved, 
the process were started in early 2014 by China and the USA; trade relations are a good, 
relatively easy place to start addressing the many issues between them. After this, under 
the guidance of the DG, a deal could be built to a critical mass and then to consensus. 
Alternatively, early in 2014, the DG could float the ideas in a ‘green room’, launching 
the process with a non-paper, perhaps in cooperation with the Chairs of the Negotiating 
Groups, and following this with intensive informal consultations of the sort that led to 
the success in Bali.
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APEC-like Duties for a post-Bali WTO
Richard Baldwin
Bali’s success got multilateralism out of the emergency room and into intensive care 
unit – but we don’t know whether the operation was a success. The Bali package is 
only distantly related to the heart of the 2001 agenda (WTO 2013). Indeed, the ‘Bali 
Package’ should really be called the ‘Bali Ribbon’, since very large parts of it had 
already implemented unilaterally by members. 
Moreover, what little that could be done of the original Doha Agenda was done in Bali. 
This means that the WTO looks set to drift for the next few years. Unless the WTO finds 
some new initiative, WTO centricity in world trade governance will continue to erode 
– perhaps even slipping past some sort of ‘tipping point’. 
Tipping into a Great Powers system of trade governance
In the 20th century, the GATT/WTO was central to almost all major trade liberalisations. 
A ‘GATT/WTO first’ attitude was ensconced in the strategic thinking of all leading 
Members. No longer. Almost no WTO-led liberalisation has occurred. The WTO 
mechanism that still works well – dispute settlement – is increasingly used as a substitute 
for negotiated liberalisation. As a result, de facto compliance is eroding. India may be 
next non-complier on agricultural subsidy disciplines.
Erosion of WTO centricity is dangerous (Baldwin 2008). Anchorage to WTO-norms 
allows each Member to view its own policies as minor derogations. Yet, at some point 
derogations become the new norm. 
•	 The steady erosion of the WTO’s centricity will sooner or later bring the world to 
a tipping point – a point beyond which expectations become unmoored and nations 
feel justified in ignoring WTO norms since everyone else does.  
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No one knows what would happen beyond the tipping point. My guess is that trade 
would continue to grow and the system would continue to function – but not equally 
for all nations. Before the GATT was set up in 1947, the Great Powers system settled 
trade disputes by gunboats or diplomats depending upon the parties involved. Only the 
naïve thought market access should be reciprocal or fair. A return to this Belle Époque 
extreme is unlikely, but a new Great Powers trade system is likely to emerge from the 
mega-regional agreements being brokered. China and Russia might set up competing 
or complementary networks.
All would lose in this post-tipping point world, but not equally. The US, EU, Japan, 
China and a few others have enough market leverage to defend their interests; small 
nations much less so. 
This chapter considers what the Bali outcome means for the WTO. It suggests a 
programme that the WTO could realistically undertake in the next two to four years – 
one that would slow or help reverse the erosion of WTO centricity. 
Paradox of WTO success and Doha failure
The Bali outcome highlights a paradox:  How can the WTO be such a success while the 
Doha Round is such a failure? 
•	 WTO membership is wildly popular; nations – even powerful nations like Russia – 
agree to massive domestic policy changes as the price of membership (Racz 2011). 
Basic WTO principles are more universally recognised than any others – far more 
than, say, basic human rights. The WTO ‘court’ is as influential as any international 
tribunal in the world.
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•	 But Doha is a dud. Bali and the 2011 and 2008 failures before it show that not all 
WTO Members view the Doha agenda as win-win – neither the full agenda nor 
various mini-packages were seen as win-win in 2008, 2011, or 2013.1 
Liberalisation everywhere but in the WTO
The paradox resolution is not that trade liberalisation is unpopular. Trade liberalisation 
has been and is proceeding rapidly since Doha was launched – just not inside the WTO. 
•	 Developing nations did, unilaterally or regionally, what they refused to do 
multilaterally in the WTO – slashing tariffs, opening services sectors, and embracing 
strong disciplines on foreign investment, intellectual property, etc. 
•	 Rich nations did, unilaterally or regionally, what they refused to do multilaterally 
in the WTO – slashing tariffs on imports from poor nations, reducing agriculture 
distortions and providing technical support for developing nation trade (aid for trade 
and trade facilitation).
Indeed, one of Doha’s major problems is that many of the gains from finishing it have 
been realised via unilateralism and regionalism. 
Paradox resolution
Understanding this is simple. WTO rules and disciplines are essential for 20th century 
trade, i.e. trade in what could be described as made-here-sold-there goods. Since all 
nations still engage in such trade, WTO membership is helpful and thus popular. The 
Doha Round, however, is largely irrelevant to the most dynamic form of trade – trade 
linked to the internationalisation of the manufacturing production, which has been 
called supply-chain trade even though it also involves cross-border flows of knowhow, 
investment, services and people.
1 See Evenett (2007a,b, 2008 and 2011) for analysis of the failures and contemporaneous suggestions for reinvigorating 
the Doha Round.
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Since governments listen to their trading firms and the most dynamic of these are 
focusing on 21st century issues, the Doha Round suffers a chronic lack of business 
interest. This leads to a chronic unwillingness of governments to make compromises. 
To put it colloquially, if the omelette is not going to be very tasty, why break the eggs? 
Much of the liberalisation we have seen is driven by the enormous win-win opportunities 
that arise from international production unbundling. It happened outside the WTO, since 
the Doha Agenda locked the WTO firmly on last century issues. WTO members quite 
naturally reacted by constructing win-win agreements outside the WTO. 21st century 
disciplines for global supply chains were established via regional trade, investment 
agreements and unilateral reform by developing nations. 
In short, the centricity of the WTO to global trade governance has been severely 
eroded. It is now just one of several pillars of global trade governance. This erosion of 
WTO centricity is the real threat that the Bali debacle poses to the world trade system 
(Baldwin 2008). Redressing the erosion tells us what the WTO should be doing. 
Task for the WTO: Keeping the Organization relevant
Plainly the best way forward would be to expand WTO coverage to include 21st century 
trade issues (Hoekman and Jackson 2013). But getting there involves a large detour. 
The logic behind this assertion rests on three facts:
•	 Fact #1: The WTO cannot move on the 21st century issues until it accomplishes the 
Doha goals of ‘rebalancing’ the trading system in the eyes of developing nations. 
The topline Doha Round goal – rebalancing the trade system by liberalising agriculture 
and labour-intensive manufactured goods (Nassar and Perez 2011) – is the key gain for 
a large number of developing nation WTO Members. They justifiably view the Doha 
Declaration as a promise that they are unwilling to let slide. That is why the WTO 
cannot address 21st century trade issues separately. 
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•	 Fact #2: The rebalancing issues cannot be completed on their own (as Bali and half 
a dozen other failures have shown).
As the long string of failures makes clear, the Doha Agenda is not broad enough to 
provide a win-win outcome for all members. 
Oversimplifying to make the point, the Doha agenda is unrealisable today since the 
2001 agenda was designed to ask nothing from China. Having granted (in 2001) a large 
number of special interest ‘wins’ to WTO Members in the course of its WTO accession, 
no-one expected China to get or give additional special interest ‘wins’ in the Doha 
Round.2 As such, China has been uninterested in offering the sort of special interest 
‘wins’ (say tariff cuts on chemicals) that would induce rich nations to make the deep 
rebalancing concessions that other WTO Members demand. There was some hope that 
a mini-package could work around this fundamental flaw, but now we know such hope 
was in vain. 
The thrust of all this is simple. It is impossible to think of Doha finishing without 
expanding the agenda, but this brings us to the third fact:
•	 Fact #3: Until the mega-regionals conclude or die, no serious negotiations on 21st 
century issues can be held in the WTO. 
Most of the WTO’s largest Members – including the old ‘quad’ of the US, EU, Japan 
and Canada – are engaged in mega-regional negotiations, namely the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).  These 
talks involve deep changes which would fundamentally alter their members’ stance in 
any WTO negotiations. They could not possibility negotiate both in the mega-regional 
and WTO setting – the logic of exchanging trade concessions precludes it. 
Thus restoring WTO centricity in trade negotiations is years away in the best of cases. 
Even if the mega-regionals finished in 2014, it would take, at best, several years to 
2 Recall that China acceded to the WTO at the same meeting where the Doha Agenda was set.
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negotiate an update of the Doha framework, i.e. an expansion of the topics that would 
great a broader arrange of ‘wins’ for key Members.  
These three facts and their implications clarify thinking on what the WTO could do. 
‘Globalise APEC’: WTO-led evaluation of mega-regional 
disciplines
Global optimists view mega-regionals as a vanguard effort. To optimists, TPP is a 
smallish group of diverse nations working out ways to cooperate on international trade 
rules. The plan is to invite others to join as and when they are ready. Note the optimistic 
order: 
•	 Step 1: Negotiate the mega-regionals. 
•	 Step 2: Consider how they might be multilateralised.
•	 Step 3: Negotiate inclusion of some mega-regional disciplines in the WTO, thereby 
providing sufficient gives-and-takes to finishing the Doha Round agenda.
My proposal is to compress this order. Think of it as globalising APEC. 
As Asia is furthest along in the global value chain revolution, it is also home to most of 
the world’s deep regional trade agreements. From the mid-2000s, Japan has had a series 
of deep bilaterals with the large ASEAN nations; the US has had them with Australia, 
Singapore, Peru and Chile for almost as long. And the first deep RTA among large 
nations – NAFTA – is also in the region. 
This Asian-Pacific deeper bilateral integration has all along been accompanied by 
regional-wide discussions and analysis. APEC forums discussed such beyond-WTO 
disciplines among a very wide range of nations – including many who have no such 
bilaterals. This two-way dialogue has certainly made the Japanese and US bilaterals 
less threatening to third nations, while at the same time making Japan and the US more 
mindful of the impact on third nations. 
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Timeline
My proposal is to start an APEC-like discussion of mega-regionals in 2014 on a global 
scale, and to put the WTO in charge of them. The World Bank and UNCTAD are 
undertaking some studies along these lines, but both have institutional perspectives. 
These discussions would be better placed in the WTO – a member-driven organisation 
that is truly global.  
In a nutshell, I propose a compression of steps 1 and 2 above. WTO-led discussions and 
analysis (not negotiations) should be undertaken on:
•	 How will TPP and TTIP disciplines affect excluded nations?
•	 Which of the TPP- and TTIP-like disciplines should be brought into the WTO, and 
how? 
•	 Which would require special and differential treatment? 
•	 Which would require technical assistance to least developed nations? 
Using its convening power, the WTO could help nations develop fully informed views 
on questions. This would help identify the key issues that arise from moving the WTO 
into the governance of 21st century trade disciplines (see, for example, Jara 2013). 
This would also start to lay the groundwork for enlarging the Doha Agenda in a manner 
that would have a chance of constructing a win-win for all WTO Members – a package 
that would provide gains sufficiently large to induce all members to agree difficult 
compromises.
Concluding remarks 
The WTO’s choice is really rather simple. Given that the Doha Agenda is manifestly not 
‘self-balancing’, the agenda has to be expanded to be concluded. The natural expansion 
items are those that many WTO Members have negotiated or are negotiating in deep 
RTAs. The problem is that the WTO is now at the back of queue when it comes to 21st 
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century trade governance. Key WTO Members could not negotiate then in the WTO 
until the mega-regional deals are done or dead. 
On the mega-regionals’ current trajectory, that means at least two idle years for the 
WTO. More likely, nothing will move until after the current Director-General’s term is 
up in 2017. 
The obvious way forward is to use the WTO’s power of convening and its uniquely 
legitimate structure to prepare the ground on 21st century commercial issues.  This is 
really the substantive outcome the WTO can accomplish in the medium run. 
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Trade, Global Value Chains and the 
World Trade Organization
Grant Aldonas
Introduction
Given the breadth of the original Doha Development Agenda, many will say the 
outcome at the 9th WTO Ministerial in Bali represents highly qualified ‘success’ at 
best.  The protracted Doha round negotiations dented the WTO’s credibility and led 
many to question the utility of multilateral trade liberalisation generally.  The trend 
toward preferential trade arrangements suggests that many member countries have 
absorbed that ‘lesson’ from the Doha round. 
There is nonetheless cause for optimism.  The outcome in Bali represents a pragmatic 
recognition of the changes globalisation has wrought in the pattern of trade and the 
organisation of production in the two decades since the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round and the founding of the WTO.  
Changing patterns of trade and the organisation of 
production
The failure to deliver on the promise of the original Doha Declaration had many 
authors,  but the most powerful reason for that failure is often overlooked.  The Doha 
Development Agenda was already dated by the time negotiators met in Qatar in late 
2001.
In the interim, however, the forces driving the integration of world markets had 
fundamentally altered the economics and politics of trade in ways inconsistent with 
the premises underlying both the Doha agenda and previous multilateral rounds. Those 
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forces, working their way through the global economy, transformed world trade from 
a series of arms-length sales largely of finished products between vertically integrated 
buyers and sellers to a global economy into an integrated market in which more than 
half of current trade consists of intermediate goods traded within a firm, its affiliates, 
and the broader reach of its global supply chain. 
The changing pattern of trade reflected a changing pattern of industrial organisation. 
Firms are organised as a means of reducing or avoiding costs that would otherwise arise 
from trying to achieve the same result through a series of market-based exchanges.  An 
environment of high transaction costs favours vertical integration of production within 
a single firm.   That pattern prevailed throughout the post-war period when the GATT 
focused on reducing tariff barriers that had been introduced between the two World 
Wars in the midst of the Great Depression. 
A low transaction cost environment, on the other hand, enhances the ability to engage 
in impersonal exchange and, therefore, reduces the need for vertical integration.  It 
favours de-verticalisation, greater horizontal reach, and softer boundaries at the edges 
of an enterprise.  
Globalisation extends that logic to world markets.  By erasing political divisions in 
the world economy, creating a much broader space within which the institutional 
underpinnings of markets applied, and introducing technologies that allowed for a 
radical reduction in the cost of doing business internationally and a broad diffusion of 
technology, globalisation created an environment in which firms could source goods, 
services, labour, capital and technology worldwide.
The resulting rise in global value chains has reshaped the way production is organised, 
how we trade and, ultimately, the political economy of trade negotiations like the Doha 
Development Agenda.  In a high transaction cost environment, firms basically had only 
one option – exporting.  Their interests were best served by lowering market access 
barriers to access outside their home market and they pressed negotiators to liberalise 
world trade as a result.
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In a low transaction cost environment, firms have more options.  Most importantly, 
they can invest and produce abroad as an alternative to exporting.  But, they can also 
diversify their sourcing and organise production on a globally efficient basis to serve a 
global market.  
The pressure for trade liberalisation – at least in a conventional sense – has waned as 
it has become easier for firms to ‘work around’ the remaining obstacles to organising 
production efficiently.  What matters more to a firm organising or participating in a 
global value chain is reducing the overall cost of operating in global markets, reducing 
the uncertainty that undermines just-in-time delivery on a global basis, and expanding 
its ability to collaborate and, increasingly, to innovate with other partners in the same 
value chain.  Industrial tariffs, agricultural export subsidies, antidumping rules, and the 
various exceptions and carve-outs from the rules for developing countries that made up 
the bulk of Doha Development Agenda are simply less relevant when seen in that light.
Instead, what matters more are initiatives aimed at lowering practical obstacles to 
moving goods, services, capital, people and know-how through a global value chain. 
No surprise, then, that what the Doha Development Agenda ultimately produced was an 
agreement on trade facilitation.  Of the many parts of the Doha agenda, trade facilitation 
was, from the start, the one item that most closely corresponded to the emerging pattern 
of trade and the organisation of production that globalisation drove. 
Implications for the WTO After Bali: An agenda for a 
networked world
The cause for optimism post-Bali is that the outcome marks a departure from the 
preoccupation of the WTO and its members trade policies designed for the mid-20th 
century.  That preoccupation has come at a cost.  It has inhibited the WTO’s ability to 
turn to the challenges that a more networked global economy presents.  The WTO’s 
continuing relevance as a pillar of global economic governance and its capacity to 
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foster further trade liberalisation depends on the organisation’s ability to rise to those 
challenges.  
The question, then, is how to build on the outcome at Bali and ensure that the WTO’s 
agenda corresponds to the global economy as it is, rather than as it was a half century 
ago.  Answering that question depends heavily on understanding the changing pattern 
of trade and industrial organisation that the rise of global value chains embodies.
Competition in a more networked world depends heavily on the capacity of firms and 
of economies to integrate themselves into the value chains that serve global consumer 
markets.  Participating in a global value chain presents a fundamentally different 
challenge from that presented by the textbook example of an arms-length sale of goods. 
In the case of arms-length sales, price is both the principal determinant of competition 
and the principal means of conveying information about the value that buyer and seller 
attach to the good or service exchanged.  Very little more needs to be shared between 
buyer and seller to effect a transaction, particularly if the exchange is an isolated, rather 
than repeated, event.
To join a global value chain, on the other hand, firms must find ways to participate, 
add value and specialise. That not only requires considerably more in the way of 
communication and collaboration, it increasingly requires an ability to innovate with 
other links in the chain.  All that entails a higher level of both technological sophistication 
and human capital.  
The new basis of competition explains why removing conventional barriers to trade has 
less traction in a networked world.  A tariff affords protection by virtue of its impact 
on the delivered price of imports, whether inputs or finished goods.  Even in a more 
networked global economy, the price wedge can have a substantial impact.  But, to 
the extent that price is less relevant to the decision to buy, a tariff necessarily has less 
impact on firm’s sourcing decisions.  
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By the same token, a trade policy aimed solely at reducing tariffs in potential export 
markets has less to offer local firms confronted with the challenge of connecting to 
global value chains.  From the local firm’s perspective, tariffs are only one of any 
number of transaction costs associated with engaging the international exchange of 
goods and services.  In this networked world, steps aimed at increasing the quality and 
reliability of goods and services, decreasing time-to-market, and enhancing the ability 
to innovate matter more than lowering the price wedge that tariffs can create.  
Trade policy and the WTO’s agenda should be geared toward facilitating that process. 
That has broad implications for how we define ‘market access’ in a more globalised 
world economy and how we pursue ‘liberalisation’ within the WTO.  It implies a 
more practical focus for an organisation that purports to be the ‘trade’ pillar of global 
economic governance. 
That points toward a new methodology for future negotiations.  One that focuses 
explicitly on reducing the cost of participating in particular value chains, rather than 
focusing on individual instruments, like tariffs, or sectors, like agriculture, textiles and 
apparel, or financial services.  The value of that approach, much like the success of the 
negotiations on trade facilitation, is that it will focus on the world of trade as its users 
comprehend it, rather than as the conventions of trade policy demand. 
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Speaking Truth about Power: 
The Real Problem in the Multilateral 
Trading System
Craig VanGrasstek
The paltry package of reforms that ministers approved at the WTO’s 9th Ministerial 
Conference offered only the latest evidence of the hard times on which the multilateral 
trading system has fallen. Analysts point to an eclectic range of problems that call out 
for equally diverse solutions, but they typically share in common an implicit argument 
that the WTO’s problems are endogenous to the trading system. One way or another, 
most critics argue, we must find some fix — whether in the objectives we set for trade 
negotiations, how we package and pursue them, or who we let take the lead — that will 
invigorate the multilateral system with new energy.
The real problem is not energy but power. That is a point that economists and lawyers 
are loathe to address or even to acknowledge, as both professions are founded upon 
intellectual traditions that promote alternatives to power as the organising principle 
for relations between states. Both favour a system in which economic competitiveness 
matters more than military competition, and in which states of manifestly unequal size 
will nevertheless enjoy true juridical equality. It would require an almost deliberate 
blindness, however, to ignore the critical importance of power in the establishment and 
maintenance of open markets, and the tremendous changes in the global distribution 
of power since the advent of the WTO era. No amount of tinkering within the trading 
system can evade the inescapable fact that the balance of power has changed radically 
over the past two decades, and that we are still in a period of rapid yet uncertain 
transition. 
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The structure of the international trading system has always been subordinate to the 
international distribution of power among states. That was as true for those periods in 
which there existed a dominant power as it has been for those periods in which the world 
system was in flux. The system of trade treaties in the 19th century was a reflection of 
the Pax Britannica, just as the creation of both the GATT and the WTO were products 
of the Pax Americana at the start and end, respectively, of the Cold War. Conversely, 
the protectionism that preceded the emergence of Britain as a leading power, and that 
came in the unhappy interval between British and American leadership, were economic 
manifestations of political chaos. 
The power dynamics in our own time more closely resemble the disruptive period 
between the First and Second World Wars than the stability achieved at the height of the 
British and American hegemonies. The WTO era has coincided with a great acceleration 
in the speed with which global economic and political power are redistributed, with the 
traditional leaders of the GATT system now in relative decline and emerging economies 
such as Brazil, India, and (above all) China rising rapidly. This has prompted a crisis of 
leadership and recurring disputes over burden-sharing, while also casting a new light on 
the importance of regional trade arrangements (RTAs). 
The GATT system succeeded because it needed to reach consensus only within a small 
circle of like-minded states. It was founded upon a hierarchy in which the US took 
the lead, its principal negotiating partner was Western Europe, and agreement between 
these transatlantic partners was both the necessary and sufficient condition for resolving 
every round. Nearly all other GATT contracting parties were either developed countries 
that broadly shared these same objectives, or developing countries that managed to 
avoid making serious commitments until, during the Uruguay Round, many of them 
recognised that their interests were better served by market-oriented than state-centric 
policies. Apart from Cuba and a few Eastern European countries, the communist 
countries remained outside the club.
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The WTO is now a virtually universal organisation, but that economic asset is a political 
liability. The divisions between developed and developing countries have grown with 
the dissipation of the Washington consensus, and are more difficult to resolve now that 
all members are expected to adopt all agreements. Ever since the Cancún Ministerial 
of 2003 it has been evident that agreement between the US and the EU may still be 
necessary, but is far from sufficient, to bring a round to a successful conclusion. Those 
perennial North-South divisions are joined in the WTO by the even more destabilising 
problem of how the traditional and the emerging leaders will share power.  
The great powers that dominated the GATT have been unwilling or unable to exercise 
the same authority in the WTO. The Doha Round was the first multilateral trade 
negotiation in which the US was not the principal demandeur, and the only time that 
US officials showed real enthusiasm for the round was from the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11 to the failure at Cancún. Their efforts thereafter focused principally on RTAs, 
first with relatively small countries and now mega-regionals. The EU initially tried to 
take up the earlier US role, having been the principal proponent of a new round, but 
has not played that part very effectively. That was amply demonstrated by the failure 
of European negotiators to win lasting support for the new issues they had advanced 
at the start of the round, dropping two of them (labour and the environment) even 
before the round was launched and jettisoning three others after a few years of fruitless 
negotiations (investment, competition policy, and government procurement). It is hard 
for a Member to supply leadership when it will not even stick to its own demands.
The decline of the WTO is matched by the concurrent rise of RTAs, a development 
that implies much more than a reversion to the economics of the second-best. While 
smaller and more trade-dependent countries may view discriminatory trade agreements 
as just another means of pursuing their economic objectives, for the bigger players they 
are also instruments of foreign policy. At a minimum, the promise of an RTA can be 
used to induce or reward cooperation on some other issue; RTAs may go much farther, 
forming the economic component of competing alliances. Consider here the differing 
uses to which the US and Russia have put RTAs. Nearly all of the agreements that the 
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Bush administration initiated were intended to promote goals in US foreign policy, 
being directed to countries that helped it either to wage war with Iraq or secure peace 
with Israel. The links between RTAs and foreign policy have been even tighter lately 
for Russia, which has pressured countries in the ‘near abroad’ not only to join its own 
bloc but to stay out of the EU.  
Geopolitical competition is also key to RTAs in Asia. Most of the participating countries 
in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) see that initiative in economic terms, but the 
same cannot be said for the world’s two largest economies. For many US policymakers, 
the TPP is defined more by the exclusion of China than by the inclusion of any other 
partner. That aspect of the TPP could be multiplied if, as some leaders in Taiwan and the 
US urge, the ‘renegade province’ were to join the group. That seems unlikely to happen 
in the near future, but nevertheless serves to illustrate the degree to which economic 
and political competition are once again becoming intertwined. The same may be said 
for the rising tensions between China and its neighbours over the control of sea lanes, 
airspace, and land borders. 
In brief, the vast changes that have taken place in the world over the past two decades 
have greatly complicated the problem of concluding substantive agreements in the 
WTO. The traditional leaders are in decline, the emerging powers are still emerging, 
and other developing countries are divided between those that can get most of what 
they want in RTAs and those that are leery of trade liberalisation in any form. In this 
environment, it is doubtful that any set of technical fixes can cure what ails the WTO.
How then can be done? If the fundamental problem can be reduced to the decline of the 
US and the rise of China, perhaps it is once more time to try a green room built for two. 
The last such effort was admittedly a disaster, with the rest of the WTO membership 
coming to regret that in 2003 they asked the US and the EU to devise a joint proposal 
to resolve the Doha Round. There is certainly no guarantee that having Beijing stand in 
for Brussels would prove more successful. One could well imagine reluctance on the 
part of China and the US to take on the task, not to mention the concerns this would 
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raise on the part of both those members that are invited to all other green rooms and 
those that rarely make it into these gatherings. Big problems call for bold solutions, 
however, and when all possible configurations have been tried and failed it is worth 
trying the seemingly impossible. Any agreement that is acceptable to both China and 
the US deserves a fair hearing, just as any agreement that is unacceptable to either of 
them would be moot.
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The Rationale for Bringing 
Investment into the WTO
Anabel González
The current investment scenario 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an engine for growth and sustainable development. 
First and foremost, it creates jobs; it also contributes to the transformation of productive 
structures, increasing productivity, enhancing access to technology and fostering 
innovation. Most countries aim at attracting FDI and have put in place policies and 
agencies to do so. 
FDI and international trade are closely linked, in particular in the context of global and 
regional value chains. Baldwin (2011) has coined the term ‘trade-investment-services 
nexus’ to refer to this relationship where investment is a key driver of trade flows as 
firms invest in different locations to put together the international production networks 
that underpin a large part of global trade today – some 80% (UNCTAD 2013). These 
links vary depending on the type of FDI, but are in any case quite significant.
Since 1980, the stock of FDI has expanded 20 times over the past three decades 
(Hufbauer and Draper 2013). This is a huge increase. Nevertheless, at US$1.35 trillion 
in 2012, FDI flows have not recovered yet to the levels reached before the economic 
crisis. The global economy, in particular developing and least-developed countries, 
need more investment. For example, it is estimated that to support a future global 
population of 9 billion people, about US$ 5 trillion per year up to 2030 needs to be 
invested in infrastructure (water, transportation, energy, etc.), and an additional annual 
$0.7 trillion if investments are to be ‘greened’ to secure future growth (Green Growth 
Action Alliance 2013). Private flows are essential to close the investment gap.
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Economic fragility and an uncertain business climate constrain FDI flows; restrictive 
policies also prevent the full realisation of the potential of FDI. These barriers include 
measures that constrain investment in certain sectors; limit the flows of capital, 
technology, people or other resources necessary to establish or conduct FDI operations; 
condition investment on technology transfer and the like; condition access to local 
markets on local content requirements or the holding of local assets in country; and 
restrict the availability of certain raw materials to locally invested firms, among others 
(Bhatia 2013). Investment subsidies also distort FDI flows (Dadush 2013). 
While there is no shortage of rules on investment, at the global level there is no 
single, comprehensive agreement, nor institution to govern FDI. Under the umbrella 
of the WTO, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services include some investment-related rules. In the context of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) for instance, investment disciplines are incorporated in agreements 
applicable to their respective members. The rule-making activity in this area is at its 
most frantic at the regional and bilateral levels, with many regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) incorporating an investment chapter and almost every country having signed 
one or more of the close to 3,000 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) currently in 
force. Divergent interpretations of these rules, resulting from decisions of international 
tribunals, further complicate this scenario (Stephenson and Dadush 2013).
This confusing, fragmented regime for FDI, while reflecting countries’ interest in 
establishing disciplines in this area, fuels uncertainty and additional costs that do 
not bode well for investors or for governments. Mega-regional agreements, like the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 
which are expected to incorporate investment chapters, could bring about some level 
of harmonisation of the disciplines in this area, but then again, only to participating 
countries.
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A renewed case for a multilateral framework on investment
The time is ripe to begin the discussion of a multilateral framework on investment, 
which would bring coherence to the governance of FDI, define clear and consistent 
rules, tackle barriers and distortions, and thus promote much needed, increased global 
investment and trade flows. 
A renewed case has been made for such an agreement for example, by the World 
Economic Forum (2013) and by individual experts (for example, Aslund 2013). Other 
organisations have proposed alternative frameworks, such as UNCTAD’s Investment 
Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (UNCTAD 2012) and the OECD’s 
Policy Framework for Investment (OECD 2006). Despite their differences in approach, 
these proposals share the view that the new global investment scenario merits a more 
cohesive approach towards developing a sound investment regime. 
One of the main arguments against trying to devise a multilateral investment agreement 
stems from the fact that past attempts were unsuccessful. These include the negotiations 
in the OECD of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1995-98, which were 
ultimately suspended, as well as the effort to launch negotiations on the topic in the 
context of the Doha Round, which despite being part of the original mandate, was 
dropped from the agenda in 2004. The underlying concern is that the strong political 
opposition that derailed these efforts could again prevail. 
The world is not the same today, however. Circumstances have changed dramatically in 
the past 10 to 15 years. First, the geography of investment is very different. Emerging 
economies are significant players in both inflows and outflows of FDI, as the figures 
below show. According to UNCTAD, in 2012, developing countries absorbed more FDI 
than developed countries, accounting for 52% of global flows; in addition, they were 
responsible for almost one third of global FDI flows.
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Second, global and regional value chains are very much prevalent today, and the 
fragmented FDI regime does not adequately reflect the interconnected nature of 
economies in global value chains (GVCs) (OECD, WTO and UNCTAD 2013). 
Developing countries have a stake in this, as many of them are part of international 
production schemes, as shown by their share in global value added trade increasing 
from 20% in 1990 to over 40% today (UNCTAD 2013). 
Third, new actors in the FDI landscape, in particular state-owned enterprises and 
sovereign wealth funds, while opening new, huge sources of capital to tap, also pose 
significant challenges that countries – both developed and developing – are struggling 
to address.
In light of the above, the fundamentals of the North-South divide that have traditionally 
underpinned negotiations on investment are being de facto rapidly eroded. Emerging 
economies are now interested in protecting the investment of their own companies 
abroad through a rules-based system, whereas developed countries are keen on 
maintaining the host country right to regulate in the public interest. The on-going BIT 
negotiations between China and the US are illustrative of the above. This is a ‘paradigm 
shift’ (Sauvant and Ortino 2013), which could pave the way for a global investment 
regime, one based on a balanced approach between investors’ rights and governments’ 
prerogatives.
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To begin the discussion
An agreement on investment would need to address both substantive and procedural 
issues, albeit maybe on different tracks. The first would include the definition of 
investment, standards of protection, investment liberalisation commitments and 
potential new disciplines, among others. Other issues, such as sustainability and 
corporate social responsibility could also be discussed. On the procedural side, the 
question of an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism merits close exam. 
In charting a course for a potential multilateral framework on investment, a venue for 
the negotiations must be selected. UNCTAD and the OECD have done very valuable 
work on the matter, but given the strong links between trade and investment, the WTO 
is the natural place for housing such an agreement, alongside agreements on key trade 
areas. In addition, a negotiation conducted in the WTO has the potential to yield more 
equitable outcomes and to ensure non-discrimination; it would also provide access to 
an effective dispute settlement mechanism (Draper et al. 2013). 
Opposition to initiating investment discussions in the WTO comes not only from those 
who object to global rules on FDI on ideological grounds.  Others fear that bringing the 
topic to the WTO could poison the environment and reduce the possibility of achieving 
any meaningful result. Others still point out the difficulty of reaching agreement among 
the large and diverse WTO Membership. 
Two comments are in order. First, it is clear that a preparatory process would need to 
take place. It is important that WTO Members are sensitised on the current investment 
context, the huge transformations that have taken place in the global economy and FDI’s 
potential contribution to growth and development. A systemic analysis of the terms 
and coverage of existing BITs and RTAs could also lay the ground for a multilateral 
framework in this area (Hufbauer and Schott 2013). The WTO, with the support of 
UNCTAD and the OECD, is ideally placed to conduct such a process –though others 
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have suggested that one or a few governments could take the lead (Sauvant and Ortino 
2013).
Second, the question about the feasibility of reaching agreement on investment at 
the multilateral level relates to the broader question of what is the most conducive 
negotiating format for reaching agreement in the WTO. Given the current state of 
affairs, negotiations for a multilateral agreement on investment could be conducted 
under a plurilateral format, among countries willing to enter into such negotiations. 
There is no need to prejudge at the outset whether the agreement would be extended on 
an unconditional MFN basis to all Members, as the decision could be taken at a later 
stage depending, among other things, on the share of world investment that ends up 
covered by the agreement.
Final remarks
The economic and political rationale for strengthening multilateral cooperation on 
international investment is very strong. WTO Members should avail themselves of this 
opportunity to launch in 2014 an informed process that would prepare the ground for 
future negotiations of a multilateral agreement on investment.
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Depth and Breadth in the WTO: Can 
We Square the Circle?
Patrick Low1
Introduction
The GATT/WTO’s membership is highly varied in terms of level of development, 
national priorities, and government capabilities.  Rules that are of considerable benefit 
to some Members, and perhaps to the world in aggregate, can be harmful to the national 
interests of others.  This reality is reflected in differing levels of obligations among 
Members, and in the particular case of government procurement, also of rights.  Tariff 
bindings and levels are different for every Member.  In addition, various special and 
differential treatment provisions provide developing and least developed countries with 
options involving both the substantive content of certain provisions and on occasion 
longer phase-in periods for introducing new obligations.
While no Member has ever said such differentiation is inappropriate, few issues are 
discussed so readily and in so many contexts as the appropriate balance of rights and 
obligations for Members at different stages of development.  Contention runs deep, 
particularly when it comes to larger emerging economies.  An additional challenge for 
the system, and one which many would argue is partly responsible for the demise of the 
WTO’s centrality, is that views differ as to the desirable coverage of WTO rules.  These 
differences have been manifest in such areas as competition, investment, transparency 
in government procurement, labour, and trade and the environment.   
While the balance of rights and obligations among members and the coverage of 
WTO rules go to the heart of differences in Members’ priorities and possibilities, the 
1 The opinions expressed here are those of the author and should not be attributed to Fung Global Institute (FGI).
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consensus decision-making rule has in practice become a key element of the stasis 
afflicting the WTO.  This is because consensus can be easily turned into veto.  One 
suggestion for addressing these difficulties is referred to as the ‘club of clubs’ approach. 
Robert Lawrence is a prominent proponent of this approach (Lawrence 2006).
The ‘club-of-clubs’ approach
The essence of this approach is to encourage voluntary associations among parties 
who would pursue shared objectives in respect of particular issues or rules.  These 
clubs would comprise a subset of the WTO’s membership, and they would define 
rights and obligations applying to those in the club.  Those outside the club would not 
share in the rights and obligations.  This would introduce another element of permitted 
discrimination into the multilateral trading system, alongside existing provisions on 
preferential trading arrangements (PTAs), non-reciprocal preferences extended to 
some developing countries, and special and differential treatment provisions.  The 
fundamental question for the WTO’s future is whether the institution would be able to 
sustain this kind of arrangement without fracturing beyond repair.
The case for a club-of-clubs approach is that it would allow like-minded Members to 
pursue their national interests without falling foul of opposition from those who believe 
that embracing the obligations in question would harm their economic interests.  At the 
same time, it would prevent the latter countries from being inappropriately pressurised 
into accepting obligations that they considered an undue burden.  Lawrence sees clubs 
formed along these lines as an alternative to the single undertaking at the close of 
the Uruguay Round, which obliged all Members of the new WTO to subscribe to all 
agreements.2   In retrospect, this arrangement is seen by many as an error.  It left a large 
number of counties feeling aggrieved, and has diluted trust among parties that need to 
cooperate in order to carry forward a WTO agenda. 
2 The most significant exception to this is the Agreement on Government Procurement, where provisions apply only to 
signatories, both in terms of benefits and obligations. 
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Lawrence’s proposals are sensitive to the risks of exclusion and coercion under a club-
of-clubs approach.  He recommends a protocol for forming clubs that would ensure 
membership was genuinely voluntary, that the clubs were not a stalking horse for 
forcing obligations on Members at a later date, that clubs were welfare-enhancing (not 
by redistributing welfare from outsiders to insiders), and that they were aligned to the 
objectives of the institution.  All Members would be able to negotiate on the substantive 
content of club rules, even if they subsequently did not join.  
Of particular significance is the principle articulated by Lawrence requiring consensus 
among Members that the WTO is the appropriate institutional setting for a club.  This 
could, in effect, be the Achilles heel of the entire proposal because it requires that 
members bless clubs inside the WTO that would discriminate against them in terms of 
benefits.  It is tempting to argue, on the other hand, that if the obligations of being in a 
club are considered onerous by a Member, then perhaps the benefits are inconsiderable 
and exclusion does not matter.  The option of joining later would always be open.
The Agreement on Government Procurement negotiated in the Tokyo Round is the only 
significant3 instance in GATT/WTO history of a discriminatory agreement being blessed 
by consensus.  All the other ‘codes’ negotiated at that time, covering antidumping, 
subsidies and countervailing measures, customs valuation, import licensing and 
standards, did not discriminate against non-signatories.  The path for a discriminatory 
outcome in the case of procurement was facilitated by the fact that no provisions on the 
subject existed previously in the GATT, unlike in the case of the other codes.          
Is a ‘critical mass’ approach an alternative?
A way of avoiding the discriminatory downside of the club-of-clubs approach would be 
to use a critical mass decision-making approach.4  The distinct element of this approach 
3 The Tokyo Round Agreements agreements on bovine meat, dairy products and civil aircraft all contained discriminatory 
elements, but these agreements never gained much traction and were non-controversial.  
4 For a more detailed discussion of critical mass, see Low (2011).
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is that it does not discriminate against those who are outside a new arrangement or 
agreement.  The notion of critical mass derives from the idea that new obligations will 
only appeal to potential takers if there is a sufficient number of other takers with a 
certain weight in the market.  If key players refuse to sign up, the agreement does not 
get done.  The composition of the critical mass is decided by those who commit if there 
is sufficient support and refrain from doing so if they consider the contrary to be the 
case.  For all practical purposes, the critical mass requirement eliminates free-riding, 
if one assumes that parties too small to destabilise an agreement cannot free-ride to a 
degree that would worry parties to that agreement.     
This approach to decision-making has been adopted on a number of occasions, namely 
in the post-Uruguay Round agreements on basic telecommunications and financial 
services and in the Information Technology Agreement.  In the latter, it is interesting to 
note that a critical mass was considered to have been attained without the inclusion of 
Brazil and Mexico.  
Speaking in favour of this approach is the fact that it would avoid a contentious and 
quite possibly futile process of trying to fashion discriminatory deals approved through 
a consensus decision taken by the entire WTO membership.  On the other hand, some 
may fear that even if non-participants were unimportant in the market today, this may 
cease to be the case in the future.  What would then induce these members to accept 
obligations rather than merely free-riding?  
Conclusions
It may be that a hybrid solution would be best.  A club-of-clubs or critical mass approach 
could be adopted depending on the issue at hand and the economic implications of 
exclusion from the benefits of an agreement blessed by the WTO.  The choice would 
have to weigh the perceived risks of coercion on the one hand, and free-riding on the 
other.  Either way, institutional integrity would call for a consensus.  Certain guarantees 
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would have to be crafted to buttress mutual trust among Members – a commodity that 
has been greatly eroded in the WTO in recent years.  
A priority for a post-Bali work programme must surely be to find a better way of 
fostering progress on important issues of international economic cooperation within 
an inclusive, multilateral setting.  Progress will be conditioned in part by agreement on 
appropriate negotiating techniques and decision-making processes, and a shared sense 
of legitimacy.  These matters need to be the subject of urgent deliberation. 
Regardless of the Bali outcome and how governments choose to interpret it, an 
ineluctable certainty is that the WTO will find itself on an accelerating path to obscurity 
if it cannot more effectively address the exigencies of modern economic and political 
realities.  If they fail to act, governments may rue their Munich moment, when they let 
go of the hard-won high ground of multilateralism.  
A practical means of proceeding would be for the membership to agree that by the 
time of their next ministerial meeting, they would have established a framework and 
set of procedures for a critical mass and/or a club-of-clubs approach to advancing the 
WTO’s agenda.  At the same time, Members could usefully agree to make procedural 
modifications to the consensus rule.  These would require that when very few countries 
were opposed to a consensus, they would be required to offer a reasoned explanation 
for doing so and be willing to discuss it.  By the time of the next but one ministerial 
meeting, four years from now, at least two new agreements negotiated under the agreed 
procedures should be in place.
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Revamping Aid for Trade for the 
post-Bali WTO Agenda1
Jean-Jacques Hallaert
Developing countries’ requests for financial and technical assistance acquired a high 
profile during the Doha Round negotiations. To answer them, the WTO had to cooperate 
with donors and development agencies (Hallaert 2013b). In the first half of the 2000s, 
donors facing calls to scale up aid to achieve the Millennium Development Goals were 
ready to support trade reforms. This convergence of interests led to the Aid for Trade 
Initiative.
The Initiative succeeded in mobilising a large amount of financial resources. 
However, because the Doha Round talks stalled, these resources could not support 
the implementation of a multilateral agreement. Instead, they were spent on various 
projects, some not clearly related to trade. As a result, developing countries are 
increasingly questioning the additionality of aid for trade. Indeed, ‘without evidence of 
additionality and a clear distinction between projects that would have occurred anyway 
under development programmes, it is challenging to assess whether the initiative has 
delivered incremental benefits to developing countries’ (Stiglitz and Charlton 2012). To 
make matters worse, facing a fiscal crisis, donors are reducing their aid envelope and 
are requesting evidence that the money spent has had an impact.
The future of the Aid for Trade Initiative and its capacity to support the post-Bali WTO 
Agenda will depend on its capacity to address these concerns. To do so, a change in 
approach is needed. In its Aid for Trade Work Programme 2012-13,2 the WTO answered 
the challenges by expanding its scope of the Initiative. Post-Bali, it should instead 
narrow the scope of the Initiative, in order to make it more focused and efficient. 
1 This chapter draws heavily on Hallaert (2013a).
2 WT/COMTD/AFT/W/30. 
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A change in approach: From expanding the scope of the Aid 
for Trade Initiative…
The Aid for Trade Initiative has helped to increase donor financing to the productive 
sector of the economy at a time when the overall resource envelope was expanding. It 
has also been successful in increasing donors’ and developing countries’ awareness of 
the role trade can play in development. 
These achievements are worth preserving, but with bleak prospects of raising additional 
resources, with a monitoring framework that has reached its limits without managing 
to build confidence, and limited capacity to show results, the Aid for Trade Initiative 
needs to reinvent itself.
The WTO is trying to do so by expanding the scope of the Initiative. Its Aid for Trade 
Work Programme for 2012-13 covers new issues such as gender empowerment, green 
growth, and climate change. It also gives a higher profile to topics, such as the role of 
the private sector in development, which have always been part of the Initiative but 
have recently attracted more attention of the development community.3 The role of the 
private sector in aid for trade was emphasised at the Third Global Review of Aid for 
Trade in 2011 and, for the Fourth Global Review in 2013, the monitoring framework 
has been extended to include a private sector questionnaire. 
Expanding the scope of aid for trade is said to show the Initiative’s capacity to adjust 
to the evolution of the global trade realities. In fact, it reflects more its ability to adjust 
to the evolution in donors’ priorities in order to maintain their interest and, hopefully, 
protect aid for trade from the cuts in aid budgets. 
However, aid-for-trade commitments fell by 14% in real terms in 2011. This was the 
first decline since the launch of the Initiative and was larger than the 11% fall in total 
official development aid (excluding debt relief) (OECD-WTO 2013).
3 The role of the private sector is at the core of the global development partnerships discussed at the Fourth High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan (South Korea) in 2011. 
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Moreover, expanding the scope of the aid for trade makes the challenge of showing 
results even more daunting. It also gives additional reasons for suspicion because the 
new areas have only remote relations (if any) to trade or with the trade and development 
nexus and are not among developing countries’ priorities. 
… to narrowing it down 
Therefore, instead of expanding the scope of the Initiative, the WTO should narrow it 
and make sure that aid for trade is more efficient. A streamlined Initiative should focus 
on clearly trade-related projects. This has two implications. 
First, providing financial resources to support the implementation of trade agreements 
and to cope with adjustment costs should remain the core objective of a revamped Aid 
for Trade Initiative. Concluding the Doha Round negotiations could take time but, in 
the meantime, aid for trade can be more focused on helping implementing other trade 
agreements:
•	 For WTO Members, aid for trade can support unilateral trade and customs reforms 
and the implementation of regional agreements, which often have a trade facilitation 
component.  
•	 For countries that have recently joined the WTO, aid for trade can help implement 
WTO rules and accession commitments. 
•	 For countries negotiating their accession to the WTO, aid for trade can provide 
support to clarify the implications of membership and to build the trade policy 
infrastructure that most of them lack but that is crucially needed. 
In doing so, aid for trade would build trade capacities that will be useful for the 
implementation of future multilateral agreements, would demonstrate its capacity to 
support implementation of trade agreements, and thereby address suspicions.
Second, projects that do not have a clear trade impact should not be reported as aid 
for trade. Aid for trade should help build trade capacities, but trade capacities do not 
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include projects that, however important for development, are not clearly related to 
trade. This is the case of support to productive capacities, to gender issues, and to some 
infrastructure projects. It is difficult to argue that urban infrastructure projects are trade-
related and should be reported as aid for trade. 
The purpose of narrowing the scope of the Initiative is to increase the focus on key 
elements of the trade and development nexus in order to make aid for trade more 
effective, build confidence, and secure donors financing. However, this may not be 
sufficient. The Initiative must also show convincing results. 
The best way to show that aid for trade makes a difference would be to gather evidence 
from evaluations. But robust impact evaluations are rare. This is in part due to 
methodological problems but, more importantly, to insufficient incentives to evaluate aid 
for trade projects. Donors often undertake evaluations more for accountability reasons 
than to investigate the impact of a project. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that a 
meta-evaluation of aid for trade projects concluded that ‘the evaluations’ conclusions 
provide little insight as to whether aid for trade works and why’ (Delpeuch et al. 2010). 
Evaluation should not be limited to the impact of aid for trade but also assess if aid for 
trade resources are allocated effectively (Do they go where they are needed? Do they 
finance the right projects?). Unfortunately, such studies are also rare.
Thus, the streamlining of the Initiative needs to be complemented by independent 
and robust impact evaluations and research on the allocation of aid for trade. A major 
obstacle to such analysis was lifted when the OECD made the Creditor Reporting 
System database accessible, allowing researchers to gather data on financial flows and 
details on the various projects.4
4  Predefined aid-for-trade queries are available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/aft/aid-for-tradestatisticalqueries.htm. 
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Aid for trade post-Bali
Post-Bali developing countries’ requests for assistance will remain high on the WTO 
agenda. Such assistance is even required for the implementation of a trade facilitation 
agreement. Annex D ‘Modalities for Negotiations on Trade Facilitation’ of the so-called 
‘July Package’ stipulates: ‘in cases where required support and assistance […] is not 
forthcoming, and where a developing or least-developed Member continues to lack the 
necessary capacity, implementation will not be required’.5 
Therefore, the Aid for Trade Initiative will remain relevant but it also faces serious 
challenges. Assuring developing countries that actual assistance is available has 
become more challenging. Developing countries are suspicious of the additionality of 
aid for trade and of the reality of the reported financial resources. Moreover, for many 
donors, in the absence of a Doha Round agreement, trade capacity-building is falling 
out of favour as new priorities emerge. The threat to the resource mobilisation is further 
increased by the fact that the aid envelope is shrinking as a result of the fiscal crisis 
experienced by most donors.
So far, the WTO’s answer to these challenges was to expand the scope of the Aid for 
Trade Initiative to new areas. Post-Bali, its approach needs to evolve. 
In the short term, the WTO should promote the streamlining of the Initiative to make 
it more efficient and focused on clear trade objectives. The Aid for Trade Work 
Programme for 2014-2015 should herald this change in approach and call donors to 
focus aid for trade on trade facilitation issues, on the implementation of unilateral 
reforms and regional trade agreements, on supporting the implementation of WTO rules 
by new Members, and on building the trade policy infrastructure that many countries 
negotiating their accession are missing.
5  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm#annexd.  
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Over the medium term, because streamlining the Aid for Trade Initiative may not be 
enough to maintain donor support and restore developing countries’ confidence, the 
WTO should promote the setting up of an independent body to undertake robust and 
convincing evaluations, highlighting where aid has the biggest impact on trade and 
through trade on development.
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Moving Towards a Refined Special 
and Differential Treatment
Sébastien Jean
While there is widespread recognition that rights and obligations under the multilateral 
trading system should be adapted to each country’s level of economic development, 
dissatisfaction is growing about the way special and differential treatment (SDT) is 
currently applied. Many developing countries claim that SDT as it currently applies 
to WTO disciplines has proved insufficient in balancing commitments and fostering 
economic development. Meanwhile, advanced economies have repeatedly claimed that 
SDT should be revamped to allow a better focus on those countries ‘most in need’ (e.g. 
as in the US-EU proposal in August 2003). 
What’s wrong with SDT at the moment?
The way SDT is implemented presently is inaccurate, inequitable, and inefficient. 
Inaccurate, because SDT is granted to countries classified as developing in the WTO, 
while this category, built out of self-declaration, includes countries which are now 
industrialised. Inequitable, because the same treatment is offered to countries with very 
different levels of economic development. 
Inefficient for two reasons. First, because the focus on exemptions did not prove helpful 
in fostering economic development: it relaxes some obligations without necessarily 
paving the way towards adopting good policies, while risking making beneficiary 
countries’ requests inaudible (as illustrated by the exclusion of agriculture from the 
GATT and by the long-standing specific regime applied to textiles and apparel). 
Second, inefficient because SDT now largely appears as an obstacle to reform, making 
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it difficult to strike the kind of grand bargain between developing and industrialised 
countries, which is necessary for multilateral trade negotiations to move forward. 
Why is this system so unsuitable? Two reasons should be emphasised. The first is that 
SDT relies upon a ternary typology, whereby countries are classified as developed, 
developing, or least-developed countries (LDCs). The second reason is that the system 
is static, relying on a once-and-for-all classification of countries. This is an unfortunate 
characteristic in an era where changes are so rapid in world trade. The increasing 
economic clout of emerging countries has been a ‘game changer’ over the past decade 
with, in particular, China turning itself into a trading superpower. In the meantime, 
policies themselves also changed a lot. This is reflected in the increasing gap between 
bound and applied tariffs: for agricultural and food products in developing countries, 
the latter now amount on average to less than a third of the former, meaning that any 
reasonable cut in bound tariffs will, in many cases, have little or no bearing on applied 
rates of protection. 
Domestic support to agriculture is another striking example: the OECD estimates that 
total support to Chinese farmers amounted to the equivalent of $193 billion in 2012, 
almost half the total for all OECD countries ($415 billion, according to OECD 2013). 
Moreover, domestic support in India (not included in OECD estimates due to lack of 
information), although smaller in absolute value to the one in China, also amounts to 
a huge figure, likely comparable in magnitude to those for the US or the EU (see, for 
example, Hoda and Gulati 2013). The time when domestic support could be thought 
of as a specificity of rich countries is long gone. Policies also significantly changed as 
far as exports are concerned: while multilateral disciplines focus on export subsidies, 
export restrictions proved during the last decades that they can be at least as, if not more, 
disruptive for world markets. This is largely due to developing countries’ practices. 
As a result of this static nature, reform is all the more difficult when multilateral 
disciplines are ‘path-dependent’, i.e. when they have been set with reference to policies 
carried out in the past. As time elapses, the legitimacy of such discipline may become 
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questionable when political circumstances and applied policies change significantly. 
This is in particular the case with bound duties and ceilings set for domestic support 
under the Aggregate Measurement of Support. Recognising the need to update such 
historical reference points would also be most helpful.
The increasing importance of trade-related rules also calls for a profound change in the 
way SDT is thought about. Exemptions are often useless, if not impracticable, when 
disciplines deal with rules. Standards set by advanced economies can, for instance, be 
very difficult for the poorest countries’ exporters to meet. Thinking about the way to 
make agreed rules friendly to the weakest economies is therefore far more important 
than exempting them from their application. 
The defects of the SDT system are not new but they are increasingly apparent, to the 
point where an update now appears inevitable if the negotiating function of the WTO 
is to be preserved. The core issue is the need to refine this treatment so as to make it 
more attuned to countries’ needs and to policy challenges. Creating different groups of 
developing countries does not seem to be a practicable option. It has been consistently 
resisted by many member states, and it is unlikely that any single criterion (or even 
group of criteria, for that matter) would allow sensible, general-purpose differentiation. 
Meanwhile, differentiation is already practiced in several areas (see, for example, Novell 
and Paugam 2006). Examples include the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM), where a sub-category of countries, based on a GNP per capita 
criterion, receive specific treatment. The URAA also identified Net Food Importing 
Developing Countries as a distinct category. While the DDA does not propose creating 
new categories of countries, special provisions target small and vulnerable economies, 
small island developing states, landlocked developing countries or recently acceded 
Members. The specific ceiling put on China’s domestic support de minimis (8.5% of 
the value of agricultural output, instead of 10% for developing countries) can also 
be put forward as an example of differentiation (Matthews 2007), as could unilateral 
preferences, even though this case is arguably different. 
Building on Bali: A Work Programme for the WTO
90
If any doubts remained about the consistency of such differentiation with WTO 
agreements, they have been articulated by the Appellate Body of the Dispute Settlement 
system. For example, following the Indian complaint about the EU’s so-called ‘GSP-
drugs’ scheme of unilateral preferences, the Appellate Body report concluded that ‘non-
discriminatory’ should be understood as requiring that ‘identical treatment is available 
to all similarly-situated’ beneficiaries, thus opening the way for differentiation, provided 
it is carried out based on an objective – and relevant – criteria (WT/DS246/AB/R).
Towards an objective approach
Against this background, moving towards finer differentiation on a case-by-case 
basis appears a practicable option going forward. Clearly, this would require making 
such differentiation conditional on policy topic, while taking into account the costs 
of implementation and development needs. Finding objective, possibly quantitative, 
criteria to rely upon is certainly difficult but not necessarily impossible, in particular if 
such an approach is combined with an appeals procedure. Their use could take the form 
of graduation mechanisms, as already included in the SCM agreement (Article 27.6).1 
In any case, implementation will not be easy, both for obvious political economy reasons 
and because of technical difficulties. A gradual and focused approach is thus required. 
Ministers left Bali pledging to negotiate an agreement for a permanent solution on 
public stockholding for food security purposes. This is an obvious area to start talking 
about a refined notion of SDT. In the context of this discussion, WTO Members should 
seek to agree upon a graduation mechanism by the next Ministerial Conference. For 
example, many analyses have shown sensible, quantitative approaches to food security.
The next issue to deal with should be market access, separately for agricultural and 
non-agricultural products, and possibly for services. No ambitious agreement is 
possible without concessions in this area. Discussions should be held to clarify the 
1  I am grateful to Christian Häberli for attracting my attention on this point.
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policy objectives of SDT in market access commitments. Economic development is the 
paramount objective, but the protection of smallholders may be another objective when 
it comes to agriculture, as might be financial stability in services, for instance. Once 
these objectives are reviewed, negotiations could be held on meaningful, objective 
criteria to assess the relevance of eligibility to SDT. These criteria could then be used 
as (more or less flexible) graduation mechanisms. Agreeing upon such mechanisms 
should be a negotiating goal over the next two years. Of course, finding the right criteria 
and parameters can only result from negotiations. But agreeing upon such matters could 
be a way to create new space for a landing zone.
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How can the Extent and Speed of 
Compliance of WTO Members with 
DSU Rulings be Improved?
James Flett1
Some commentators characterise the WTO compliance record as good. Relatively few 
of the 500 or so cases have gone to compliance panels; and fewer still to arbitration 
panels under Article 22.6 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). One must 
also account for the many issues settled on the basis of the WTO Agreement itself 
and the clarifications provided by the dispute settlement system. WTO Members are 
generally law abiding and do not wish to be seen in any other light. Compliance has 
sometimes taken a while, but in the long term what is important is that it is ultimately 
achieved, even if domestic firms obtain relatively long periods to adjust. The system 
works well enough. Other commentators have focused on particular cases where full 
compliance has not been achieved, or where it has taken a long time. Of growing 
concern are the issues of recidivism and self-help (in the form of tit-for-tat trade remedy 
measures or DSU proceedings). Leaving aside the more general lines of this debate, this 
contribution focuses on what could be improved, particularly in the legal as opposed to 
the diplomatic mechanisms for inducing compliance.
The issues of extent and speed are obviously linked: justice delayed can be justice 
denied. Nevertheless they are distinguished below and for each, four areas of potential 
improvement are identified. For extent: make WTO and municipal law work together; 
multilateralise the compliance process; simplify arbitration panel proceedings (and 
recognise the possibility of appeal); and revive the use and significance of suggestions. 
For speed: provide the system with the necessary resources; target as such measures; 
1 Any opinions expressed are attributable to the author and not the EU or the Commission. The author frequently represents 
the EU in WTO litigation.
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broaden the scope of compliance proceedings; and account for nullification or 
impairment arising after the end of the reasonable period of time.
This contribution is built on the assumption that the DSU should not be modified because 
this is unnecessary and hazardous for its key feature, negative consensus, and therefore 
equally a threat to the dispute settlement system and thus the WTO. Thankfully, the 
current DSU review seems to be limited to harmless improvements, such as with respect 
to sequencing. Sequencing is in fact a non-issue that has the incidental positive effect 
of keeping diplomats occupied and away from more important issues. It is the perfect 
example of a narrow textual approach; context, object and purpose obviously dictate 
that a Member electing to go for compliance proceedings does not lose its retaliation 
rights. Even if the DSU is modified following the current DSU review, this contribution 
is built on the assumption that no further modifications should be considered in the 
immediate future. Consistent with this approach, these proposals are not directed at the 
Membership as a whole, but rather at WTO adjudicators, those that advise them, and 
Members that litigate.
A general threshold point is that the extent and speed of compliance is greatly facilitated 
by the quality of reports, because it allows Members to persuade domestic stakeholders 
to comply. Attention to detail and rigour in the treatment of the facts, evidence and 
procedures, and full rational and reasonable explanation are essential. Also, WTO 
judges should not overreach. Accusations of gap-filling are almost always irrational and 
driven by vested domestic interests: judges are paid to apply the law to the facts. But 
there is one area where special care is needed: the balance between trade restriction and 
regulatory autonomy. The WTO Agreements do not impose harmonisation, whether 
through positive or negative processes, but reserve to Members the right to identify and 
weigh legitimate regulatory objectives; there is no pure proportionality test. If WTO 
judges want Members to comply with their rulings, they must respect these limits.
Turning to the four ways to improve the extent of compliance, the first is to make 
WTO law and municipal law work together. This is a lesson provided directly by EU 
How can the Extent and Speed of Compliance of WTO Members with 
DSU Rulings be Improved?
95
law. EU national judges are in fact EU judges. WTO law requires direct effect and/or 
interpretation in conformity and/or dualism that at least permits timely compliance. 
Furthermore, beyond these formalities, there are other more subtle ways in which WTO 
law and municipal law can work together. Even if municipal judges deny that they 
take account of WTO rulings, there is no doubt that they do so as a matter of fact. It is 
increasingly common for litigants to pursue a twin track, getting justice at the WTO and 
a remedy in (for example) the European Court of Justice. A particular expression of this 
is the way in which municipal injunctions can be obtained to suspend execution until 
after the end of the reasonable period of time, as occurred in the zeroing cases. This 
model is susceptible to being used in all areas of WTO law.  
A second way to improve the speed of compliance would be to multilateralise the 
compliance process. In effect, every case could be brought by the entire Membership as 
a sort of class action. Article 9 of the DSU already foresees this. A number of cases have 
already been brought by multiple complainants using standard terms of reference, and 
the model could easily be scaled to the entire Membership. All other Members could 
simply free-ride to the retaliation phase. The defending Member would then face far 
more pressure, both diplomatically and economically, to comply.
A third way to improve the speed of the compliance process would be to simplify 
arbitration panel proceedings. They should be more legal and procedural. They should 
see retaliation as a blunt instrument to induce compliance, not as a re-balancing that 
requires fine calibration. They should be much more imaginative about the potential 
scope of the nature of retaliation measures. Retaliation may be bad for trade, but it is a 
necessary evil to ensure compliance, and this needs to come more to the fore. As part of 
this, it should be recognised that arbitration panels can be appealed pursuant to Article 
17.1 of the DSU. The extra procedural burden is worth it in order to bring some order 
into this otherwise casuistic area of WTO law.   
The fourth and final way to improve the speed of the compliance process would be to 
revive the use and significance of suggestions pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU. Their 
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importance was diminished in the Bananas III case, which was a lost opportunity. They 
offer a flexible tool for differentiating between those cases where additional compliance 
pressure is necessary and those where a more patient approach is reasonable. It is not 
too late to revive them.
Turning to the four ways to improve the speed of compliance, the first is to provide the 
system with appropriate resources. Whilst the Appellate Body has generally respected 
the 90 days rule, panels and compliance panels are systematically and significantly 
late. The lapse of time makes compliance foot-dragging excessively attractive. The 
secretariat needs to be properly resourced.
The second way to improve compliance is to get at the root of a given problem: the 
measure that is as such inconsistent. This is a particularly effective means of countering 
the current tendency for recidivism or repetition. Complaining Members who fail 
to do this find themselves locked in an interminable game of catch-me-if-you-can. 
Adjudicators therefore need to be particularly open to apprehending unwritten measures, 
indirectly evidenced, so that continuing situations can be efficiently addressed by the 
dispute settlement mechanism.
The third and related way to improve the compliance process is to maintain and further 
extend the broad approach to the scope of compliance proceedings. Resources being 
limited, WTO judges cannot be expected to resolve every aspect of a measure’s WTO 
consistency in original proceedings, and are going to exercise judicial economy of 
necessity. Nevertheless, defending Members have been put on notice that the measure 
is suspect, and must be expected in the compliance process to re-consider all aspects of 
its WTO consistency. Protestations of innocence in this respect generally ring hollow. 
As a matter of fact, following compliance proceedings, defending Members generally 
have an additional period of time in which they could comply if they would really wish 
to.
The fourth and final way to improve the compliance process would be to account for 
nullification or impairment arising after the end of the reasonable period of time. WTO 
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adjudicators have so far indicated an unwillingness to do this, because the WTO is 
perceived as focused on prospective compliance as oppose to reparation for past injury 
(although a rigorous judicial analysis of WTO law on this issue in the light of public 
international law has not yet been forthcoming). This means that the passage of time 
plays in favour of the defendant. This reasoning is difficult to justify after the end 
of the reasonable period of time. Suspension of concessions could account for such 
nullification or impairment by allowing retaliation with respect to a third product (not 
subject to the main retaliation) for a temporary period, corresponding to the period 
between the end of the reasonable period of time and the commencement of the main 
retaliation. In this way, defendants would be reasonably penalised for late compliance.
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Developing Countries and DSU 
Reform
Marc L. Busch and Petros C. Mavroidis
There has long been a desire to help developing countries make more of dispute 
settlement at the WTO. Ever since the subject of Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) reform was taken up in the Doha Round, Members have proposed various ways 
to help developing countries gain more ex post compliance. In the Chairman’s current 
text (JOB/DS/14, Art. 22), DSU receives a lot of attention in this regard, the aim being 
to make retaliation more viable for developing-country complainants as a matter of 
special and differential (S&D) treatment. Two proposals merit careful attention: Art. 
22.3bis DSU provides for developing countries to ask for authorisation to cross-retaliate 
as a first option (contrary to the current text which provides for cross-retaliation only 
if retaliation in the same agreement is ineffective); and Art. 22.4 DSU changes the 
way that the level of nullification and impairment is calculated for these complainants 
(the current standard being equivalence between damage inflicted by the author of the 
illegal act and the amount of retaliation authorised). 
We worry about both proposals, less because of their mechanics than the mindset they 
create with respect to the efficacy of retaliation as being the key to compliance. We 
would prefer more S&D provisions focused on ex ante settlement.
Ecuador’s request for cross-retaliation in EC-Bananas III made the idea nearly 
irresistible, and it is now routine for developing countries to at least weigh this option. 
US—Gambling, US—Upland Cotton and US—Clove Cigarettes have drawn added 
attention precisely because cross-retaliation by Antigua-Barbuda, Brazil and Indonesia 
(respectively) looms large. We see the lessons of EC-Bananas III differently. First, 
Ecuador never followed through on its authorisation to cross-retaliate, fearful that the 
suspension of copyrights on European music would only hurt foreign direct investment 
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(FDI). Now that cross-retaliation is synonymous with poor countries hitting back 
against the intellectual property of rich countries, our concern is that it is not credible 
to fast-track cross retaliation, especially in light of the web of north-south bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) that cover intellectual property. Indeed, respect for property 
rights is among the most salient country-risk factors shaping flows of FDI, and threats 
to undermine intellectual property on an ad hoc basis can only hurt in this regard. 
We are not saying that cross-retaliation should be ruled out, but rather that it should 
not be fast-tracked. On the contrary, the harm done to FDI by cross retaliation might 
actually be lessened by adhering to a more formal vetting of why other forms of 
retaliation (as per the hierarchy established in Art. 22 DSU) are not within reach. The 
current case law has probably gone too far by imposing too much of a constraint when 
it comes to deciding on cross-retaliation. We are afraid, though, that by going too far 
in the other direction through the proposed text, developing countries might rush to 
cross-retaliation without giving adequate thought to negative externalities stemming 
from similar actions. The risk to do so depends, of course, on inter-agency coordination 
across national administrations.  
Second, more central to EC-Bananas III than Ecuador’s threat to cross-retaliate was 
the US’s implementation of carousel retaliation. By raising uncertainty on the part of 
EU exporters as to whether they would be named on the US list, carousel retaliation 
had the effect of prompting widespread lobbying in favour of compliance. True, it may 
be difficult for some developing countries to retaliate in-kind or under the exact same 
agreement, but if they can, something modeled on carousel retaliation could be the 
preferred S&D provision to cross-retaliation. If, on the other hand, cross-retaliation is 
the only option, it should be shown to be so, not fast-tracked as per Art. 22.3bis DSU.
Carousel retaliation is not necessarily DSU-consistent, of course, since there is no 
guarantee that all lists for retaliation respect the discipline established in Art. 22 DSU 
(equality between damage inflicted and amount of retaliation), unless if the requesting 
Member presents various lists for authorisation. In this case, the surprise effect is 
Developing Countries and DSU Reform
101
somewhat mitigated since all potential addressees will have been ex ante revealed. On 
the other hand, revelation might induce them to form wide coalitions to address the 
potential for retaliation through lobbying efforts. 
Art. 22.4 DSU is a step in the same direction, adding to the level of concessions 
that a developing country complainant might suspend. This may well seem enticing. 
Something like it happened in Canada—Aircraft, where the WTO factored in a punitive 
cost to what it saw as the harm done to Brazil when Canada announced its ex ante 
unwillingness to comply. Art. 22.4 DSU formalises this for developing countries, 
such that “the level of nullification and impairment shall also include an estimate of 
the impact of the inconsistent measure on the economy of such Member”. We doubt 
that this “estimate” would be within reach of an Art. 22.6 DSU arbitration. But this is 
beside the point. Even if it were, this is a highly ‘incomplete’ provision which could be 
interpreted in various ways by judges; there is no guarantee that it will be meaningful. 
More importantly, if developing countries struggle to retaliate, adjusting the level of 
nullification and impairment higher is not going to help. Small economies, by definition, 
cannot be much of a threat to recalcitrant big players, even if economy-wide effects 
enter the calculation for lawful retaliation. Worse still, it may motivate complainants to 
pursue a big judgement, rather than negotiate a solution to their dispute up front.
Our concern is that both proposals create a mindset that compliance must be pursued 
through retaliation, Art. 22.3bis DSU making it easier and Art. 24 DSU making it bigger. 
Ideally, we would like to see similar proposals in practice and then ‘measure’ how much 
they have contributed to securing compliance. Alas, we do not have this luxury. What is 
clear to us, though, is that developing countries suffer from procrastinated compliance. 
In the absence of retroactive remedies (an issue that no one wants to touch upon in 
the current negotiations), it is in their interest to look for legislative solutions that will 
promote fast-track solutions, as opposed to ex post compliance (which might, if at all, 
come at the earliest five years down the road, e.g. from the moment that a request for 
consultations has been submitted).
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Developing countries are at a disadvantage in negotiating ex ante settlement. The focus 
of S&D provisions should thus be to help make consultations work these complainants. 
The DSB Fund proposed in Art. 28 DSU can help in this regard.
Over the years, there have been many proposals to reimburse developing countries’ 
legal fees in the event that they prevail against a developed country. The problem is 
that this only increases the incentive to go the legal distance, looking for a favourable 
ruling. Art. 28 DSU explains that those countries that cannot access the DSB Fund, 
for lack of budget, may nonetheless be reimbursed where the developing country wins 
as a complainant, or does not lose as a defendant. The spirit of Art. 3 DSU is to settle 
whenever possible, not prevail in litigation at all costs. In fact, where rich countries 
do better than poor ones in dispute settlement is in negotiating mutually satisfactory 
solutions. Importantly, developed country complainants do not win more, nor do they 
get more compliance with the rulings they win. The DSB Fund should therefore invest 
in helping developing countries make more of consultations. We would start with the 
proposed reimbursement rate. First, the amount allocated for consultations should be 
increased so that developing countries can retain counsel earlier in deciding whether to 
file, and keep counsel longer should consultations go on for the additional 15 days that 
are provided for under the proposed Art. 4.10(b) DSU. 
The next step is to affirm that all legal expenses for consultations are to be covered 
by the DSB Fund, even if the case does not proceed to the panel stage. This should 
not be viewed as subsidising ‘fishing expeditions’ – which is why we know that, as 
an S&D provision, Members would never go along with the idea that rich countries 
should underwrite the legal expenses of poor ones in consultations. But in the context 
of the DSB Fund, we submit that there is already an untapped architecture in place 
that would guard against fishing expeditions: namely, Art. 27.2 DSU, which is in need 
of revitalisation, potentially as a precursor to tapping the DSB Fund. And while DSU 
has never gained much traction, we would submit that this mechanism can do much to 
improve the experience of developing country complainants in consultations.
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In line with these recommendations, we suggest the following work programme:
1. Delete Art. 22.3bis DSU and Art. 22.4 DSU in favour of Art. 28 DSU as a more 
viable S&D provision, focused on consultations, as we outline above.
2. Bridge 27.2 DSU to Art. 28 DSU to ensure that developing countries get an opinion 
about the legal merits of pursuing a dispute and the funding to launch productive 
consultations. The required text for this recommendation should be drafted for the 
next ministerial. We are well aware that this will change the nature of Art. 27.2 DSU; 
one of us (Mavroidis) has provided legal advice under this mechanism. Developing 
countries have always needed more from Art. 27.2, and we would submit that this 
is a relatively easy fix.
3. We further propose building a bridge between Art. 27.2 and the Advisory Centre on 
WTO Law (ACWL). This would facilitate the exchange of information between the 
two institutions and enable developing countries to tap a wider pool of information 
in the process. The required text for this recommendation, like the one above, should 
be drafted for the next Ministerial Conference.
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A Post-Bali Agenda for Agriculture
Tim Josling
The agenda for agricultural trade negotiations is still full after the successful Bali 
agreement. Bali considered two elements already on the table in the Doha Round 
(administration of TRQs and phasing out export subsidies) and one item that has 
been added recently (the purchase of domestic foodstuffs for stocks). In addition, the 
cotton issue has been included in the LDC agenda, though still very much relevant to 
agriculture. The remaining parts of the agenda have yet to be agreed – though the 2008 
Revised Draft Modalities (known as Rev. 4) still provide a strong starting point for the 
final push (WTO 2008). Much of this agenda could be considered within a revived 
Doha Round, though some items can be handled by negotiation between smaller groups 
of countries.
So what items on that agenda are most urgent, and hence should be included in a two-
year WTO horizon? And what other items have arisen that should be advanced up the 
list of priorities for consideration in a next phase?
Market access
The most important item on the DDA agricultural agenda items for the next two years 
is market access. Agriculture is still sheltered, and world markets distorted, by high 
tariffs – about three times the level of non-agricultural tariffs. Until these tariffs are 
substantially reduced, the global trade in foods and farm goods will fall short of its 
potential for meeting the challenges of feeding the world, responding to price instability 
and adapting to weather-related events. The DDA formula as specified in the draft 
modalities spelled out in Rev. 4 for reducing both the levels and the dispersion of such 
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tariffs is sound.1 Bilaterals and RTAs can move quickly to remove tariffs on all but a few 
sensitive products, but in the multilateral negotiations such liberalisation does not seem 
possible. So an agreement that included the DDA tariff cuts for agriculture would be a 
welcome sign that the multilateral negotiation process can still deliver.
The question is what can be offered to the food-importing countries (represented by the 
G10 of protected developed countries but also by the G33 of developing countries with 
large small-holder populations)? Two elements of the agenda fit that criterion. First, 
the Special Safeguards Mechanism (disagreement over which was in part to blame for 
the collapse of the talks in July 2008) should be speedily concluded with some proviso 
that it could not be used for long-term avoidance of increased market access. Of course, 
such a safeguard will inevitably limit the benefits of greater market access, but this is 
a price the exporters should be willing to pay. Second, the exporters of basic grains 
and oilseeds should agree to avoid export bans or excessive export taxes in times of 
supply shortage. This agreement could be part of a DDA package or a self-contained 
agreement in the name of food security.  
Export subsidies
The second priority for the negotiators as they reconsider the post-Bali agenda is to 
finally get agreement to eliminate export subsides and similar practices. An agreement 
at Bali to keep subsidies below current levels and to maintain progress towards their 
elimination should provide a boost to this objective. Once again the wording in Rev. 4 is 
suitable, and the text is now ‘stabilised’. Of course an agreement on export competition 
could be rolled into a larger Doha package, but as it would apply to only a handful of 
countries it might also be considered as a stand-alone (plurilateral) item. The countries 
concerned are actively negotiating on these issues in the context of the bilaterals and 
1 The level of tariff cuts would be significant (a minimum of 54% cut for developed countries and up to 36% for developing 
countries), with the higher tiers of tariffs being cut by more. A ceiling of 100% would be placed on most products, though 
for a limited number of ‘special’ and ‘sensitive’ products the market access would be through expanded low-tariff quotas. 
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regional agreements, and it would help in such talks if the WTO were to come to closure 
on a new set of rules.
Domestic support
The most difficult part of the post-Bali DDA agenda will be getting an agreement on 
domestic support. In many ways the significance of this item is small compared to the 
gains from better market access and the removal of export subsidies, but it directly 
impinges on farm policy decisions in industrial countries. Trade negotiators have to be 
cautious to avoid the perception that they are trading away farmers’ support programmes. 
But the domestic political backing for these support programmes in developed countries 
has eroded considerably in the dozen years since the DDA was started, and a period of 
high prices has made many of these support instruments redundant. So the time is ripe 
over the next two years for an agreement along the lines of that suggested in Rev. 4 on 
domestic support.2 Moreover, by general agreement this issue is being left off the table 
in the bilaterals and regionals, on the assumption that only the WTO can successfully 
tackle the problem. 
To reach an agreement in this area over the next two years may be feasible as well 
as desirable. The ‘negotiating leverage’ that the developed countries once considered 
they had – trading domestic support cuts for market access in emerging markets – no 
longer seems so valuable. Domestic support constraints are more likely in the future to 
impinge on developing countries. So reaching an early agreement in this area is in the 
self-interest of the developed countries (particularly the US and the EU). 
One aspect of the domestic support agenda has now become more highly charged. The 
green box (of minimally trade-distorting domestic policies) was originally intended as a 
convenient refuge for the conversion of price supports to income supports in developed 
2 The Draft Modalities call for a reduction of between 50% and 85% of price-distorting subsidies in developed countries 
(tiered by their present level) with caps on individual support instruments. An additional obligation, to limit the Overall 
Trade Distorting Support, would be agreed.
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countries. So long as they conformed to the various criteria of the green box spelled 
out in the UR Agreement on Agriculture, the expenditures were not counted against 
the support limits. So the green box criteria directly affect the amber box constraints 
(on policies that are deemed to be trade distorting). Developing countries in the main 
did not notify such policies in the base year and thus are constrained to a ‘de minimis’ 
amount of support under the Agreement. This has become an issue in the context of the 
Bali Ministerial, with the G33 led by India arguing for more flexibility in the green box 
to allow purchases on the domestic market to be put into storage without being counted 
as an element of price support for the domestic producers. The Bali compromise is to 
introduce a ‘peace clause’ to avoid challenges to such expenditure. But the issue has to 
be resolved eventually, and should by included in a two-year post-Bali agenda. 
Although the food stocks issue was one of the more contentious at Bali, several aspects 
of the green box criteria are in need of clarification or updating. Some of these relate to 
the greater emphasis on developing country compliance with the criteria (not seen as a 
major issue in the UR). Development policies that come under the heading of ‘general 
services’ often do not fit well into the existing green box categories; correcting this has 
been a part of the Bali package on agriculture. But some of the green box issues relate to 
developments in industrial country policies. The rapid growth of policies such as crop 
insurance in the US (until now not compliant with the green box criteria) and domestic 
food aid (which is supposedly compliant) has made the revisiting of the definitions 
crucial to maintain the credibility of the green box rules. If these rules are applied 
ambiguously then the dispute settlement process may get overloaded with cases. Better 
to have a clear agreement on what can and cannot be included in the green box and 
hence be free of reduction constraints. However, it may be better to think of this issue 
as one for the medium term agenda, say the next four years.
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Biofuels and price volatility
The DDA agenda for agriculture has been criticised for not addressing other pressing 
current issues. One of these is that of subsidies for biofuels. Certainly there needs to be 
an agreement on whether such subsidies come under the constraints of the Agriculture 
Agreement; at present there is no agreement on whether all the variable biofuel products 
themselves are ‘agricultural’. But it might be as well to treat this issue along with other 
energy subsidies, a topic that the WTO may need to visit in the context of the interaction 
between climate change policies and trade. 
A stronger case can be made for including in a post-Bali agenda the issue of price 
volatility. One aspect of this is the development of rules governing export restrictions and 
taxes. As indicated above, this could be a useful complement to further market opening. 
But it may be best to treat this as one component of the reaction of the trade system 
to uncertainties from climate events, financial disruptions and economic fluctuations. 
The first responsibility for addressing such issues is with sovereign governments, but 
the existence of avenues in Geneva to discuss, coordinate and alleviate the impact of 
such events on trade flows may be useful. In the case of agriculture, a work programme 
on food security could be a suitable framework for this activity. The work programme 
would be responsible for bringing forward suggestions for action by the 11th Ministerial 
Conference . The aim would be to increase the confidence of all countries in the ability 
of the trade system to assist governments in achieving growth and stability. 
Reference
WTO (2008),  Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture,TN/AG/W/4/Rev. 4.
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The WTO Negotiations on 
Agriculture: What Next After Bali? 
Melaku Geboye Desta
Introduction
The 9th WTO Ministerial Conference held in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2013 
showed that the WTO is still relevant and can take decisions. This is as important as the 
substantive policy and legal content of its decisions. Next to the highly promising and 
‘long-sought’ Agreement on Trade Facilitation, the few major breakthroughs concern 
agriculture: (1) an interim but open-ended peace clause to protect from legal challenge 
otherwise trade-distorting domestic support already in place for “traditional staple food 
crops in pursuance of public stockholding programmes for food security purposes”; 
(2) a decision to expand the list of green box domestic support measures to include 
development and land-use programmes as “general services” falling under paragraph 
2 of Annex 2 to the Agreement on Agriculture  (AoA); and (3) a decision to apply 
a slightly tightened version of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures to the 
administration of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) together with additional mechanisms to 
trigger “unencumbered access” obligations in the event of consistent and significant 
quota under-fill. The remaining two agriculture-related decisions, in the areas of export 
subsidies and cotton, are as much an expression of remorse for broken promises in the 
past as political commitments to do better in the future. 
What is striking about the Bali agriculture package is that, from a strictly trade 
liberalisation point of view, its major achievements in the area of agricultural domestic 
support represent a reversal in the sense that both the new peace clause for some amber 
box measures and the expansion of the general services category of the green box 
legitimise, rather than discourage, further trade distortions. From this perspective, only 
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the commitment on TRQ administration can pass the trade liberalisation test. However, 
if these new decisions are considered from the perspective of formal or relative fairness 
of the rules, i.e. if they are assessed by the extent to which they level the playing field 
particularly between developed and developing Members of the WTO, they are likely 
to be seen more favourably. This is so because, until now, while all developed and a 
few developing countries had the legal right to provide amber box support, albeit within 
Member-specific limits, a substantial majority of developing countries, including China 
and India, were not allowed to provide such support beyond de minimis levels. 
What next? Forge consensus around an essential minimum
Going forward, WTO Members do not have a shortage of ideas for their post-Bali work 
on agriculture; on the contrary, they have detailed technical proposals contained in 
draft modalities formulated and reformulated by a series of negotiation chairmen from 
Stuart Harbinson in 20031 to Crawford Falconer in 20082, General Council decisions3 
and ministerial declarations,4 representing almost a decade’s worth of work. Their 
challenge, far from easy, is to forge a political consensus around the essential minimum 
so as to take the process of agricultural reform to the next level. The body of proposals 
contained in the December 2008 draft of the Modalities text is still a good place to start. 
To this extent, my job here is easy: the post-Bali agenda for the agriculture negotiations 
is already in place. In this contribution, I only try to highlight what in my view should be 
at core of this post-Bali WTO work programme on agriculture. To do that, my starting 
point and guiding principle is the AoA’s own long-term objective: “to establish a fair 
and market-oriented agricultural trading system”. As the opening observations above 
may show and as will be further highlighted below, these two objectives – fairness and 
market orientation – do not always coincide.
1  TN/AG/W/1, 17 February 2003 and TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1, 18 March 2003.
2  See TN/AG/W/3 (12 July 2006); TN/AG/W/4 (1 August 2007), later revised four times: TN/AG/W/4/Rev.1 (8 February 
2008), TN/AG/W/4/Rev.2 (19 May 2008), TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3 (10 July 2008) and TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 (6 December 
2008). 
3  E.g. WT/L/579 (2 August 2004), often known as the July 2004 Package. 
4  E.g. the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(05)/DEC) of 18 December 2005. 
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The search for a fair and market-oriented system: 
Regressive v progressive routes
Under the WTO rulebook, if there is a distinction between developed and developing 
countries in terms of their obligations, it is often one where the latter are given more 
policy flexibility in terms of the level of binding commitments they have to undertake, 
the period over which those commitments have to be implemented, possible technical 
and other assistance to be made available to them, and a more development-sensitive 
approach in dispute settlement. We find many of these privileges in agriculture as well. 
However, a unique feature of the AoA is that, in all the three substantive areas of market 
access (e.g. the special agricultural safeguard or SSG), domestic support (e.g. amber 
and blue box measures) and export competition (e.g. right to give scheduled subsidies 
on scheduled agricultural products), developed and a few high-income developing 
countries enjoy special and more favourable treatment over the poorest majority of the 
WTO membership. In trade negotiation terms, what this means is that the WTO has the 
option to push the fairness agenda in these areas in either of two ways: by extending a 
right to distort the market to all its Members (the regressive route), or by banning or at 
least mitigating existing market distortion rights altogether (the progressive route). The 
latter route is, of course, superior to the former; but as we saw earlier, at Bali, the WTO 
followed a mix of these two routes. 
Export competition: Where fairness is to be found only in 
enhanced market orientation
This is one area where the solution can only be the progressive one of a complete ban 
and phase out. Traditionally, export subsidies have been the most contentious policy 
area for the trading system to handle, in the process causing enormous trade friction 
among the major players and tarnishing the image of the GATT/WTO system itself as 
one that rewards the strong and punishes the weak, because: 
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1. export subsidies always have only one objective: to distort the patterns of trade in 
favour of their recipients, which is why they were outlawed as early as 1955 for 
non-agricultural products; the same measures were tolerated in agriculture until 
1995; 
2. the new rules in 1995 explicitly allowed the richer Members to continue to 
subsidise their exports, albeit within certain limits, while explicitly prohibiting 
the poorest Members from providing such subsidies, even if money were to fall 
like rain for them from the heavens; 
3. in any case, even if the rules had allowed them, the poorest Members of the WTO, 
whose export capacity is likely to be concentrated in the production of primary 
agricultural products, would be financially unable to subsidise their exports and 
compete with similar products originating in rich countries; and 
4. the cumulative effect was that while the market share of some of the poorest 
countries with acknowledged comparative advantage in agriculture fell over time, 
the share of subsidising powers continued to grow. 
Fortunately, over the past decade or so falling stocks of agricultural supplies and rising 
world market prices appear to be obviating the need for export subsidies. Reflecting 
this encouraging development, the Doha commitment to “comprehensive negotiations 
aimed at ... reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies” 
was translated by the July 2004 package into a firm decision to achieve “the parallel 
elimination of all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export measures 
with equivalent effect by a credible end date”; the Hong Kong Ministerial in 2005 
then put that “credible date” to be 31 December 2013. On the specific issue of cotton, 
this Ministerial promised that developed countries’ export subsidies on cotton would 
be eliminated by 2006. That these deadlines have been missed by such a wide and 
uncertain margin is indeed to be regretted, but the prospect is less bleak than it might 
look at first sight, for the same reasons as above: the commercial need for export 
subsidies is diminishing and the WTO has come to realise that it can ill-afford to keep 
such a damaging anomaly in its rulebook. 
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As a result, I believe this has now become an area where the WTO can plausibly aim 
to achieve a concrete and lasting outcome by the 10th Ministerial conference along 
the lines contemplated in the 2008 Modalities text, which were accepted by the entire 
membership at the time. Accordingly, it should be within the reach of WTO Members 
to: 
1. agree, by the end of 2015, to eliminate all export subsidies and other similar 
practices over a period of two years;
2. reduce their budgetary outlay commitments by 50% as envisaged in the 2008 
Modalities text as a down payment by the beginning of 2016; and 
3.  bring those budgetary commitments down to zero by the end of 2017.
The same should apply to the other related policy instruments of export credits, export 
credit guarantees, insurance programmes, exporting state trading enterprises, and 
international food aid deliveries with elements of export subsidisation. 
In sum, export competition should be the least-contentious pillar of the AoA right now 
because the rules are simply out of date. If WTO Members deliver on this, the result 
will be a fairer, more modern and more market-oriented trading system with a much 
enhanced legitimacy. 
Domestic support: Where fairness and enhanced market 
orientation might not always coincide
Trade negotiators are like travellers; they start from where they are, not from where they 
wish to have been. In agriculture, perhaps more than in any other sector, the national 
domestic support policies of a country effectively dictate its foreign trade policy. In 
countries with the requisite resources and technical and institutional capacity, successful 
agricultural domestic support policies often lead to surplus production domestically, 
making most imports redundant and, in some cases, even necessitating resort to export 
subsidies in order to dispose of surplus production on the world market. The tri-colour 
framework of the AoA to discipline domestic support shares several features in common 
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with that on export subsidies, the most important being the explicit authorisation to the 
richer Members to use trade-distortive (amber box) measures of support while a large 
majority are explicitly prohibited from the use of such measures (outside de minimis 
levels). However, unlike export subsidies, there is little consensus as to whether or not 
they should be eliminated altogether. Indeed, unlike export subsidies, trade-distortive 
measures of support outside agriculture are only actionable, rather than prohibited, 
subsidies under the SCM Agreement. As a result, the pursuit of formal fairness can be 
approached not just through a complete ban of trade-distortive measures of support, a 
political impossibility for now, but also through the extension of the right-to-distort to 
those that have been denied it by the AoA. The peace clause agreed in Bali for domestic 
support measures intended for food security programmes in developing countries is 
close to, though not the same as, an authorisation to distort. The same can be said about 
the expanded list of general services that are now considered as totally exempt green 
box measures. 
Until Bali, the Doha negotiations had followed an ambitious programme to reduce 
trade-distortive domestic support measures both in aggregate as well as at policy- and 
product-specific levels. However, the Bali decision to protect from legal challenge 
possible breaches of AoA obligations on amber box measures in pursuit of national food 
security objectives, or the decision to expand the list of green box measures, is unlikely 
to be a one-off. We have seen from experience that as countries grow richer, they also 
increase their budgetary expenditure for agricultural domestic support. Until amber box 
measures are completely prohibited for all countries, which is unlikely for a long time 
to come, emerging economic powers such as India are likely to continue to demand 
equality of treatment in this area. If it is unlikely for those Members of the WTO that 
have the privilege to use amber box measures today to agree to their elimination, and 
if more and more developing countries continue to intensify their demands for policy 
space in this area, the WTO may need to moderate its ambition on this issue and prepare 
the ground to avoid unnecessary shocks later. Indeed, we must not be surprised if the 
success of these two otherwise regressive initiatives inspires others to start looking to 
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the SCM Agreement as a model and propose the abolition of the domestic support pillar 
of the AoA altogether in favour of a general rule that makes all non-green agricultural 
domestic support measures actionable regardless of the amount of support provided 
to individual products or the agriculture sector at large. Domestic support might have 
become a fertile ground for innovation yet again, and the approach of selective and 
careful expansion of the green box that was followed for general services at Bali has 
some potential to serve as a model for the future.
In terms of a post-Bali work programme, therefore, it will be desirable and feasible if 
WTO Members aim, by the end of 2015, to: 
1. take final decision on proposed modifications to the green box (Annex 2) 
measures, of which there are many as can be seen in the December 2008 draft 
modalities, so as to accommodate particularly developing countries’ concerns;
2. clarify the fate of the blue box (currently intended to remain as a separate box but 
subject to tighter conditions on the amount that can be spent on it); 
3.  convert members’ aggregate AMS commitments into product-specific ones; and 
4.  set firm figures by which all trade-distorting domestic support – amber, blue as 
well as de minimis – will be reduced (using the tiered formula that was first agreed 
in the July 2004 agriculture package) and the implementation period within which 
those reductions will be applied. 
Finally, it is notable that while the same factors noted earlier in the context of export 
subsidies – falling stocks of supplies and rising prices that would reduce the need for 
subsidies – also apply here, the multi-purpose nature of national domestic support 
policies precludes a simple solution here. As a result, the twin goals of fairness and 
market-orientation can be pursued in a complementary fashion, but there will also be 
times when considerations of the former may have to override the latter. 
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Market access: Where enhanced market orientation is likely 
to lead to enhanced fairness
Agricultural market access issues have been central to Doha since its early days. Just as 
in other areas, the agriculture negotiations had to grapple with such traditional matters as 
how and by how much to reduce tariffs, whether or not to adopt some principle of tariff 
harmonisation, the form final tariff commitments should take (in ad valorem terms or 
also in others?) and the level of flexibility to be allowed developing countries. However, 
agriculture also presented its own unique challenges in this area: only agriculture has a 
special agricultural safeguard (SSG) that is available to just a few Members; tariff rate 
quotas (TRQs) and their administration present a particular difficulty in agriculture 
because only in agriculture do we have minimum and current access commitments for 
the implementation of which TRQs were created; the concept of special treatment of 
selected products  (such as the rice clause contained in AoA Annex 5), which appears to 
have inspired new demands for special products (SP) and sensitive products in the Doha 
negotiations, is little known outside agriculture; and the agricultural sector suffers from 
an acute form of tariff escalation.
The Doha process needs to address all these and many more complex matters of 
agricultural market access. The proposed solution for many of these is almost predictably 
messy, containing both progressive and regressive elements. The ambitious proposal to 
apply a tiered and harmonising formula to reduce tariffs, to convert all specific and 
compound tariffs into their ad valorem equivalents, to reduce the in-quota tariffs within 
TRQs and to enhance their use through more effective methods of administration, and 
the effort to simplify tariffs can be cited as examples of a progressive agenda. On the 
other hand, the proposal to introduce new categories of products for special treatment 
(special products and sensitive products) and a new special safeguard mechanism (SSM) 
represent a degree of backsliding in the liberalisation process. The high tariff waters 
available in many poor countries means that the proposed SSM and SP mechanisms are 
unlikely to be of much practical use to a vast majority of them. To the extent that these 
developing countries are unable to make use of the built-in flexibility of their tariff 
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waters because of loan conditionalities from the World Bank or the IMF, closer policy 
coordination between the WTO and these financial institutions should be the way 
forward. By insisting on SSM and SP, and by agreeing as quid pro quo to the creation 
of a sensitive products category that would apply to up to 4% of tariff lines in developed 
countries, developing countries once again might be paying an excessive price for little 
actual gain, in the process contributing to a further erosion of the AoA’s already weak 
disciplining power on every member. That the 2008 negotiations collapsed apparently 
because of disagreements over the SSM shows how the entire system can be taken 
hostage in the pursuit of such marginal issues. 
In terms of a post-Bali work programme, I believe it will be desirable and feasible for 
WTO to aim, by the end of 2015, to:
1. remove all those eye-wateringly high, three-digit tariffs from the national 
schedules of some of its members, for which a decision to apply the proposed 
tiered formula is essential; 
2. simplify the system of bound tariffs by agreeing to a comprehensive conversion of 
all specific and compound tariffs into ad valorem equivalents; 
3. address the one-sided and unfair system of tariff escalation directly; 
4. substantially reduce or eliminate in-quota tariffs within TRQs, expand the volume 
of products that can be imported within TRQs and enhance their fill-rate and if 
this is not achievable, consider removing TRQs altogether and pursue enhanced 
market access through the more traditional and transparent route of lower standard 
tariffs; and 
5. eliminate the SSG and other forms of special treatment, which should make it 
easier to stop the de-liberalisation creep that it has inspired, including the proposed 
rules for SSM, SP and sensitive products. 
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have highlighted what I believe to be some of the essential items that 
should be on the WTO’s post-Bali agenda in its agriculture negotiations. The proposal 
does not aim to be exhaustive, nor even systematic; it only contains an academic 
observer’s reaction to the Bali package on agriculture. The result of these negotiations 
might not always serve the Agreement on Agriculture’s objective to establish a fair and 
market-oriented trading system in agriculture, but the effort must stay alive and must 
continue.
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The Quest for an Efficient 
Instrument in Services Negotiations
Patrick Messerlin
Negotiating in services boils down to negotiating on regulations. This raises two – not 
one – challenges for multilateral (WTO) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The 
first is well known and occurs during the negotiation phase: it is hard to assess the 
level of protection (that is, the level of unjustified restrictions to business generated by 
a regulation) of the services at stake which exists before the negotiations. The second 
challenge occurs after the conclusion of an agreement, hence it is rarely mentioned 
though probably the more important: it is even more difficult to monitor the fulfilment 
of the liberalisation commitments of the trading partner. After such a conclusion, a 
country can change a services regulation with the best intentions, and inadvertently 
erodes the market access negotiated in the agreement. This situation (unknown in the 
case of tariffs where each country can easily monitor whether its trading partners keep 
their commitments) creates strong disincentives to negotiate on services when the 
negotiating partners are not trusted. 
Both challenges raise the question of the efficiency of the instruments of negotiations 
on regulations. During the last 150 years, tariff negotiations have amply shown that 
inefficient negotiating instruments (requests and offers on tariff cuts on a product basis, 
tariff-rate quotas, etc.) do not necessarily bring the expected benefits from market 
opening and even can deliver costly – because distorted – liberalisations.
What then would be the most efficient instrument to negotiate on services regulations? 
Trade negotiators are amazingly vague. They often refer almost indifferently to 
‘harmonisation’, ‘mutual recognition’, ‘equivalence’ or ‘regulatory convergence’. 
Clarification is thus needed, and it should help to spot the most efficient instrument of 
negotiations.
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Harmonisation and mutual recognition: bad records
Most negotiators have a deep bias in favour of harmonisation. Regulatory convergence 
echoes this feeling: if harmonisation is not possible now, then one should hope that 
convergence will occur over time. However, the history of the EU Internal Market leaves 
little doubt that harmonisation is a non-starter. In modern economies characterised by a 
huge variety of services and regulations, a regulation can be better in one environment, 
and not in another. Comparing the regulations of various countries in a well defined 
service suggests often that few regulatory features have an unambiguously detrimental 
impact on the efficient provision of the service. This lesson casts heavy doubts on 
regulatory convergence. If regulations accompany the creative process of varieties, 
then there are no strong forces leading to regulatory convergence; regulations could 
converge at some periods of time, and diverge at others.
Mutual recognition (MR) means that each party accepts the regulations of its partner for 
the services at stake conditionally upon the adoption of a ‘core’ of common provisions 
(‘essential requirements’ in the legal jargon of the EU Internal Market). MR is thus 
a hybrid instrument: the ‘core’ is harmonised through negotiations, and only the 
rest of the provisions are subject to mutual recognition. As the ‘core’ is harmonised, 
the whole MR approach suffers from the limits faced by harmonisation – pressures 
from the firms and the negotiators for limiting the pro-competition impact of MR by 
negotiating constraining ‘core’ provisions. As a result, MR has progressively drifted to 
harmonisation, and faced the same limits. This evolution explains the very unsatisfactory 
situation of the EU Internal Market, still characterised by severe fragmentation in most 
services.
‘Mutual equivalence’: the way to go
Mutual equivalence (ME) means that each party recognises the regulations of its 
partner in a given service as fully equivalent to its own. To be politically acceptable, 
ME requires a systematic preliminary step: a joint process of ‘mutual evaluation’ of the 
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regulations at stake by the two partners. This process allows the two parties to decide 
whether the regulations examined will be covered by ME or not.
At a first glance, ME seems a bold move in the unknown. But it has actually been 
implemented by the EU 2006 Services Directive – the only EU Directive to cover such 
a very wide range of services, from logistics, to hotels, to retail, and so on.
The mutual evaluation first step has a crucial feature. It requires the involvement of 
the partner’s regulating bodies in the negotiating process, suggesting some interesting 
division of labour between trade negotiators and services regulators. Trade negotiators 
agree on broad areas of goods and services they consider as promising candidates for 
the MR approach in the agreement under negotiation. Regulators in charge of these 
services then undertake the mutual evaluation process. They examine the partner’s 
regulations, ask for clarifications and possibly changes as pre-requisites for granting the 
ME status, define exceptions (if any) for some sub-sectors of the services examined and, 
lastly, request reviews to be done for eliminating the exceptions in future negotiations.
Such a process offers a unique opportunity to build, restore or improve trust among the 
signatories. In this respect, it offers the appropriate answer to the strong disincentives, 
evoked in the introduction, generated by the absence of trust among negotiating partners.
Mutual equivalence and world welfare
ME is not only the best instrument for the negotiating partners, it is also the most 
promising instrument for the third countries which will not be part of the emerging 
mega-PTAs for the following reason. The large signatories (the US, the EU, Japan, 
China) of such mega-PTAs will be induced to make their regulations appealing to third-
country providers. In order to get better access to these mega-PTAs, third countries will 
be induced to adopt the regulations of the large signatory capable of designing the least 
costly regulations while keeping the equivalence status with its mega-PTA partner(s).
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In other words, ME gives the best definition of what should be ‘norm-setters’, a term 
often used in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Agreement (TTIP). 
Far from mirroring a duopoly of shrinking (in relative terms) economies trying to 
impose their regulations on the rest of the world (as often seems the case in the current 
TTIP context), ME creates competition among large economies to achieve the best 
regulations while not endangering the regulatory equivalence agreed among them.
By the same token, ME blurs the frontier between multilateral and bilateral negotiations 
by creating permanent incentives among PTA members (particularly the large members 
of the mega-PTAs) to give a ‘multilateral’ dimension to their domestic regulations. ME 
thus creates positive interactions between PTAs (which benefit from the higher trust 
among their members, but could generate costly trade diversion) and the WTO (which 
generates low trade diversion, but is constrained by a lower level of initial trust among 
all its Members).
A work programme for the WTO
The WTO could develop a work programme drawn from the few experiences of 
implementing mutual equivalence in services in order to better understand how this 
instrument could work at the multilateral level. A working WTO group could start by 
examining two key Articles of the EU Services Directive in order to adjust them to the 
multilateral or plurilateral services negotiations in the WTO forum.
•	 Article 14 of the EU Directive lists provisions that represent indisputable barriers to 
market access (nationality clause, obligation to have an establishment in more than 
one location, etc.). The WTO would probably endorse this list with few changes, 
and simply add barriers still existing in developing countries but no longer present 
in the EU countries when the Directive was drafted.
•	 Article 15 draws the list of the provisions that should be mutually evaluated 
(quantitative or territorial restrictions, requirements on shareholding, etc.) because 
they have the potential to restrict market access and therefore need to be clarified or 
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amended before concluding the targeted mutual equivalence agreement. Most of the 
debates in the WTO will focus on this list.
WTO discussions on Article 15 have a ‘systemic’ merit. They will give the right 
perspective on liberalisation and its dynamics by underlining that it is not so much 
liberalisation that counts (an exchange of concessions in a narrow mercantilist approach) 
but the dynamics of ‘better regulations’ that should go with it. In short, Article 15 
takes a trade agreement – be it multilateral or preferential – for what it should be: an 
opportunity for each signatory to improve its domestic regulations.
A last crucial point: all that has been said on mutual equivalence in services is valid 
when negotiating on technical norms in goods, since norms are defined by regulations. 
In goods, as in services, harmonisation is very rarely an efficient solution, and mutual 
recognition an unstable and disappointing hybrid. Showing how mutual equivalence 
is the most promising instrument could be the task of the WTO working group on 
technical barriers to trade.
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Unleashing Recognition in 
International Trade
Joel P. Trachtman
The tariff reduction enterprise that has driven the GATT/WTO system since 1947 has 
run out of steam.  Most of the low hanging fruit has been harvested, and tariffs among 
developed countries on manufactured products are generally quite low.  During the tariff 
reduction period, multilateral disciplines on non-tariff barriers were largely intended 
to limit defection from tariff-reduction commitments.  Therefore, discriminatory 
measures, and measures that failed tests of necessity or a requirement to be founded 
on a scientific basis, are prohibited.  These prohibitions have generally not imposed 
extensive discipline on national measures that have a plausible non-protectionist 
rationale, although there are some arguable exceptions.  In the field of services, there 
are no tariff barriers.  Therefore, the greatest share of future gains from liberalisation 
in manufactured goods and services trade are likely to come from reduction in barriers 
resulting from measures that have a plausible non-protectionist rationale.  
In addition, since 1947, much has changed in international trade.  Changes in 
technology, including transportation technology, and the globalisation that itself was 
promoted by the GATT/WTO system have resulted in greater specialisation and more 
complex supply chains, as well as greater homogenisation of consumer demand.  These 
longer supply chains and homogenisation of demand make it more attractive to have 
homogeneous products across markets, and not to differentiate production due to 
different regulatory requirements.  
The most ambitious regional integration projects today recognise these changes, and 
seek to provide for greater regulatory integration.  This can be seen most vividly in 
the proposals for the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), where 
the lion’s share of welfare gains will come from reducing non-tariff barriers.  In order 
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to realise these gains, the US and EU will have to engage in increased adjudicative 
determination of equivalence, or legislative or administrative rules for recognition or 
harmonisation of regulatory standards for goods and services.    
To the extent that the US and EU are successful in harmonisation, the standards they set 
will establish a focal point that many producers will wish to achieve, and many other 
countries will find it convenient to adopt these standards.  This would be a powerful 
‘California effect’, causing manufacturers to seek to homogenise their production 
according to the US-EU standard.  Because of the attraction of any US-EU harmonised 
standard, foreign producers and even foreign governments and consumers will wish to 
have some input on the content of these standards.  They may seek arrangements by 
which they can have formal representation in the establishment of these standards.  
Of course, since 1957, the relatively economically and culturally homogenous states of 
the EU have shown that it is possible, through a gradual process, to establish judicial 
and legislative mechanisms that can reduce the costs of non-protectionist barriers 
to trade.  This process included rules against discrimination, judicial application of 
proportionality requirements to domestic regulation, and judicial determinations of 
equivalence of exporting state regulation to address the regulatory concerns of importing 
states.   On the other hand, it included positive integration in the form of rules of 
harmonisation and recognition, combined under the formula of essential harmonisation 
and mutual recognition.  This process has gone a long way towards reducing regulatory 
barriers to trade in goods and services, even while the EU has engaged in substantial 
expansion to include more heterogeneous states.  
Can this type of process be initiated on a multilateral level at the WTO?  Of course 
any initiative will begin with modesty, and there are even better reasons for regulatory 
diversity in the multilateral context than in the EU context.  However, the TTIP proposal, 
along with the Trans-Pacific Partnership and other preferential trade agreements that 
are proposed to include significant reduction of regulatory barriers, show that there 
are significant potential welfare gains that may result from this type of process.  There 
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will indeed be costs of doing so as well, including costs of transition to new regulatory 
standards and costs of compromise from the regulatory standard that would otherwise 
be optimal under autarky.  The benefits and costs can only be evaluated by each state 
acting in its own interests in connection with a process of negotiation.  
But at times, states decide to accept legislative and adjudicative tools to make decisions 
in this type of area – rather than negotiating each context separately, they agree on 
majority voting rules or empower adjudicators according to specified standards – in 
order to facilitate equivalence, recognition, or harmonisation.  
Building blocks like the TTIP might be a somewhat easier path towards reducing 
regulatory barriers.  However, the most-favoured nation (MFN) rule in existing WTO 
law does not seem to permit rules of recognition that would benefit only parties to 
preferential trade agreements, and it is not clear that these measures would be exempted 
under the regional exception contained in Article XXIV of GATT.  (Yes, there is a 
plausible argument that this component of the EU Single Market project are illegal 
under WTO law.)  So, for preferential trade agreements to serve as building blocks in 
this area, some revisions, or definitive interpretations, of existing WTO law would be 
necessary.  
But even more importantly, it may be suitable in some areas to move directly to deeper 
multilateral integration of regulatory standards relating to goods and services, and the 
WTO today lacks an appropriate institutional structure to facilitate such integration. 
What would it take to do so?  
First, it would be possible for Member States to encourage WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body to apply the necessity requirements in the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade and in the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, so 
as to include a rule of equivalence.  That is, it should be understood that a national 
measure is more trade restrictive than necessary if it requires a change in a foreign 
product or service where the foreign regulation already achieves the desired regulatory 
goal satisfactorily.   No formal change in WTO law would be required in these areas. 
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However, the General Agreement on Trade in Services lacks a broadly applicable 
necessity discipline, so in that area, action by the Council for Trade in Services under 
Article VI(4) of GATS may establish appropriate rules to form a basis for equivalence. 
Alternatively, a treaty amendment could institute a rule of equivalence.    
Second, in the field of trade in goods, multilateral rules of recognition in the area of 
goods regulation could be established either by consensus among Member States, or by 
sub-multilateral groups of Member States.  These would probably not violate the MFN 
obligation, so long as goods that fail to meet the recognised standards are not considered 
for that reason to be treated less favourably (in the words of Article I of GATT, denied 
an advantage) compared to goods that meet those standards.   The distinction cannot 
be origin-based, but must be based on substantive regulatory concerns.  The Appellate 
Body has recently found in the context of the TBT Agreement that a national measure 
does not treat imported products less favourably if the detrimental impact on imports 
‘stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction rather than reflecting 
discrimination against the group of imported products’.  In the field of trade in services, 
there is already a specific facility for recognition provided in Article VII of GATS. 
In the case of both goods and services, recognition arrangements may be permitted, 
even on a sub-multilateral basis, so long as they do not artificially exclude any WTO 
Member States.  
Third, there is nothing in WTO law that restricts the ability of groups of Member States to 
harmonise their goods or services regulation.  So a project to reduce regulatory barriers 
to trade may proceed at once.  However, Member States in fear of being left out of the 
process of harmonisation that could create a standard they would de facto be required 
to follow may wish to establish a multilateral majority voting, or weighted majority 
voting, arrangement within the WTO in order to attract leading states to take account of 
their concerns in establishing a harmonised standard.  Poor states may especially seek 
to have their views taken into account in establishing harmonised standards.  Indeed, 
once harmonised standards are established, poor states would wish to have a facility by 
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which to provide them with technical assistance in meeting these newly harmonised 
goods and services standards.  
The next frontier of trade barrier reduction involves greater attention to regulatory 
barriers.  While regional integration agreements will increasingly seek to address 
regulatory barriers, more can be done in the multilateral system to address these barriers 
with greater efficiency and greater participation of affected states.  A multilateral rule 
of equivalence can be applied under existing WTO law in connection with goods, but 
a formal WTO decision would be required to do so in connection with services.  The 
experience of the EU shows that judicial enforcement of a rule of equivalence can 
provide incentives for states to agree on a standard of harmonisation pursuant to which 
exporting state regulation would be recognised as satisfactory by the importing state. 
Multilateral agreement on harmonised regulatory standards for goods and services could 
be accelerated through a majority voting system, perhaps applied first on a sectoral 
basis, and perhaps including special opt-outs for areas of special national concern. 
Special facilities may be appropriate to provide technical assistance to developing 
countries in participating in harmonisation, and in achieving equivalence or satisfying 
the requirements for recognition.  
Thus, over a two-year horizon until the 10th Ministerial Conference, Member States 
could agree on a broad decision, pursuant to Article VI(4) of GATS, to apply disciplines 
to national services regulation to ensure that they are not more burdensome than is 
necessary to achieve the relevant regulatory goal.  This necessity discipline would 
include equivalence.  It would then be for individual Member States to identify and 
bring dispute settlement cases, both under the TBT and SPS Agreements related to 
trade in goods, and under this proposed GATS decision, seeking to ensure that goods 
and services that are regulated adequately by the exporting state (equivalently in terms 
of meeting importing state regulatory goals) are not subject to unnecessary importing 
state regulation.  
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Over a four-year horizon, that is in the run up to 11th  Ministerial Conference, Member 
States could agree on specific sectors in which they would engage in majority voting with 
respect to harmonisation of regulation for goods and services.  This agreement would 
include provisions for opt-outs where important national concerns are implicated, as 
well as technical assistance to ensure full participation of developing countries.  Perhaps 
as a complementary arrangement, Member States could also agree to interpret Article 
I:1 of GATT and the MFN provisions of the TBT Agreement and SPS Agreement to 
clarify authorisation for ‘open’ recognition agreements relating to goods, similar to the 
permission contained in Article VII of GATS, in sectors not covered by their agreement 
for majority voting on harmonisation.  
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A Plurilateral Agreement on Local 
Content Requirements
Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott and Cathleen Cimino1
Introduction
The proliferation of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) remains a significant challenge to the 
multilateral trading system. ‘Micro-protection’ reached new heights compared to just 
five years ago, as countries turned towards politically expedient measures to counter 
their sluggish economies and high unemployment. The latest Global Trade Alert report 
estimates that since the Great Recession nearly 2,500 discriminatory measures have 
been implemented worldwide; the majority of them behind-the-border NTBs (Evenett 
2013, p. 61).
Among such policies, local content requirements (LCRs) and kindred performance 
requirements, while not new, have grown in popularity. Job creation and the infant 
industry argument rank as the top rationales for imposing LCRs.  By their design, LCRs 
ensure preferences for domestic suppliers of goods and services. These preferences 
come with economic efficiency costs in the form of higher prices, poorer quality, and 
project delays.  But the protective effects are uncertain, especially when LCRs take the 
form of quantitative restrictions or discretionary guidelines imposed on foreign firms.2 
Forced localisation can disrupt global supply chains and deter foreign direct investment. 
Empirical studies are mixed as to whether LCRs sometimes fulfill the tenets of the 
infant industry argument by creating industries that can compete in world markets.3 
1 Views expressed are the authors’ own.
2  For an overview, see Chapter 1 “Introduction: The LCR Phenomenon,” in Hufbauer et al. (2013).
3  For example, see Moran (1998); WTO and UNCTAD (2002).
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According to our broad survey (Hufbauer et al. 2013), 117 LCR measures have been 
proposed or implemented since 2008 by about 30 countries. Both developed and 
developing economies have imposed LCRs and across nearly all industries, with direct 
impacts on trade flows, services, investment and procurement. Based on our estimates, 
these practices in aggregate may have reduced global trade by about $93 billion 
annually.4
This LCR phenomenon has garnered attention. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
forum (APEC) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), among others, are seeking new solutions to the proliferation of LCRs. 
Mega-regional pacts, like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
are considering the inclusion of localisation disciplines within their negotiations.
An initiative by the WTO to address LCRs would offer the highest payoff. While many 
LCRs are inconsistent with the multilateral rules inscribed in several WTO agreements, 
important gaps in the current rulebook, along with weak surveillance and enforcement 
mechanisms, have allowed LCR practices to flourish. We first summarise several 
policy alternatives to LCRs, as outlined in Hufbauer et al. (2013). We then propose 
strengthened LCR disciplines that could take shape as a plurilateral agreement inside 
the WTO framework. Such an effort would set a precedent for enhanced obligations on 
NTBs, a longstanding objective of the WTO.
Policy alternatives to LCRs
Several policies are available to governments that can stimulate economic growth and 
create jobs, without the distortive impact of LCRs. Alternatives include:
•	 Promoting a business-friendly climate, such as lowered tax rates and anti-corruption 
measures, to stimulate investment over the long term.
4  For detail on methodology, see Chapter 3 “Survey and Case Studies,” in Hufbauer et al. (2013).
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•	 Developing corporate social responsibility guidelines that encourage multinational 
firms to do business with local suppliers, without crossing into ‘forced localisation’.
•	 Expanding training programmes to build on the demonstrated linkage between 
training and higher labour force participation rates.
•	 Improving logistics, such as border administration and transportation infrastructure, 
to cut trade transaction costs and boost competitiveness.
•	 Expanding investment opportunities for the private sector in infrastructure projects, 
potentially financed by user fees. 
If countries pursued these alternatives, they would, in and of themselves, provide a self-
enforcing norm against LCRs. But in practice, governments often find that ‘beggar-
thy-neighbour’ policies are easier to implement.  In that event, we recommend ‘second-
best’ protectionist policies, rather than Nth best. Second-best policies have the virtue 
of greater transparency and calculable costs, compared to the more opaque LCRs, 
and generally adhere to WTO obligations. First, if governments are determined to use 
LCRs, they should apply classic price preferences on designated projects or products 
(e.g. a 25% bid preference) rather than impose quantitative restrictions or discretionary 
guidelines. Second, governments determined to support infant industries should use 
domestic subsidies on a temporary basis rather than LCRs. Domestic subsidies violate 
WTO obligations only when they cause ‘adverse effects’ to another WTO Member, 
and in practice, this threshold is seldom reached. Lastly, governments that choose to 
protect preferred industries for an indefinite time should impose higher tariffs rather 
than LCRs. Many developing countries maintain ample space between their applied 
tariff and bound tariff levels and thus can raise tariff rates without violating WTO 
obligations. Those that do not have room to raise their applied tariffs should simply 
choose to breach their bound tariff rates and pay compensation to their trading partners, 
in the form of lower tariffs on other products.  
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New disciplines on LCRs 
Various WTO rules limit the use of LCRs, but have gaps in their coverage. A few of the 
important gaps are summarised here.
WTO rules have proven most effective when LCRs violate the GATT obligation of 
national treatment (Article III).  However, government procurement is excluded from 
coverage under Article III, and many LCRs are linked to procurement.  Some 42 WTO 
Members have acceded to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) which, 
by design, extends the national treatment principle to covered agencies. However, 
numerous exceptions are attached to national GPA schedules, and the coverage of 
sub-federal agencies is limited, leaving ample space for the continued use of LCRs in 
public procurement. Given the widespread practice of conditioning public procurement 
on LCRs, WTO Members should continue their efforts to enlarge the GPA in order 
to expand entity coverage and country participation, thereby reducing the scope for 
LCRs.5  
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) prohibits certain 
types of LCRs in the form of performance requirements, but only when coupled 
with investment incentives attached to manufacturing sectors, leaving service sectors 
as targets for discretionary LCRs. Among other gaps, new forms of LCRs related to 
technology and data currently do not fall under TRIMs disciplines.
Last, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) prohibits 
subsidies that are contingent on the use of domestic goods over imports. But a financial 
contribution coupled with an LCR must be proven to provide a benefit to qualify as a 
subsidy within the meaning of the agreement.  The benefit test, as the Canada wind 
turbine case illustrated, can be clouded by confusing factual circumstances.  In that 
5  The WTO estimates that the revised GPA, currently under negotiation, could expand market access coverage to as 
much as $100 billion dollars of procurement annually. See “Historic deal reached on government procurement,” 2011 
WTO news items, December 15, 2011. http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/gpro_15dec11_e.htm (accessed 
on November 12, 2013).
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case, the confusion arose because it was not proven that the gain arising from the wind 
turbine subsidy was any greater than the gain that the wind turbine firms might have 
received from an alternative scheme.   
Of equal importance is the weak enforcement of current rules. The cumulative number 
of LCR cases, by our count, significantly outnumber the cases subject to the resolution 
procedures of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), by 117 to 3. One reason is that 
it can be both politically and financially costly to pursue a case in the WTO. Another 
reason relates to the ‘glass house’ syndrome: countries hesitate to draw attention to 
foreign abuses in order to shield their own domestic policies from scrutiny. Finally, 
many governments do not publish their performance requirements and other LCR 
measures, in disregard of WTO transparency obligations, which makes it more difficult 
to launch a complaint. 
New disciplines on LCRs should be crafted to address these deficiencies. A plurilateral 
agreement within the WTO framework would ensure that obligations of a new LCR code 
apply only to signatories and that disputes would be subject to resolution procedures 
of the DSB. Such disciplines could feasibly be applied to new LCR practices, while 
allowing for ‘non-conforming measures’ to be scheduled on a positive list subject to 
periodic review. New disciplines could foremost narrow important gaps within the 
language of the GPA, TRIMs, and the ASCM.6  Specific provisions could include the 
following: 
•	 Projects administered by sub-federal governments and materially financed by the 
federal government should be subject to GPA obligations.
•	 Obligations under the TRIMs Agreement not to impose performance requirements 
as a condition of investment should also apply to services.
6  For more detail on proposed new disciplines, see Cimino et al. (forthcoming).
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•	 Financial contributions, as defined in the ASCM, if attached to LCRs, should 
be considered ‘actionable’ when they inflict adverse effects on another member, 
regardless of whether they confer a benefit on domestic firms.  
New rules should also be supplemented by surveillance and enforcement mechanisms 
that promote enhanced transparency obligations and real-time monitoring of LCR 
practices. Specific provisions could include:
•	 Timely, semi-annual reports of all new and existing LCRs imposed by all federal 
and sub-federal government agencies of member countries.
•	 A new body created to monitor national LCR practices.
•	 Notification requirements for new LCRs, with recourse to reverse notification 
procedures and penalties for non-compliance.
•	 Expedited consultation period for dispute resolution. 
Concluding remarks 
Moving forward, the future WTO agenda will likely centre on the successful conclusion 
of plurilateral negotiations. This pathway should encompass new LCR disciplines. 
WTO inaction very likely ensures the continued proliferation of LCRs.  Absent a WTO 
initiative, enhanced LCR obligations will become the province of bilateral FTAs and 
mega-regional trade agreements, leaving many countries on the sidelines. A new LCR 
code would not only limit the proliferation of LCRs, but would also set an important 
precedent for enhanced obligations on NTBs, a longstanding objective of the WTO.
Over the next few years, the WTO programme will likely focus on implementing the 
Bali package and on sealing major plurilateral deals, exemplified by the expanded 
International Technology Agreement (ITA) and Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). 
Like TISA, the LCR agreement should build on the conditional MFN principle. Talks 
can start in 2014 among interested parties, and the accession procedures should enable 
a widening circle of WTO Members to join the negotiations.  
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The new code would, of course, complement the enlarged GPA which is expected to 
enter into force in 2014. But the LCR code would reach practices that are not covered 
by the GPA, in particular the gaps we have noted in the ASCM and TRIMs.   Ideally the 
WTO agreement should be launched by 2016, reinforcing whatever LCR disciplines 
are declared by the mega-regional agreements – TPP, TTIP, and RCEP.      
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Exchange Rates: Alien to the WTO?
Hector Rogelio Torres1
Since 2008 the US Federal Reserve (Fed) has printed approximately 3 trillion US dollars 
and it is still pumping in $85 billion every month. It uses them to purchase long-term 
US government bonds and mortgages so as to keep long-term interest rates down, as 
part of so-called ‘quantitative easing’ (QE). The Fed is not alone in this. Japan’s central 
bank is acting similarly and other reserve-issuing countries have also indulged in QE. 
The Fed is not trying to weaken the US dollar (though I cannot be as sure in Japan’s 
case), but rather is trying to boost domestic growth and job-creation. Nevertheless, this 
extraordinary liquidity may compound financial volatility. 
Earlier this year we saw a hint of what this could mean for exchange rates. In late 
May the Fed gave some ‘forward guidance’ to markets by announcing that, if certain 
conditions were met, it could start slowing-down (‘tapering’) and eventually ceasing 
the creation of new money. The subsequent reverberations in emerging market 
economies (EMEs) were strong and many experienced steep currency devaluations. 
The expected ‘tapering’ was then delayed and in September markets went into reverse, 
appreciating EMEs’ currencies to the dollar. When tapering actually happens, exchange 
rates could experience severe volatility. Whereas the industry is normally happy with 
a weak currency, sharp swings in exchange rates are less welcome. Financial traders 
may make good money but those producing tradable goods or services will feel that 
the ground is shaking. Some EMEs have been preparing themselves by building up 
additional reserves (hence using resources to buy dollars, rather than importing goods 
and services). But, given the unprecedented amount of liquidity created, reserves 
1 I wish to thank Professor Richard Baldwin and Michele Ruta for their comments. Any errors are my exclusive 
responsibility. Opinions are strictly personal and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of neither the IMF nor 
the WTO.
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may not be enough to contain volatility and governments could experience calls for 
‘protection’ and accusations of ‘currency manipulation’ (by trading partners). 
Exchange rate volatility and trade could be quite a hot topic in the coming years and 
the rather legalistic discussion of whether WTO rules are prepared or not to deal with 
exchange rates could be overtaken by events. Should trade ministers bring the subject 
to the WTO, or should they rather wait for their colleagues at finance ministries to 
do ‘something’ at the IMF? In my view the question is moot. The problems raised by 
compounded exchange rate volatility could be too big to ignore and trade ministers will 
somehow feel (and rightly so) that the WTO should play a bigger role in promoting 
policy coherence and concerted action. So the real question is: Who should do what? 
Exchange rates are the Fund’s bread and butter. Yet the IMF has never found a country 
‘manipulating’ its currency ‘to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other 
members’, which represents a breach of a IMF member’s statutory obligations. So trade 
ministers should not expect the IMF to enforce disciplines on exchange rates. 
The IMF is, nevertheless, concerned with the negative spillover effects of QE and it 
has recently accepted that imposing capital restrictions may be necessary to contain 
financial volatility (exchange rates included). Legally speaking, IMF members were 
always free to restrict financial capital movements. The Fund only bans one kind of 
capital restrictions – those imposed on capital transfers that are for the purpose of 
settling current transactions (as those resulting from trade in goods and services). 
However, until very recently capital flow management measures (CFMs) were 
stigmatised. The massive liquidity creation (and the consequent serious risk of financial 
volatility) moved the Fund to acknowledge that capital restrictions were ‘respectable’ 
policy tools, albeit of a ‘temporary’ and ‘last resort’ nature. The IMF is still keen to 
over-emphasise the benefits of financial flows and recommends flexible exchange rates 
as the best protection from the negative spillover effects of ultra-loose monetary policies 
(in the US and elsewhere). Still, the severity of the challenge is undeniable and the Fund 
is closely monitoring its potential consequences on trade. An ‘external sector unit’ has 
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recently been created (in its mighty Strategy, Policy and Review department) to unify 
the analysis, review, and policy development of the ‘external sector’, encompassing 
exchange rates, capital flows, and trade. This is in sharp contrast with the WTO that, 
just before the crisis (2008), decided to dismantle its Trade and Finance Department. 
In Geneva many believe that the WTO should keep exchange rates at bay. I, for one, think 
that WTO rules are unprepared to discipline the subtle ways in which governments can 
intervene to repress appreciation or to devalue a currency. It would be very difficult to 
prove that a trading partner, by loosening its monetary policies or building up its foreign 
reserves, is ‘frustrating’ the ‘intent’ of WTO provisions (Article XV.4 of GATT1994) 
or providing a subsidy that is prohibited or actionable in the terms of the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. However, this does not mean that the WTO 
should just brush-off the problem on the assumption that the IMF is better prepared for 
it. 
Conventional wisdom indicates that weakening a currency (or repressing appreciation) 
is tantamount to cutting wages and making domestic products more competitive. 
However, the effects of devaluations are less clear for ‘task-exporting’ countries, where 
the value added to exports is a fraction of the cost of imported inputs. In such cases, 
devaluing the domestic currency would cheapen the fraction of domestic production 
costs, but raise prices of intermediate inputs processed and integrated in exports. 
The IMF has recently published a seminal study2 finding that the increased influence of 
global value (added) chains (GVCs) on international trade warrants changing the way 
it calculates national competitiveness (in technical terms, their real effective exchange 
rates). Currently trade flows (one of the components for the calculation) are measured 
in gross terms, on the assumption that countries mostly trade final products produced 
on the basis of domestic inputs. This assumption is not valid in countries whose exports 
are part of global chains of production. 
2  Trade Interconnectedness:-The World with Global Value Chains, August 28, 2013.
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However the importance of GVCs should not be exaggerated. According to IMF 
estimates and projections,3 international trade is not growing faster than world output 
(in 2013 both are at the snail’s pace of 2.9%) and in 2012 world output growth 
outpaced trade growth by a significant margin (3.2% vs. 2.7%). This is suggesting that 
the importance of GVCs may not be so large and that governments may still gain a 
competitive advantage by weakening their currencies. 
Some reasons could tentatively explain why trade growth is not outpacing output growth 
and, therefore, why the ‘benefit’ of devaluing a currency (or repressing its appreciation) 
may still outweigh the damage it could cause to producers integrated into GVCs. Wage 
differentials between advanced and emerging economies are narrowing and, on top, 
many advanced economies are actively fighting production outsourcing; both of which 
could be at the very least holding back the growth of GVCs.  
It is difficult to pinpoint a cause explaining why, despite GVCs, trade is not growing 
faster than output. Moreover, trade in some manufactured products may still be growing 
faster than the share of manufacturing in GDP, but this could be happening only in 
countries really involved in GVCs, where informal protectionism and red tape is at bay. 
In any event it is quite apparent that governments continue to assume that an artificially 
weakened currency provides an unfair competitive advantage to the ‘manipulator’.  
Is the WTO the place to monitor exchange rates? The answer is both yes and no. 
As noted above, WTO rules were not designed to detect purported exchange rate 
‘manipulation’. However, the recent global economic crisis has underscored the need 
to match economic interdependence with enhanced coherence in global economic 
policy-making. The WTO offers a unique forum for multilateral policy dialogue 
and information sharing. As such, the WTO could facilitate concerted action and 
international cooperation to limit the trade consequences of exchange rate volatility. 
3  World Economic Outlook, October 2013.
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This is well within the WTO’s remit,4 and the periodic multilateral monitoring of trade 
measures (initiated in October 2008) has been a positive contribution. 
However, the WTO’s radar mostly misses monetary policies with potentially important 
trade implications. The time between the Bali Ministerial and the next should be used 
to rethink and re-launch the WTO’s cooperation with the IMF. For instance, the WTO 
could team up with the Fund to prepare an external sector report (covering trade, 
financial, monetary and exchange rate policies). Such a report could feed into the 
WTO’s multilateral TPR monitoring.
The WTO could also help integrate trade into the G20’s Mutual Assessment Process 
(MAP).  The G20 leaders pledged to work together in a MAP; they periodically 
identify economic objectives and the policies they will be implementing to reach those 
objectives. This makes governments mutually more accountable. However, the MAP 
does not include trade policies. G20 members could be invited to lay down the trade 
policies that they will be using to achieve the economic objectives identified in the 
MAP. The WTO (as the IMF does) could assist G20 members to periodically assess 
progress in meeting the aforementioned objectives.5 Mainstreaming trade into the MAP 
would expose potential inconsistencies between economic objectives and trade policies, 
therefore deterring G20 countries from slippage into protectionism. Adding a trade 
chapter to the aforementioned MAP would also enrich the understanding of the causes 
and consequences of exchange rate movements, including policy-related determinants, 
and taking such a step would reinforce multilateral monitoring by the WTO.
About the author
Hector Rogelio Torres is Alternate Executive Director at the IMF and WTO staff (on 
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together—and whether, collectively, they can achieve the G20's goals. The WTO could do the same.
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Trade and Climate Change – 
Establishing Coherence
Laura Nielsen
Coherent policy choices
Climate change and trade is not a new topic on the policy agenda, but it may be time to 
add the missing component – coherence.  
It seems contradictory to support and perhaps even advocate green trade liberalisation 
whilst at the same time refraining from unilaterally liberalising trade on a chosen group 
of products – if this is thought to be so desirable, why should it not be accomplished free 
from any mercantilist considerations? It seems equally contradictory to seek liberalising 
green trade whilst at the same time reserving the right to impose antidumping or 
countervailing duties, and perhaps even imposing such or seeking to impose such on, 
for example, solar panels. 
If one accepts the idea that green trade liberalisation is desirable, this must be based 
on the premise that lowering prices on these goods can assist the world in scaling 
up renewable energy technologies.  If one accepts that premise, it seems even more 
desirable if a government is so ‘generous’ as to subsidise and hence further lower 
prices on products.  Accepting that premise also means refraining from engaging in 
mercantilist considerations of ensuring that one’s own country obtains the economic 
rewards from the green industry that particular country excels in or wishes to excel 
in.  It is precisely those types of arguments that can explain why unilateral trade 
liberalisation is not occurring and why it seems so pressing to impose antidumping 
and/or countervailing duties on green goods.
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However, to give a more balanced and more politically digestible view for governments, 
the realistic coherent policy goal is probably this: there should be an agreement on a list 
of green products on which governments liberalise trade simultaneously, whilst at the 
same time allowing some government intervention in promoting green industries – in 
a type of green light subsidy with clearly defined limits that should not be actionable 
or subject to countervailing duties.  Antidumping may be more difficult to tackle due 
to the involvement of private actors, but it would certainly be beneficial if governments 
refrained from imposing antidumping duties on the scale of which it is presently 
occurring.
Green trade liberalisation
After the advent of the APEC list of green products, it seems realistic that an agreement 
on green, climate friendly or sustainable energy generating products would be possible 
to reach at the WTO. Whether this negotiation should begin with the already politically 
agreed-upon APEC list and seek to expand the list and aim at further lowering tariffs, 
or follow the SETA/SETI format, or even resurrect the failed efforts of the green trade 
liberalisation from the Doha Round, albeit with a new and different mandate, is a 
political decision only the WTO Members can make.  However, with the APEC list as 
a starting point, the pragmatic point of view is probably that many WTO Members at 
present live up to the 5% target and this starting point would make it relatively easy 
for those to accede to such an agreement.  From this starting point, the negotiations 
could aim at broadening the list and further lowering the tariffs.  What matters is that 
a list of products which the WTO Members can agree upon is embedded into a full-
fledged WTO Agreement or alternatively a plurilateral WTO Agreement allowing some 
Members to proceed while others choose not to.  The different manners in which this 
can be designed in and outside the WTO system have already been succinctly described 
in ICTSD publications.1
1  See ICTSD list of publications concerning SETA/SETI at http://ictsd.org/programmes/climate-change/a-sustainable-
energy-trade-initiative/research-analysis/ 
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Subsidies on green technologies
The so-called ‘green light’ subsidy in the SCM Agreement could be reinstated and 
amended so it covers only subsidies granted to support renewable energy generating 
equipment or green technologies – or perhaps covering the identical list on which WTO 
Members have decided to liberalise trade. It would naturally have to include a limit on 
the magnitude of the subsidy so that the prices would not get overly distorted, but some 
minimal subsidisation could be allowed. The subsidies should of course not be linked 
to WTO-inconsistent local content measures or import substituting measures – so the 
subsidies to, for example, feed-in tariffs would not be actionable provided they were 
granted equally to green technologies irrespectively of where they are produced.
While this type of negotiation at the outset seems more politically sensitive and perhaps 
even an impediment to establishing a green trade liberalisation plurilateral in the WTO, 
it nevertheless seems important that the policymakers consider it a necessity in the 
long run.  It could, for example, function so that it becomes active upon the ratification 
of the green trade liberalisation plurilateral from 50 WTO Members – recalling 
that plurilateral rules on subsidies are not realistically going to function, although a 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ on not pursuing CVD actions to subsidies of a low magnitude 
may be the interim solution preventing the worst types of problems.  This ‘gentlemen’s 
agreement’ may even be extended to ADD.
Fossil fuels
In the ideal world, a comprehensive agreement such as the SETA should be reached. 
This agreement would also address the issue of fossil fuel subsidies, which contribute 
greatly to blocking the scaling up of renewable energy technologies. Currently, the 
Global Subsidies Initiative by IISD estimates that around US$600 billion a year are 
granted as subsidies to fossil fuels.2 This is estimated to be three times the amount 
2  See The Global Subsidies Initiative at http://www.iisd.org/gsi/fossil-fuel-subsidies/fossil-fuels-what-cost 
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granted to green technologies.3 The removal of subsidies is estimated by OECD to 
result in a 10% lowering of greenhouse gasses by 2050.4
While the issue was discussed at a side event at COP19, it is not necessarily a topic best 
suited to the UNFCCC process.5 It could perhaps more optimally fit the WTO-agenda 
where the experience with enhancing transparency of and ‘locking in’ the agricultural 
subsidies at a certain level, with a gradual reduction plan, proved very successful in 
the Agreement on Agriculture.  Using either the export subsidies or domestic subsidies 
model of ‘locking in’ and gradually reducing the subsidies would be a strong starting 
point for such negotiations. This would not remove such negotiations from the 
UNFCCC, but it could be strong starting point for any further reform at the UNFCCC 
process.
Suggested Work Programme for the WTO
During 2014-15 commence negotiations on green trade liberalisation, 
including:
•	 Decide on the starting point – the APEC list and 5% tariffs? Moving on to goals of 
2% and duty free treatment by 2018? 2020?
•	 Design a plurilateral agreement in the WTO and start discussing embedding a 
green light subsidy to become active in the SCM Agreement upon, for example, 
50 ratifications. If it proves impossible, then adjust the amount governments are 
allowed to subsidise to a minimum, with perhaps a built-in re-negotiation deadline 
two years after it enters into force to take stock of the associated effects.
3  See The World Economic Forum at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC/2013/WEF_GAC_GovernanceSustainability_
GreenLight_October_Report_2013.pdf 
4  See The OECD at http://www.oecd.org/env/45575666.pdf 
5  See The Global Subsidies Initiative at http://www.iisd.org/gsi/news/cop19-side-event-fossil-fuel-subsidies-and-climate-
change 
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•	 Discuss the opportunities for a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ on exercising self-restraint 
in imposing new CVDs and ADDs – perhaps agreeing on consultations with the aim 
of finding political solutions for the cases actively pending or potentially pending 
in the near future.
During 2015-16 continue negotiations on green trade liberalisation, 
including:
•	 Have a draft list ready with a set timeline for when new products can be accepted on 
the list – for example revision of the list every three years.
•	 Have a draft plurilateral ready for the adoption at the Ministerial in December 2015.
•	 Start preparing negotiations on fossil fuel subsidies – perhaps getting a negotiation 
timeline ready for the Ministerial in December 2015.
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Can the WTO Adapt to a World 
Where Everyone Is Empowered to 
Engage in Global Trade?
Usman Ahmed, Andreas Lendle, Hanne Melin and Simon 
Schropp
“The fast pace of innovation is at odds with the outdated trade disciplines that still 
govern us.”
WTO Director-General Roberto Azevêdo (October 2013)
In 1995, the WTO was created ‘to develop an integrated, more viable and durable 
multilateral trading system’.1 At the time, the majority of global trade involved large 
multinationals trading physical products across borders to large local businesses 
that would then work through a network of smaller businesses and intermediaries 
to eventually reach local consumers. The multilateral trading system has played an 
important role in bolstering this global supply chain model by reducing tariffs and 
providing rules of the road for large, sophisticated businesses engaging in goods and 
services trade. 
Notably, the mid-1990s also marked the time when the commercial internet began to 
take shape. In less than 20 years, the commercial internet evolved from a global user 
base of less than 20 million to a user base of over 2.7 billion.2 This rapid expansion has 
revolutionised the way people live, work, communicate, find information, consume, 
and trade. 
1  See chapeau of the Marrakech Agreement.
2  Internet World Stats.
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The internet is enabling a novel parallel model for trade. A business of any size can 
now utilise the internet – and the services built on top of it – to connect directly with 
a customer in another country. The internet greatly reduces the search, information, 
marketing, and transaction costs that have traditionally limited the ability of smaller 
businesses to participate in global trade. At the same time, it has developed mechanisms 
and processes that establish trust between market participants. Internet voice and video 
services improve long distance communication, social platforms help to build brand, 
marketplace platforms provide powerful reach, and payment services facilitate trusted 
transactions. We refer to this parallel model for global trade as the ‘global empowerment 
network’.3 
A growing evidential base on internet-based international 
commerce
eBay Inc. has spent the past two years researching the scale, scope, and effect of the 
global empowerment network. Their findings shed light on the relevant of this recent 
global commercial phenomenon:
•	 More than 95% of commercial businesses on the eBay platform export.4 This is 
true for eBay businesses based in developed5 and developing countries.6 In contrast, 
evidence for traditional firms suggests that typically less than 20% of brick-and-
mortar firms export.
•	 When exporting, commercial eBay sellers reach a very large number of countries. 
They are what one may call ‘micro-multinationals’. The average commercial 
eBay seller ships to consumers in 20 to 40 different countries within just one year. 
3 The National Board of Trade describes the characteristics of e-traders as (1) selling into a large number of markets 
simultaneously, (2) seldom established in the markets they sell into, (3) small, and (4) often shipping a large number of 
small consignments rather than single big ones. (see Report 2012:4, E-Commerce: New Opportunities, New Barriers).
4 We define “commercial eBay businesses” as those with annual sales of at least $10’000 USD.
5 For evidence on the US, see Lendle et al. (2013); see also eBay’s report Enabling Traders to Enter and Grow on the 
Global Stage. 
6 See Lendle and Vézina (2013). For more evidence on developing countries, see Commerce 3.0 for Development: The 
promise of the Global Empowerment Network.
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Again, this is in complete contrast to traditional offline exporters. Evidence from 
a comprehensive dataset provided by the World Bank suggests that the average 
number of markets reached by traditional exporters is around three (World Bank 
2012). 
•	 Finally, geographic distance (a commonly used proxy for trade costs) matters 65% 
less for technology-enabled trade than for traditional trade (Lendle et al. 2012). 
The technology-enabled marketplace truly is flat and the opportunity for businesses 
of all sizes will only continue to grow. Findings from market research firm Nielsen 
demonstrates that cross-border retail trade among six key markets alone (the US, the 
UK, Germany, Australia, China and Brazil) will triple to over $300 billion by 2018.7 
There are significant benefits to the global trading system from the rise of the global 
empowerment network:
•	 Small-scale and artisanal producers or retailers of niche products can reach a global 
market, something that was practically impossible before the emergence of the 
internet. These small entities can thus benefit from economies of scale and improve 
their growth prospects. 
•	 The founding WTO document, the Marrakech Agreement, recognised the need 
for ‘positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries secure a share in 
the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic 
development’.8 Research demonstrates that the global empowerment network has 
similar effects in the developing world as it does in the developed world. Developing-
country businesses that were traditionally isolated from global markets stand to reap 
tremendous gains as a result of the internet. 
•	 Consumers and small-scale producers benefit from gains in variety that are provided 
by technology-enabled trade, especially those in small and remote countries with 
struggling domestic retail sectors. International selection increases competition all 
7  See eBay’s report Modern Spice Routes: The Cultural Impact and Economic Opportunity of Cross-Border Shopping.
8  See chapeau of the Marrakech Agreement.
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the way down to the retail level. It ensures that gains from trade directly benefit final 
consumers, whereas an increase in traditional trade does not always lead to falling 
consumer prices. 
Moving beyond an ‘offline’ trade policy mindset
The multilateral trade rules have unsurprisingly been drafted with traditional – offline 
– exporters in mind. However, if the WTO framework is to remain relevant in the 
21st century, the global trading order must start taking into account the expectations, 
needs, and concerns of technology-enabled traders. WTO Members should therefore 
modernise and amend their trade agenda to create policies that will be relevant for the 
billions of internet users all over the world. 
The traditional policy issues tackled by the WTO (tariffs, subsidies, quotas and such) 
have limited effect on the global empowerment network. For small transactions of, 
say, US$50 a 5% import duty is relatively minor in absolute terms and will affect 
trade less than high shipping fees or a $10 customs processing fee. Therefore, future 
tariff reductions through WTO negotiation rounds are unlikely to significantly affect 
technology-enabled trade, unless policymakers complement the trade agenda with 
topics relevant for 21st century internet-based commerce.
A revitalised work programme on electronic commerce
There are several concrete steps that WTO Members can take over the next four years 
‘to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system’ for the 
modern internet age:
•	 Improve and harmonise customs procedures by raising de minimis levels. 
The recent agreement on Trade Facilitation represents an important first step in 
addressing the difficulties that modern businesses have with customs. Inefficient 
customs procedures affect all types of trade, but technology-enabled trade can be 
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particularly impacted not only because small businesses shipping low-value items 
have less capacity to deal with customs, but also because final consumers now have 
to deal with customs formalities. Frequent traders with bulk shipments often receive 
preferential treatment through expedited procedures, to which most technology-
enabled businesses will not have access. Notably, the costs from collecting customs 
on these low value shipments can exceed the revenues governments receive from 
them (see Hufbauer and Wong 2011). Raising and harmonising de minimis levels (the 
level below which imports are exempted from duties and paperwork requirements) 
will facilitate technology-enabled trade, reduce confusion for final consumers, and 
enable customs agencies to save money and focus their energies on security. 
•	 Optimise and harmonise the postal system. In many countries, there is a large 
gap between cheap, slow and untracked postal service providers on the one hand, 
and expensive, fast and tracked services on the other. Filling the middle – providing 
efficient, reasonably priced and reliable postal services for international shipments – 
is a key ingredient for the successful growth of technology-enable trade. Moreover, 
postal systems rarely use harmonised systems or standards, thus once a package 
leaves national borders it is difficult to track. The WTO could work closely with the 
United Postal Union to create binding rules for international postal communication 
and cooperation.
•	 Structure a global consumer rights system. The emerging trade landscape is 
one where businesses serve consumers directly and worldwide. Therefore, the full 
potential of technology-enabled trade depends on ensuring that both businesses 
and consumers are confident transacting across borders. Consumer concern 
about engaging in a transaction with traders in foreign markets is an important 
trade barrier. Heterogeneous consumer protection rights between countries may 
effectively exclude consumers from engaging in international transactions. Indeed, 
former Director General of the WTO Pascal Lamy was quoted in a recent article 
suggesting that the WTO should act on consumer regulation and harmonisation 
efforts (Financial Times 2013). The WTO could take practical steps towards 
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‘leveling up’ consumer legislation worldwide through a system of transparency 
mechanisms (e.g. an ‘exchange platform’ for consumer legislation) and globally 
standardised dispute resolution.9 
•	 Maintain the principles of interconnection and openness that form the core 
of the internet. The beauty and power of the internet is that it is an open global 
interconnected network. National governments around the world are exploring 
policies that would de facto create localised versions of the internet in response 
to very legitimate concerns about surveillance, privacy, and consumer protection. 
Moreover, the openness of the internet is regularly threatened by powerful actors 
(governmental and non-governmental) that seek to drive users to particular services. 
The WTO should discourage actions that seek to disconnect portions of the Internet 
or that give preference to certain services over others. 
There is a tremendous opportunity for WTO Members to create new rules that will enable 
the growth of the global empowerment network. The dormant WTO Work Programme 
on Electronic Commerce can take a central role in driving the work outlined in this 
chapter. If the WTO fails to remove some of the barriers to technology-enabled trade, 
the beneficiaries of the global empowerment network may be limited to a handful of 
larger players – those able to internalise the costs of policy hurdles. By acting now to put 
the right global policy framework in place for the internet, WTO Members can ensure 
that the internet continues to operate as a powerful force for economic development in 
the future. 
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Cross-border Data Flows in the Post-
Bali Agenda
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama
The progress between Doha and Bali
One of my least controversial remarks about the WTO concerns one of its biggest 
controversies – the digital economy. Brian Hindley and I noted that ‘the versatility 
of internet technology was understood by few observers, and trade negotiators were 
not typically among those few’ (Hindley and Lee-Makiyama 2009). There are many 
contrarieties between the digital economy and international trade law, and the stasis 
of multilateralism has not contributed to solving them; the draft declaration of the 
Bali Ministerial Conference does not change this fact.1 As usual, the e-commerce 
moratorium was merely extended until the next ministerial conference, binding the 
membership to ‘continue their current practice of not imposing customs duties on 
electronic transmission’.2 
However, the practicality of the moratorium is questionable. It is technically difficult 
for most governments to introduce discriminating duties on ‘foreign’ data flows as they 
are in most cases indistinguishable from domestic ones.3 The moratorium remains the 
only WTO text to directly address the question of trade-related aspects of data flows. 
Moreover, the WTO Members have done little to remedy the situation as no proposal on 
cross-border data flows ever fell within the modalities of the Doha round. 
1  WT/MIN(13)/W/3.
2  WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1.
3 There are occasions where it is technically feasible to such duties. See Lee-Makiyama, Samarajiva, Whither Global 
Rules for the Internet? The implications of the World Conference on International Telecommunication (WCIT) for 
international trade, ECIPE Policy Brief No. 12/2012.
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As a result, a new breed of digital trade barriers has flourished where the trading system 
has failed – legal bans, physical blocking, selective filtering and slowing down of 
foreign websites still occur. Some economies have moved towards a ‘licence to operate’ 
regime where a ‘content licence’ is necessary to keep a website accessible in the 
country (Hindley and Lee-Makiyama 2009). In the wake of the electronic surveillance 
revelations, data localisation requirements and privacy laws have also been enacted to 
intentionally limit commercial data-processing overseas. 
Inherent incompatibility with GATS
Despite this, no comprehensive catalogue of trade disciplines has ever emerged in 
any geometry of trade to date. Both the multilateral and bilateral trade agreements 
are still structured according to GATS and its four modes of delivery that predates the 
creation of the internet. As neither the internet nor data flows are always a ‘sector’ or a 
mode of delivery, current GATS architecture represents a systemic problem. Effective 
data access requires liberalisation along at least two dimensions: first, as cross-border 
delivery (mode 1 and 2) of the sector of the data subject (e.g. banking, retailing); 
second, for the underlying business processes (such as data storage, online processing), 
which are typically computer and related services (CRS).4 
Furthermore, the existing regulatory disciplines are originally designed for liberalising 
voice communication rather than data. Both the GATS Annex on Telecommunications 
and the Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications were drafted to ‘lock in’ 
telecom deregulations during the 1990s. Only the GATS Annex have some internet 
relevance, providing MFN terms and non-discrimination for the use of public networks 
for interconnection and movement of information,5 but by and large, it is ineffective 
in addressing the existing barriers. To fill this void, the legal dynamism of disputes 
has provided a stop-gap jurisprudence – to date, all disputes concerning GATS to date 
4  Understanding on the scope of coverage of CPC 84, S/CSC/W/51, TN/S/W/60.
5  GATS Annex on Telecommunication, Article 5b and 5c. 
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deal with online services in some form.6 The important interpretations on technological 
neutrality and GATS general exceptions, such as the necessity criteria or the rule of 
least trade restrictive measure, have been derived from these disputes.7
Establishing a new discipline on data flows
The services industry no longer trades in ‘modes’ but instead through the movement of 
competences (e.g. consultants), intellectual property (often transmitted via goods such 
as devices and servers), investments, and cross-border supply by data flows. Whereas 
the first three feature in clearly defined sections of WTO agreements, the trade aspects 
of data remain a blind spot of the multilateral system. 
Moreover, trade negotiators often make the erroneous assumption that data flows 
ought to be dealt with under GATS. Meanwhile, an increasing number of goods like 
smartphones, medical devices or cars transmit and process information. It is self-evident 
that a car should not need to be classified as a telecom operator or an online processing 
service to be granted market access. In extension, online barriers on goods would have 
to be addressed with the TBT agreement or as a non-violation complaint (NVCs), a role 
they were ultimately not designed for. 
The multilateral system is in need of a horizontal discipline to deal with all trade-related 
aspects of data, for goods and services alike, in the same way that TRIPS established 
a basis for IP-related aspects of all trade. Drawing on the GATS Annex and recent 
preferential agreements, the horizontal discipline would grant open access to public 
or proprietary information between WTO Members for commercial entities. Despite 
recent attempts to advance e-commerce regulations, such horizontal disciplines on data 
flows are few even amongst the most recent preferential agreements, which tend to 
simply incorporate existing WTO texts. One notable exception is the Korea-US FTA, 
6  United States – Measures affecting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services, DS285; China – Measures 
affecting trading rights and distribution services for certain publications and audiovisual entertainment products, DS363.
7  For further analysis of these cases, see Hindley and Lee-Makiyama (2009).
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which made an overhaul of GATS Annex terminology by extending the coverage to 
online services, digital products, applications and devices.8 
Licensing and localisation requirements would be inconsistent with the horizontal 
discipline unless they are justified under existing GATT and GATS general exceptions 
– including data privacy – and these exceptions are unlikely to be renegotiated. However, 
these exceptions are still subject to necessity and least trade restrictive measure rules – 
and contrary to common misconceptions, both the EU and the US have negotiated free 
movement of personal data in their FTAs, but limited to the financial sector within the 
‘ordinary course of business’.9
In short, market access for the data subject (the commercial entity) will continue to be 
governed by the Members’ GATT and GATS schedules. WTO exceptions primarily 
deal with data objects (the traded item) for their characteristics, e.g. an audio-visual 
product or service may infringe on copyrighted work, data privacy regulation, security 
interests or public order. The new horizontal discipline would simply govern the 
principles for cross-border data flow when both data subjects and objects are deemed 
WTO consistent. 
A future work programme for the WTO
The future roadmap to address digital trade barriers starts with the question of what the 
current rules can and cannot do. The existing rules provide sufficient basis to address 
some of the current disproportionate restrictions on data flows using the necessity and 
least trade restrictiveness rule. The relative few disputes to date (at least in proportion 
to the volume of trade lost) reveal a reluctance to launch disputes. Indeed, many of 
these cases may set the precedent for a case against a Member’s own practices while 
exporter interests are either relatively weak or diffuse. However, such caution grossly 
8  Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), article 15.7.
9  Korea-US FTA, Annex 13B; EU-Korea FTA, Article 7.43 where it also adds the proviso of ‘adequate safeguards’ for 
privacy.
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depreciates the merits of legal certainty and an arbitration on internet openness on 
strictly commercial terms that authoritarian governments understand and ultimately 
respect. In the end, the alternative – non-action – is far worse. 
As discussed, the majority of trade barriers and regulatory divergences cannot be 
addressed under the current set of rules. A new data flow discipline would rectify 
antiquated concepts of data and e-commerce that linger from the early days of the 
internet and the WTO. To this end, an increasing number of physical goods have become 
data- or services-dependent, or have been entirely digitalised into services – in effect, 
previously achieved market access on both goods and services are reversed unless data 
flows are reopened. This rollback is fundamentally a question of institutional relevance 
for the post-Bali WTO. One approach is to consider a path into cross-border data flows 
through the ITA – indeed, the early ITA talks of 2012 seems to have involved ideas of 
augmenting its scope to at least encompass computer and related services.10
Multilateralism is obviously subject to institutional competition from the ongoing 
negotiations on the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), the Trans-Pacific Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and other major FTAs. However, preferential agreements alone 
cannot hope to establish a functioning framework that keeps digital trade open given 
the inherent fragmented and multilateral nature of the internet. For the economies that 
impose online trade barriers, no single preferential agreement would provide sufficient 
critical mass to be an incentive against the strong commercial and political vested 
interests in favour of data barriers.
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Strengthening The Rules On State 
Enterprises
Przemyslaw Kowalski
State enterprises and international commerce
The key concern with state enterprises is that governments may provide them with 
certain financial or regulatory advantages to improve their competitive position in 
international markets, or influence them to provide such advantages to other firms. In 
either case, goods and services may end up being produced not by those who can do it 
most efficiently, but by those that receive the greatest advantage. The rationale for – and 
the benefits of – international trade may be seriously undermined.
As testified by the recent commotion on the subject of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)1 
in the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) negotiations and its inclusion as a 
negotiating issue in another potential mega trade deal – the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) – these concerns have not receded. Indeed, the 2000s 
saw dynamic growth and trade expansion of some emerging market economies with 
important enterprise-state links extending well beyond traditional state sectors such as 
energy or telecommunications. In industrialised countries, the extent of government 
intervention in the economy is deemed less significant in general, but there are 
considerable exceptions in a few economies and in a number of selected economic 
sectors (see, for example, Christiansen 2011). Governments and enterprises have also 
certainly got closer to each other on the wave of bailouts and state interventions in the 
aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis.
1 Note that ownership is neither necessary for governments to influence enterprises’ operations, nor does it inevitably 
entail such influence. But it implies certain interests, rights and obligations characteristic to an owner, and is directly 
observable.
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The WTO rules discipline some forms of discriminatory government behaviour related to 
state enterprises. Yet, they were developed when the state firms were oriented primarily 
towards domestic markets, or were concentrated in declining or special sectors and may 
be inadequate when large, internationally active state firms compete with their private 
peers for resources, ideas, intermediate inputs and consumer markets. Indeed, recent 
empirical research has revealed for example that SOEs account for as much as 10 to 
30% of the world’s largest firms’ sales, employment or value of international mergers 
and acquisitions, and that the extent of their international activity may have tripled 
or quadrupled over the last decade (Gestrin and Shima 2013, Kowalski et al. 2013, 
UNCTAD 2011). 
The more extensive rules on state enterprises that have been emerging in regional 
trade agreements (RTAs), bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and national investment 
regimes respond to some of these new realities. In many cases they build on and fill 
the gaps in the existing WTO rules by providing clearer definitions and interpretations. 
They suggest a number of initiatives the WTO could take to make its rules more adapted 
to competition in today’s global markets. Some would require not much more than 
a methodical reconsideration of interpretations of current rules and could be readily 
pursued within the regular work of the WTO. This is the case, for example, with an 
extension of the application of the GATT Article XVII on state trading enterprises 
(STEs) in order to improve transparency and to cover a wider range of discriminatory or 
anti-competitive behaviours, or with a clarification of the ‘public body’ concept in the 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCMA). Other relevant initiatives, 
such as an agreement on subsidy disciplines in services or a resurrection of negotiations 
on competition and investment, while perhaps even more pressing, are more ambitious.
Elements of a future WTO agenda on state enterprises
The current rules of the SCMA prohibit or discipline various forms of trade-distorting 
financial preferences, irrespective of whether they are granted to state or independent 
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firms. Yet, they do not cover services or investment. The exclusion of services from 
the WTO subsidy disciplines is a significant omission in the context of strong vertical 
links between goods and services sectors, the significant presence of state enterprises in 
services sectors2 and the extent of government aid that went to the sector in the aftermath 
of the 2008-2009 crisis.  The General Agreement on Trade in Services mandates the 
negotiations of disciplines on subsidies, and significant progress is reported to have 
been achieved but there was not enough momentum and political will to complete the 
negotiation (Horlick and Clarke 2010). Investment and competition issues, originally 
expected to be added to the Doha Round agenda, were dropped at the 2003 WTO 
Ministerial at the request of the LDCs and with support of other developing countries, 
including China and India. 
A significant problem with existing WTO rules on subsidies is that it can be difficult to 
detect a subsidy if, for example, the finances of state enterprises are not separated from 
the finances of the state itself, or if operations of such enterprises are not transparent. 
The WTO transparency provisions on state enterprises are limited to an obligation of 
notification of so-called STEs (GATT Article XVII). Yet, with the current interpretation 
of the Article, only a narrow subset of today’s state enterprises are considered STEs. 
While the original text of Article XVII defines an STE to be a ‘state enterprise’ or 
‘any enterprise which is granted exclusive or special rights or privileges’, the current 
‘working definition’3 of STEs puts emphasis on the latter.4 Thus, otherwise state-linked 
enterprises, which cannot be proven to have been granted exclusive or special rights or 
privileges, are not considered STEs even though their actions may be trade-distorting.
The precedence of the exclusive rights and privileges criterion is often interpreted as 
a consequence of the traditionally ownership-neutral approach of the WTO law. Yet, 
this tradition has already been sacrificed in the WTO Accession Protocols of China and 
2 See, for example, Kowalski et al. (2013) for evidence on state ownership in different economic sectors.
3 See the WTO Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII.
4 It defines STEs as “governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, which have been 
granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which 
they influence through their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports”.
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Russia, which explicitly refer to state ownership and similar concepts. This could be 
taken advantage of to simplify the interpretation of the Article XVII and return to the 
original letter by making either of the two elements – ‘exclusive rights and privileges’ 
or ‘state enterprise’ – a sufficient criterion when combined with a trade distortion.5 This 
would certainly require an effort by the WTO membership to agree on a definition of 
‘state enterprise’ and an appropriate trade distortion test. The RTA negotiations, which 
considered similar provisions, could be a useful point of reference (see, for example, 
Kowalski et al. 2013).
In next steps, to further improve transparency with respect to internationally active 
state enterprises and to strengthen the enforcement of the SCMA and other agreements, 
in the run-up to the 10th Ministerial Conference the WTO membership could consider 
adopting more extensive rules on transparency and disclosure. There the work would 
hardly have to start from scratch. The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of 
State-Owned Enterprises (OECD 2005) which list and elaborate guiding principles in 
a number of areas, including transparency and disclosure of the corporate accounting 
system of SOEs, could be a useful starting reference point for this exercise (see 
also Nakagawa 2012). The issue will, however, be to make any notification or other 
transparency exercise meaningful by making countries comply, which has not always 
been the case in the WTO so far.
Another initiative would be to reconsider the current interpretation of the relationship 
between Article XVII(a) and Article XVII:1(b),6 which implies that there is no separate 
obligation applied to STEs to operate in accordance with commercial considerations. 
As a result, STEs can act in an anti-competitive manner insofar as they do not violate 
the obligation of non-discrimination (e.g. Nakagawa 2012). Re-establishing such a 
commercial considerations obligation would be tantamount to having a competition-
5 It is important to note here that keeping the exclusive rights and privileges criterion is important as it can be usefully 
interpreted as covering the above-mentioned government-granted advantages in the form of preferential regulatory 
treatment.
6 This interpretation is currently determined by the Appellate Body Report on the Canada – Wheat case.
Strengthening The Rules On State Enterprises
173
law-type obligation on state enterprises. This is exactly the approach that has been 
taken in the 2004 US-Singapore FTA and, reportedly, in the ongoing TPP negotiations.
Finally, while state enterprises involved in goods trade are covered by the current 
WTO subsidy disciplines when they are subsidy recipients, their status as grantors of 
subsidies is less clear. The SCMA specifies that subsidies granted by ‘public bodies’ 
are subject to WTO disciplines in the same way as subsidies granted by government 
authorities. Whether or not a state enterprise is subject to these disciplines thus depends 
on whether it can be considered a ‘public body’. While existing rulings provide some 
indications in this respect (e.g. DS379 United States –Definitive Anti Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China) and while more rulings in the 
future will eventually flesh out an interpretation, the WTO could usefully undertake a 
more systematic debate in the course of its regular work on what the right answer might 
be.
Addressing some of the above issues would go a long way towards making the WTO rules 
more adapted to the realities of competition in today’s global markets. Yet, even the most 
comprehensive rules may be worth little if they are difficult to enforce. WTO dispute 
settlement procedures can have diplomatic and commercial costs and might represent 
an uncomfortable forum for enforcement when the ultimate owners or supporters of 
state firms are closely affiliated to other government bodies which act, for example, 
as regulators or principals of government procurement biddings (e.g. Potter 2001). 
This suggests that more effective enforcement might only materialise through sounder 
incentives for states and state firms to abide by market and transparency principles in 
the first place. Interesting examples to follow here are be some of the existing national 
investment policies and BITs, which on the one hand specify requirements with respect 
to behaviour of state investors, and on the other hand, offer access to investment 
markets and protection of investors’ rights (see, for example, Gestrin and Shima 2013, 
Kowalski 2013). Thus, ultimately, a real strengthening of WTO rules on state firms in 
the future may require a resurrection of multilateral negotiations on trade, competition 
and investment. Some may be anxious to see if that phoenix would indeed fly.
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The Return of Industrial Policy:  
A Constructive Role for the WTO
Vinod K. Aggarwal and Simon J. Evenett
One prominent feature of crisis-era policymaking is the resurgence of industrial 
policy. Until recently, industrial policy had been taboo in Anglo-Saxon countries such 
as the US and UK.  Yet even in these economies, since the crisis began some senior 
policymakers have made the case for state intervention to promote economic activity in 
specific sectors. Rather than debate the pros and cons of industrial policy, the primary 
goal of this chapter is to examine  the implications of its return for the future work 
programme of the WTO.
Evidence on the resort to industrial policy during the crisis era is beginning to pile 
up. Aggarwal and Evenett (2012) demonstrate how pervasive sectoral – as opposed to 
across-the-board – intervention has been in seven large trading powers. Furthermore, 
they show that there is considerable variation across those powers in the degree to which 
sectoral interventions discriminate against foreign commercial interests and between 
domestic firms. ‘Propping up losers’ as well as ‘picking winners’ are prominent features 
of crisis-era policy choice. In addition, in 2013, Aggarwal and Evenett commissioned a 
series of sectoral studies to better understand intervention across the globe in the same 
area of economic activity.1 Finally, the OECD, World Bank, and UNCTAD have taken 
an interest in examining industrial policy choice, and in some cases, promoted selective 
intervention.
1 The sectors examined include automobiles, banking, steel, biofuels, petroleum, wide-bodied aircraft and wind power. 
These papers are currently being revised and are available from the authors upon request. 
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The momentum behind industrial policy
Broadly speaking, four explanations have been advanced for the industrial policy 
measures taken during the crisis era when, at the very minimum, national economic 
growth rates fell below trend. First, intervention has been rationalised on defensive 
grounds – that is, limiting or slowing down adjustment or mitigating associated costs. 
Second, some measures have been explained in terms of improving the long-term 
growth prospects by promoting certain sectors, of which so-called green growth is 
perhaps the highest profile example. 
A third rationale is similar to the second. Here the goal appears to be to restore nationwide 
economic growth by promoting an activity – innovation is a leading example – that is 
said to benefit many sectors. Finally, fixing market failures is sometimes used as a 
rationale for industrial policy intervention. 
While these purported rationales for industrial policy existed long before the recent 
global economic crisis, for many WTO Members their salience and relevance grew 
once the crisis began. Advocates of industrial policy – long on the defensive – believe 
that the tide had turned in their favour. Moreover, the imperative of restoring economic 
growth has been used by some to brush aside objections to industrial policy. What could 
possibly go wrong?
Why the return of industrial policy matters for the WTO
Given the many ways in which firms seek to supply customers located abroad, any wave 
of government intervention that affects commercial opportunities should be of interest 
to WTO Members. The principal concern is not government intervention per se, given 
that such intervention is to be expected during systemic economic crises. Rather, the 
concern is that such intervention violates the WTO’s principle of non-discrimination, 
including in ways that go beyond what is necessary to attain the policy objectives at 
hand. 
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Even where discrimination against foreign commercial interests is necessary to attain 
an industrial policy goal, it is of interest whether governments have put in place 
deliberative processes that identify the correct government intervention and that 
withdraw that intervention when its job is done. Just because a discriminatory industrial 
policy measure is thought to have worked in one context does not provide carte blanche 
for its uncritical application elsewhere.
These are not hypothetical concerns. Resort to industrial policy in previous eras has 
involved substantial discrimination against foreign commercial interests, most notably 
when governments sought to promote so-called national champions, infant industries, 
and the like. These matters require particular attention because so many discussions 
of industrial policy are ideological, rather than evidence-based. Can the renewed 
emphasis on industrial policy be conducted in a manner that does the least violence to 
the principle of non-discrimination? 
Fortunately, the WTO has experience in dealing with forms of government intervention 
that are pervasive and that are said to be motivated by concerns other than favouritism 
towards domestic commercial interests. The science-based WTO rules on sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) regulations come to mind. While the SPS agreement may not 
be perfect, certain elements of its underlying approach to evaluating policy might be 
usefully employed in assessing industrial policy initiatives. Likewise, the approach 
that the competition law community typically uses to assess state interventions that 
compromise short-run market efficiency could serve as a model as well. 
A work programme for the WTO on industrial policy
Over the next two years, the WTO Membership could adopt a constructive work 
programme that sought to inform state decision-making on industrial policy by 
examining in depth crisis-era measures taken in key sectors of the global economy. 
This work programme could draw upon the evidence collected by other international 
organisations and by independent analysts and researchers. The goal would not be to 
Building on Bali: A Work Programme for the WTO
180
negotiate new WTO rules – although the fact-finding and deliberative phase may well 
identify matters where existing rules need amendment or where new rules might be 
desirable.
A Working Group open to all WTO Members and supported by the WTO Secretariat 
could examine crisis-era policy interventions in leading sectors of the global economy. 
The sectors considered could be chosen so as to be of interest to the broadest range 
of WTO Members, bearing in mind their different stages of development and sectoral 
specialisations. For example, given that car assembly is undertaken in many WTO 
Members and the billions of US dollars of trade in cars, a better understanding of 
intervention in that sector might of interest. WTO Members could propose sectors for 
analysis.
For a given sector, the first stage would involve establishing the factual record 
concerning several decisions by governments to intervene, bearing in mind that some 
governments may have contemplated intervention and decided against it. The fact-
finding phase would do the following:
•	 Describe the factors that triggered consideration of government intervention, 
including possibly intervention by foreign governments in the same sector.
•	 Identify the purported rationale for government intervention.
•	 Identify the options a government considered when intervening.
•	 Identify the metrics used by a government in assessing those interventions.
•	 Describe the process used by the government in assessing options for intervention, 
including use of objective evidence, consultation with trading partners, and expertise 
employed during this process.
•	 State the decision(s) taken, the form and scope of intervention chosen (where 
relevant), the financial resources employed, and the duration of the intervention.
•	 Where a measure was imposed, identify whether the intervention de facto or de 
jure discriminates between rival domestic and foreign commercial interests. Here 
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it would be important to establish whether the discrimination violates the national 
treatment principle, the most-favoured nation principle, or both.
•	 Where a measure taken was discriminatory, describe whether the design of the 
measure deliberately sought to limit the harm done to foreign commercial interests.
•	 Describe any mechanism used to review the intervention after implementation, 
the terms of that review, and whether the review was actually undertaken. When a 
review was undertaken, its findings and any steps taken in the light of the review 
would be described.
•	 Describe any evaluation of the effectiveness of the policy intervention undertaken 
by the implementing government or by a third party.
•	 Describe whether and when the policy intervention was unwound and the rationale 
given for unwinding the measure.
Separately, the Working Group should examine the factors responsible for the speed 
with which government interventions were unwound in those major sectors of the 
world economy where many measures were imposed during the turbulent decade of the 
1970s or the sharp global economic downturn of the early 1980s. During that era, the 
OECD took the leading role in promoting the unwinding of government intervention in 
certain sectors and that experience could be drawn upon.
With this evidence, the Working Group could do the following: 
•	 Identify, for each broad motivation for industrial policy, the types of government 
intervention that do not raise concerns from the perspective of non-discrimination. 
‘Safe harbours’ for industrial policy interventions could then be established, which 
if followed by a WTO member might provide reassurance to trading partners.
•	 Identify under what circumstances effective industrial policy intervention does not 
involve violating the most-favoured nation principle.
•	 Identify and articulate better practices for the processes that WTO Members 
should follow when considering industrial policy interventions, in particular those 
interventions that might harm foreign commercial interests.
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•	 Establish principles for the periodic review of industrial policy interventions, 
including the potential for the removal or amendment of the intervention being 
reviewed.
•	 Consider ways to encourage the phasing out of discriminatory industrial policy 
interventions taken in recent years or, where possible, the substitution of more 
discriminatory policy instruments with less discriminatory alternatives. 
Execution of this work programme would be part of the deliberative function of the 
WTO. Execution would encourage evidence-informed policymaking by WTO Members 
as well as the careful consideration of the necessity and form of any discrimination 
against foreign commercial interests. In so doing, this would reassure trading partners, 
potentially reduce the number of disputes between WTO Members, and provide 
government officials with good arguments when resisting self-serving attempts to jump 
on the industrial policy bandwagon.
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Export Restrictions
Marcelo Olarreaga
Export restrictions, like import restrictions, can hurt trading partners who see their 
‘access’ shrink as the price of the goods they purchase in international markets increase 
and quantities traded decline. There is, however, a strong asymmetry in the regulation 
of import and export restrictions in the WTO. While rules on import restrictions are 
numerous and well-known, those on export restrictions are essentially limited to 
Articles XI and XX of GATT, and some soft language in Article 12 of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture. There are also some ‘WTO+’ requirements imposed 
on a few recent members (China, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine) which raise more 
questions than answers (Karapinar 2012). The post-Bali agenda should aim at a more 
comprehensive agreement on export restrictions and bring part of the ‘+’ into the WTO. 
Why so little progress in the past?
The apparent lack of interest in the regulation of export restrictions by GATT and 
WTO Members can be partly explained by the fact that WTO law has been generally 
driven by the interest of exporters. It is also true that the use of export restrictions is 
less common than the use of import restrictions. However, a recent compilation of the 
WTO’s Trade Policy Reviews by the OECD suggests that half of WTO Members used 
export duties in the 2005-09 period; this was up from 40% in the early 2000s (Kim 
2010). The 2007-09 food crisis was partly responsible for the increase, as dozens of 
countries facing food shortages imposed export restrictions to try to ‘export’ their food 
shortage to other countries. The use of export restrictions is also frequent in the mineral 
and metal sectors, as illustrated by the recent disputes over China’s raw materials and 
rare earth export restrictions. The rationale behind restrictions in these sectors is often 
based on government revenue considerations (in the case of taxes, and auctioning of 
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quantitative restrictions), environmental concerns, and the promotion of downstream 
sectors, which are intensive users of these mineral and metals.1   
The current disciplines on export restrictions impose no constraints on the use of export 
taxes, except for those new Members that committed not to impose (new) export taxes 
at the moment of their accession as part of their WTO+ commitments.2 Quantitative 
restrictions are allowed by Article XI of GATT, but only if ‘temporarily applied to 
prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the 
exporting contracting party’. The definitions of ‘temporary’, ‘critical’, or ‘shortage’ are 
not given by Article XI, but some recent decisions by the WTO’s Appellate Body provide 
some guidance. Article XX also provides, in several of its paragraphs, exceptions for 
the use of export restrictions if they are taken within an intergovernmental commodity 
agreement (paragraph h), or the restricted product is used for domestic processing 
(paragraph i). Article 12 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture requires 
Members to consider the impact of export restrictions on other Member’s food security, 
and to give notice in advance and consult with other members having a substantial 
interest as an importer. But the above disciplines have not been followed by the dozens 
of countries that imposed export restrictions for food security purposes during the 
food crisis, suggesting that these rules do not have much of a bite. The use of export 
restrictions during food shortages can make things worse. While there is not a strong 
consensus in the literature, some observers consider than up to 40% of the increase in 
prices during the 2007-09 food crisis was due to policy measures adopted by countries 
trying to reduce prices at home. 
There have been several proposals to improve disciplines on export restrictions during 
the Doha Round. Japan, a net food importer, proposes an approach similar to that 
applied during the Uruguay Round for agricultural import restrictions. First, transform 
1 Political reasons may also play a role, and there is evidence of countries using them to squeeze rents out of opposition 
supporters.
2 Some preferential trade agreements also forbid the use of export duties (Article 314 of NAFTA). Depending on the 
degree of integration of national markets, commitments taken at the bilateral level could de facto apply at the multilateral 
level through market arbitrage.
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all quantitative restrictions into export taxes, and then bind all export taxes, with a quota 
allowed to be exported duty free. The Swiss proposal goes one step further and requires 
the elimination of all export restrictions on agricultural products, with some differential 
treatment provided to LDCs. Exporters of agricultural products usually do not go as 
far. The Cairns Group agrees with the need for improved disciplines, but interestingly 
links these improved disciplines to tariff escalation. The US proposal also aims at a 
strengthening of the rules targeting a more reliable food supply, but also puts forward 
a prohibition of their use for competitive advantage or supply management, aimed at 
restrictions on industrial raw materials. 
Where to go after Bali? Towards a work programme on 
export restrictions
There is a need to bring rules on export restrictions within the WTO umbrella. WTO 
Members could start down this road in a work programme that builds up to the next one 
or two Ministerial Conferences. Further consideration – which might in turn stimulate 
further proposals – should be given to the suggestions made hitherto. The Japanese 
proposal provides a clear symmetry between import and export restrictions that should 
appeal to students of Abba Lerner. Its weakness lies in the fact that most of the countries 
imposing export restrictions today are developing countries, which are likely to require 
differential treatment. Giving in to demands for differential treatment leads to a two-
speed WTO system, which is probably dangerous for the institutional stability in the 
long run and also takes away the gains from solving time-inconsistency problems for 
WTO Members that face credibility problems at home. 
An interesting idea that could help bring some developing countries to the negotiating 
table is to link tighter rules on export restriction to reductions in import tariff escalation, 
as suggested in the Cairns Group proposal. Indeed, tariff escalation by importers leads 
to relatively lower international prices on raw materials, whereas export restrictions on 
raw materials have the opposite effect. An agreement limiting tariff escalation would 
be embraced by resource-rich developing countries, which often feel trapped in the 
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export of food and raw materials due to tariff escalation in the rest of the world. An 
agreement limiting export restrictions would be embraced by importers of food and raw 
materials. Linking the two provides an opportunity to generate gains for both importers 
and exporters, while reducing policy-driven uncertainty in international markets. 
Beyond the economic and political gains that an agreement would bring for importers 
and exporters of food and raw materials, the image of the WTO as an institution with 
fair and balanced rules is at stake. The WTO+ disciplines on export taxes that some 
WTO Members had to take in order to accede seem utterly unfair when existing WTO 
Members can impose prohibitive export taxes without constraints. An agreement would 
correct these imbalances.
Because food security is often linked to export restrictions, it is crucial than any 
agreement allows for exceptions in the presence of food shortages. This would require 
a clear definition of what represents a food shortage. This can be undertaken within the 
WTO or could be delegated to other UN agencies that are specialised in food shortages 
(Howse and Josling 2012). This would obviously require looking not at the situation 
of a country in isolation, but also at food shortages in trading partners which may be 
affected by the measure as requested by Article 12 of the Uruguay Round Agreement 
on Agriculture. 
Looking further, there is probably a second important exception that rules on export 
restrictions should consider. It is clear that the WTO cannot keep avoiding global 
environmental questions. The issue of border adjustment and carbon taxes is too 
important to be settled by decisions by the dispute settlement body. WTO Members 
have to tackle these questions head on, and border adjustments can in principle be 
applied in the importing or exporting country. Border adjustments by exporters may 
help reconcile opposing views on border adjustment measures. More importantly, it is 
crucial in all areas to find the right exchange of concessions to encourage developing 
countries to sit at the negotiating table rather than hide behind requests for special and 
differential treatment.
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Technology Transfer for Sustainable 
Development
Keith E. Maskus
The point of departure
In recent years, policy issues surrounding the international transfer of technology (ITT) 
to developing countries has taken on increasing importance on the global stage.  One 
reason is the evident failure of TRIPS Article 66.2, which sets out an obligation for 
governments in developed countries to provide mechanisms supporting ITT to the least 
developed countries, to generate such flows.  This failure can be attributed to many 
factors, most readily the simple fact that governments cannot mandate or effectively 
subsidise private investments in places where firms do not want to invest.  Nevertheless, 
the weak response of private technology flows to poor countries in the wake of TRIPS, 
which implicitly should support them in ways far beyond Article 66.2, is a source of 
considerable disappointment in the agreement to authorities in the developing world.  
A second reason is the widespread perception that access to technology, and its effective 
adaptation and implementation into local production, are critical processes supporting 
economic transformation and growth.  This perception is growing in response to the 
emergence of global innovation and research networks, which are important channels 
of cross-border information.  Governments in many countries wish to see their firms 
and research workers become more connected with these processes.  
Finally, access to technology is among the best means available for poor countries to 
address key areas of public concern, such as agricultural security, energy conservation 
and mitigation of climate change.  Such issues are so important on a global scale that the 
United Nations, along with other international organisations, is currently deliberating 
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whether to make improved access to science and technology, and the promotion of local 
innovation, a fully articulated Sustainable Development Goal for 2015.  
As an institution, the WTO is properly focused on liberalising border measures and 
improving clearly trade-related regulations such as intellectual property rights in 
order to enhance the efficiency of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI).  In this 
context, it is already deeply involved in policy issues that directly and indirectly affect 
ITT.  Trade liberalisation importantly channels technology flows.  A clear example 
is the International Technology Agreement (ITA), which has successfully cut import 
restraints on a range of products in the information and communication sector. Within 
the WTO agreements, elements of ITT clearly are envisioned and protected by TRIPS, 
TBT, SPS, TRIMS, and the GATS, along with the ITA.  Also relevant are the subsidies 
agreement (SCM) and the plurilateral agreement on procurement, since both address 
policies that could affect investments in new or adapted technologies.
Thus, there is certainly scope for the WTO to revisit some of its rules and consider 
extending certain agreements in a way that can expand effective ITT to facilitate both 
economic benefits and solutions for public needs in developing economies.  Doing 
so would permit the institution to engage collaboratively with other international 
organisations and elements of civil society that are increasingly focused on this area as 
a solution to public-goods problems.  The balance of this chapter sets out some areas in 
which fruitful study and negotiations could take place within the WTO.
What could be accomplished within a two-year time 
horizon?
Between now and the 2015 ministerial there are at least two areas in which further 
WTO deliberations could deliver real benefits in ITT.  
Technology Transfer for Sustainable Development
191
Complete the expanded International Technology Agreement
Negotiations to increase the scope of the ITA, in terms of both country membership 
and, crucially, product coverage, are tantalisingly close to completion.  A unique 
agreement, the original ITA cut tariffs to zero on an important range of earlier-generation 
information technology products and attracted growing membership over time. 
Empirical analysis suggests it had a substantial trade-creating effect, with relatively 
more gains in developing countries because of the larger tariff cuts they implemented 
(Mann and Liu 2009).  
Access to the newest ICT products on reasonable terms is one of the most effective means 
of linking individuals and enterprises to key global technologies.  These products enable 
internet connections, cheaper communication and better educational opportunities.  In 
this context, the original ITA should be counted a success for facilitating technology 
transfer.
It remains anomalous that the product list in the 1996 agreement has yet to be expanded 
to cover many of the wide range of digital consumer products, equipment and inputs 
that have evolved since that time.  Cutting tariffs on these newer goods should generate 
similar gains, while helping to facilitate connections of enterprises and research 
organisations in developing countries to information sources elsewhere.  Thus, a 
renewed push to move the new ITA past its finish line is both sensible and well within 
range of short-term possibility. 
Trade in research services
One of the most important trends in ITT is the emergence of global innovation and 
research networks.  These involve cross-border horizontal or vertical sharing of research 
tasks, whether within multinational firms or, increasingly, across multiple institutions 
including universities, foundations and private enterprises (Maskus and Saggi 2013). 
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These networks offer considerable promise for increasing the international circulation 
of technological information.
The GATS does not meaningfully address service and research regulations that could 
inefficiently restrict trade and international investments in research networks.  Yet its 
approach could be applied to liberalise disparate R&D processes, subject to appropriate 
safety and security needs.  For example, research grants often restrict associated 
management services or purchases of equipment to domestic suppliers.  On the output 
side, governments may have requirements that universities or similar institutions license 
their inventions to domestic firms on a favourable or even exclusive basis (Barton and 
Maskus 2006).  Similarly, rules regarding the location of clinical trials can diminish 
prospects for efficient investments in locations where such trials may be cheaper or 
better focused on local needs.  
Thus, it could be beneficial to bring research services into GATS negotiations for those 
countries willing to liberalise the sector in particular ways.  R&D services, ranging 
from equipment purchases and testing protocols to grant management and accounting 
and beyond, are often heavily regulated in favour of domestic providers.  Similarly, 
grants may raise barriers to using research workers and students in other countries. 
Commitments to open such services to competition, whether through GATS or perhaps 
the emerging Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), could offer efficiency gains and 
improve global network linkages.
What could be accomplished within a four-year time 
horizon?
While the steps just mentioned would deliver real gains in ITT, ultimately the largest 
net gains could come from considerably expanding the scope of temporary migration of 
technically and entrepreneurially skilled workers through the GATS.
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Expanding GATS to encourage temporary mobility of skilled workers
The essential idea is to increase ‘brain circulation’, in part to avoid perceived drawbacks 
of ‘brain drain’ in depriving developing countries of talent.  Evidence shows that a 
significant channel of ITT is the temporary – though not brief – relocation of skilled 
personnel from countries where production technologies and R&D are lagging to where 
those skills can be fully utilised.  The reverse flows contribute to technology transfer as 
well.  The development of global research and innovation networks has been facilitated 
by the unimpeded flow of such personnel among R&D and production facilities for 
temporary stays.  Similar comments would apply to research professionals, faculty, 
and graduate students moving between universities and public research labs and also 
migrating to spend time in private R&D facilities.
Compared to the current world of tightly limited visas and short stays, a more efficient 
system would link skilled workers together in an ‘innovation zone’ in which countries 
would agree to permit longer-term work visas, perhaps for ten years, that could be 
valid in all participant countries.  The concept would be to facilitate free circulation of 
technical and entrepreneurial talent among the member nations, permitting them to be 
deployed freely within the associated innovation networks.  
Thus, WTO Members could move towards (at least) a plurilateral agreement for 
significantly liberalised skilled-labour flows under the framework of an innovation 
zone work visa.  The agreement would need to consider how the certification of skills 
acquired in different professions and in different countries would be recognised by the 
members, though a basic preference for mutual recognition would seem most efficient. 
Consistent with GATS principles, countries could reserve certain sensitive professions 
or perhaps enact safeguards, for example to ensure that security-sensitive positions in 
public agencies or research labs are ineligible.   
Building on Bali: A Work Programme for the WTO
194
References
Barton, J H and K E Maskus (2006), “Economic Perspectives on a Multilateral 
Agreement on Open Access to Basic Science and Technology”, in S J Evenett and B M 
Hoekman (eds), Economic Development and Multilateral Trade Cooperation, London: 
Palgrave MacMillan.
Mann, C L and X Liu (200), “The Information Technology Agreement: Sui Generis or 
Model Stepping Stone?”, in R Baldwin and B Low (eds), Multilateralizing Regionalism, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
Maskus, K E and K Saggi (2013), Global Innovation Networks and Their Implications 
for the Multilateral Trading System, Geneva: International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development.
About the author
Keith E. Maskus is an Arts and Sciences Professor of Distinction and Professor of 
Economics at the University of Colorado, Boulder, USA. He was Associate Dean for 
Social Sciences at CU Boulder from 2007-2013. He has been a Lead Economist in the 
Development Research Group at the World Bank. He is also a Research Fellow at the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, a Fellow at the Kiel Institute for World 
Economics, and an Adjunct Professor at the University of Adelaide. He has been a 
visiting professor at the University of Adelaide and the University of Bocconi, and 
a visiting scholar at the CES-Ifo Institute at the University of Munich and the China 
Center for Economic Research at Peking University. He serves also as a consultant for 
the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization. Maskus recently chaired a panel of the National Academy of Sciences on 
intellectual property management in standards-setting organisations. 
Maskus received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Michigan in 1981 and 
has written extensively about various aspects of international trade. His current research 
Technology Transfer for Sustainable Development
195
focuses on the international economic aspects of protecting intellectual property rights. 
He is the author of Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy, published by 
the Institute for International Economics, and co-editor of International Public Goods 
and the Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, 
published by Cambridge University Press. He recently wrote a piece analyzing the need 
for reforms in U.S. patent policy, published by the Council on Foreign Relations. A new 
volume, Private Rights and Public Problems: The Global Economics of Intellectual 
Property in the 21st Century, was published in 2012 by the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics.

197
Mode 4: The Temporary Movement 
of Workers to Provide Services
L Alan Winters
Mode 4 was the great hope of many developing countries for the Uruguay Round: 
developing countries are abundant in labour and developed countries have high wage 
levels, and so the former hoped to be able to provide services to the latter much more 
cheaply than could the locals. These hopes have come basically to nothing, with little 
agreed in the Uruguay Round and nothing since. Indeed, even the offers in the Doha 
Round have been slight and conditional. 
But this does not mean that temporary mobility has failed – far from it, in fact. For 
example, qualified medical personnel are highly mobile internationally and regional 
trading arrangements frequently have clauses guaranteeing the mobility of key 
personnel. At the opposite end of the scale, the US responded to the Haitian earthquake 
in 2010, not only with aid, but by adding Haiti to the list of countries that could 
receive H-2 temporary migration visas1. And previously New Zealand had pioneered 
its Recognised Seasonal Employers Scheme (RSE), which welcomes workers from 
poor Pacific Islands for the agricultural season. Fully operational since 2008, it allows 
recognised agricultural employers to recruit workers from 11 Pacific Islands for a 
season’s work subject to the workers meeting certain (mild) criteria and the employers 
providing reasonable working and living conditions. Successful workers can return in 
subsequent seasons. A formal evaluation of the RSE in Tonga and Vanuatu found that 
‘per capita incomes of households participating in the RSE had increased by over 30% 
relative to the comparison groups in both countries… Subjective economic welfare is 
estimated to have increased by almost half a standard deviation in both countries… 
1  See http://www.cgdev.org/blog/haitian-officials-welcome-h-2-visa-program---michael-clemens
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School attendance rates increased by 20 percentage points for 16 to 18 year olds in 
Tonga… Overall these results show that the seasonal worker programme has been a 
powerful development intervention for the participating households’ (Gibson and 
McKenzie 2011). In Vanuatu over 1% of the entire population travel under the RSE 
each year.
The point about these schemes is that, for a series of reasons, they proceed without 
any input from the WTO’s GATS. First, the GATS seeks binding agreements and lacks 
a safeguards clause. Given that labour demand fluctuates and that governments often 
see overseas labour as the margin of adjustment, the politics of ‘foreigners taking our 
jobs’ are poisonous, and few governments are willing to contemplate tying their hands 
in this way.2 Second, the MFN clause presents major challenges. The movement of 
people is far more sensitive than that of goods: governments see the ability to control 
who is present within their borders as a defining aspect of sovereignty. Thus even when, 
for example, governments recognise the need for temporary inflows of labour, they 
are unwilling to extend invitations worldwide; all of the examples noted above are 
constrained geographically.
Relatedly, the movement of people is complex, for example, in terms of recognising 
qualifications, managing social security, ensuring the absence of criminal intent and 
obtaining assurances that workers can return home without hindrance once they have 
served their contracts abroad. Bilaterally, host and home countries can cooperate on 
these details, often with significant burdens being placed on the latter. An MFN clause, 
on the other hand, vitiates them because it, prima facie, prevents access from being 
conditional on such agreements and offers developing country exporters of labour no 
scope to make commitments to such cooperation. 
2 Even the EU is starting to feel stresses in this direction as the UK, formerly the chief champion of enlargement of the EU, 
is now proposing limits on the free movement of labour within the EU,  see for example,  http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/uk/politics/david-cameron-to-lobby-for-support-on-migration-restrictions-at-eu-summit-in-lithuania-8967018.
html. 
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Finally, a major difficulty throughout the GATS is that services trade liberalisation 
is not just about trade. In many sectors, liberalisation concerns the relaxation or re-
figuring of domestic regulations, and domestic regulators have a completely different 
perspective from trade negotiators. Getting the two groups into the same room, let 
alone onto the same page, is a major challenge. Mode 4 contends with possibly the 
most entrenched of all regulators – those managing access to the country via the visa 
system. Supported by other interests such as labour, policing and national security, the 
visa authorities see themselves as central to sovereignty and do not readily surrender 
their influence to mere trade negotiators. Neither do they generally like sector-specific 
visa regulations, although as developed countries become keener on quality-selective 
immigration policies and on restricting immigration to ‘shortage-trades’, this barrier is 
being eroded.
This analysis leads me to conclude that within the Doha Round, the chances of MFN 
Mode 4 concessions for less-skilled mobility of the sort that would be of most use 
to developing countries are vanishingly small. However, there may be scope for 
agreements or concessions on ‘key’ workers’ mobility. Multinational companies are 
strong advocates for such mobility (for good reason), which will be sufficient for most 
developed country negotiators to support it, and the elites in developing countries are 
often keen, not least because they and their families are potentially direct beneficiaries. 
If there is to be any progress on less-skilled workers it will have to be bilateral, but 
even then I would not expect to see it brought under the GATS. Regional trading 
arrangements may include some such mobility and thus insert it into the WTO’s ambit 
via Article 24 deliberations, but it is much more likely that they will sign completely 
separate migration agreements. The narrative that Mode 4 concerned only international 
trade and was quite separate from migration (of which I was guilty with others) was a 
fiction, and it seems to me that we now need to accept this. Mode 4 will never advance 
unless we see it as part of the migration policy domain. That means that the migration 
authorities will have to have at least equal status to the trade authorities before we will 
get progress. 
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So what can be done in the WTO over the next two and four years? The truth is not 
very much. One plausible possibility is to try to negotiate an agreement in which Mode 
4 concessions are requested and offered but which all parties accept can be overruled 
by any party by reference to its visa policy. That is, the GATS defines the structure 
and scope of an agreement but essentially allows countries to move any bilateral flow 
in and out of it with no reference to the GATS and with no WTO-based sanction. The 
trade-off between key workers and less-skilled access might allow sufficient countries 
to coalesce around such an agreement. This would preserve multilateralism in principle 
and impose a degree of discipline on agreements in terms of structure and terms (e.g. 
over the treatment of workers or definitions of temporary work), and thus it might make 
the resultant noodle bowl a little easier to comprehend and negotiate. However, the 
inability to guarantee that such an agreement would be operative for any given bilateral 
flow would obviously be a disincentive to invest heavily in negotiating it or offering 
concessions against it. 
A feasible and useful precursor to this agenda would be for the Secretariat to collect data 
on the migration agreements that have been signed in the last decade to identify their 
scope and definitions and the extent of their discrimination between source countries. 
This would provide a step towards developing a common vocabulary with which to 
negotiate and an inventory from which to start.
A much more ambitious agenda would be to develop the agreement in principle as 
above, but to attempt to negotiate the terms on which countries could use visa policy to 
override a Mode 4 agreement. One could, for example, allow a system whereby specific 
flows could be bound under the GATS – i.e. voluntarily remove their vulnerability to 
override. To go further, however, seems very difficult; it would essentially open visa 
policy up to international scrutiny, which is difficult at any time but seems basically 
impossible currently, given how difficult any international negotiation is at present. 
An alternative one sometimes hears would be to try to negotiate a framework agreement 
which governed bilateral arrangements in Mode 4, recognising their lack of MFN (i.e. 
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their discriminatory nature) but nonetheless offering to make them enforceable through 
WTO processes. This would appear to some to be a useful and, at a stretch, feasible 
contribution that the WTO could make. It would, however, bring bilateralism right into 
the heart of the WTO, and once the principle had been conceded for Mode 4 how long 
could it be resisted for other trade? Thus while it may preserve the WTO’s credibility as 
an organisation, it would undermine its credibility as an institution of multilateralism. 
At least for some of us, this would be a poor bargain. I would rather preserve the WTO’s 
weak, but not yet deceased, commitment to multilateralism than undermine it for the 
sake of a little more activity and supposed ‘relevance’. 
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